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Abstract 
This thesis investigates effects of asset securitization on originators from three 
aspects, effects on cost of capital, effects on risks, and effects on share price. A 
sample containing 542 issues by 133 companies on UK securitization market 
covering a 13 year period (1993 - 2005) is obtained from Fitch rating and ABS 
reports. Accounting and financial data of companies are collected from Datastream. 
T -test, regression analysis and event study are adopted by empirical studies. 
In the first test, asset securitization is found to lower overall cost of capital through 
diversification and mitigating level of information asymmetry between investors and 
originators. Companies suffering high leverage level could use asset securitization to 
reduce information costs. But smaller companies or companies with less growth 
opportunities have to be cautious since they are affected more significantly by asset 
securitization. 
In the second test, asset securitization is proved to hedge prepayment and interest rate 
risks effectively, also reduce leverage level and bad debt provision significantly. It 
offers originators the opportunities to reallocate risks, and only take risks they can 
handle. 
Thirdly, asset securitization brings positive wealth effects for originators. Investors 
pay more attention on issue-specific characteristics than firm-specific characteristics. 
Further, wealth effects of asset securitization are industry specific. Banks and retailers 
perform well, while automobile industry experiences losses. Moreover, stronger firms 
with superior financial slack experience more gains from securitization. Finally, firms 
II 
that lack growth opportunities enjoy gains from asset securitization due to adverse 
selection under information asymmetry. 
This study is a systematic empirical study on effects of asset securitization on 
originators. It tests the direct relationships between asset securitization and cost of 
capital, also, between asset securitization and overall risks. Further, it focuses on 
individual transaction and tries to identify characteristics influence the results. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Over last two decades, asset securitization has represented a substantial and 
established part of financial world. It began as a result of the housing credit market 
collapse during the Great Depression in 1930's in United States, which was created to 
replace the traditional financial intermediaries by linking borrowers directly to capital 
market (Kendall and Fishman, 1996). Since then, global securitization market has 
grown rapidly, and has hit $20,000 billion in volume by 2005 (ESF Data Report 2006). 
Although residential mortgages have dominated the market in sheer volume, more and 
more types of financial assets are included in the market, such as auto, manufactured 
housing, student loans and credit cards. 
Asset securitization is a process of converting a pool of illiquid, relatively 
homogeneous receivables and other financial assets into a tradable security that can be 
placed and traded in the capital markets (Norton, Spellman and Dupler, 1995). The 
technique is characterized by the bankruptcy remote structure of SPV (special purpose 
vehicle), and the isolation of financial assets from business (Jobst, 2003 and 2005). 
The process of isolating the financing of a specific business operation from a larger 
business by letting the specific part support itself through internally generated cash 
flow is a very old concept. As early as in the 1400s, project financing had made its 
debut (Norton, Spellman and Dupler, 1995). Corporations that have financed projects 
independent of other business operations have not only reduced their own risk against 
0 
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the venture, but have promoted efficiency by accessing a widely group of investors 
with cheaper sources of funds. As a much more recent innovation, asset 
securitization offers the same advantages, but is distinguishable both in purpose and in 
method. While project financing is to isolates an entire operating business, 
securitization is only concerned with isolation of specific assets. While in the process 
of project financing, the purchaser of the receivables is usually obligated to collect the 
receivables, in securitization, the originator generally continues to service the 
receivables and collect them when they are due. Finally, the central accounting issue 
in asset securitization is to account securitization as sales or financings (Eugene, 1992, 
and Perry, 1993). Under the predominant-characteristics paradigm, securitized assets 
remain on the originator's balance sheet and the securities issued are recognized as 
liabilities, accordingly, risks associated with the assets are not transferred. Under the 
financial-components paradigm, securitization is treated as sales. Securitized assets 
are removed from balance sheet and replaced with cash. The financial ratios are likely 
to be improved. 
Securitization has been used as a tool to achieve a variety of goals depending on the 
needs of users, for instance, to manage the balance sheet, to release immediate cash 
flow, or to be taken as an investment decision. This study focuses on how it works as 
a funding and risk management tool. From this aspect, asset securitization offers a 
number of benefits: reduction of cost of funds (e. g. Morrissey, 1992, Bryan, 1988a 
and Benston, 1992), achievement of reliable and constant funding source (e. g. Kendall, 
1996 and Twinn, 1994), reduction of credit exposure (Twinn, 1994), achievement of 
liquidity enhancement (e. g. Finnerty, 1988, and Bartlett, 1989), diversification (e. g. 
Hess and Smith, 1988, and Zweig, 1989)and favourable regulatory/accounting 
treatment (e. g., Pavel and Phillips, 1987, Hull, 1989, and Twinn, 1994). 
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The originator of asset securitization, who initiates the process, plays vital role in the 
process. At the same time, it enjoys the benefits offered by asset securitization. The 
effects of asset securitization on originators, from corporate finance point of view, 
focus on influences on cost of capital; from a risk management point of view, focus 
on the changes of risks over securitization; and, the potential benefits offered by asset 
securitization suggest positive wealth effects to originators. Accordingly, effects of 
asset securitization on originators are investigated from three aspects, effects on cost 
of capital, effects on risks, and effects on share price, through empirical studies using 
a sample containing 542 issues on UK securitization market over the period January 
1993 to December 2005. 
Firstly, previous literature suggests asset securitization reduces cost of capital due to: 
(1) it offers competitive rate of funding (Morrissey, 1992); (2) it reduces "information 
costs" under information asymmetry (Frankel, 1991); (3) it mitigates the regulatory 
capital charge (Hill, 1997). In contrast, Benston (1992) contended that securitization 
could not lower capital cost due to irrelevance between capital structure and cost of 
capital, suggested by MM model (Modigliani and Mille) (1958 and 1963). 
Secondly, asset securitization affects risks suffered by originators not only directly 
through launching the issue, but also by affecting the lending decision (e. g. Murray, 
2001, and Jobst, 2003). As risk management tool, asset securitization reduces credit 
risk and interest rate risk (Ong, 2000), and offers better estimation and control of risk 
(Benston, 1992). However, asset securitization may also create new problems for 
originators, for instance, irrational lending and reduction of the average quality of 
assets on book (Bradt, 1991, Kravit, 1997, and Jobst, 2005). 
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Thirdly, Lockwood, Rutherford and Herrera (1996) suggest potential benefits offered 
by asset securitization suggest positive wealth effects to originators, including 
lowering cost financing (Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988), reducing risks (Zweig, 1989); 
and reducing reserve and capital requirement (Donahoo and Shaffer, 1991). 
However, there are also debates on whether those benefits actually work for 
originators in real life (Benston, 1992, and Hill, 1997). Therefore, in academic field, 
whether asset securitization affects share price is still problematic. It is important to 
find the answer for originators because -wealth effects of asset securitization reflect 
investors' attitude to this financial innovation, which changes the market value of the 
issuing company. Any potential issuer has to take the factor into account when it 
makes the decision to securitize or not. 
1.2 The Aims of the Study 
The objective of this study is to investigate the effects of asset securitization on 
originators, including effects on originators' cost of capital, effects on originators' 
risks, and effects on originators' share price. By examining those problems, it is 
expected to find motivations of such technique, which are important to answer a 
fundamental problem, "why securitize? " 
Although literature on asset securitization is well established, the empirical studies are 
not sufficient. Moreover, it appears that researchers have yet to go inside firms and 
study forces driving securitization transactions by obtaining perceptions of relevant 
staff. It has not been identified whether certain factors, both exogenous and 
endogenous to firms, might discriminate between firms that securitize and those that 
do not. Therefore, this study is to examine the effects of asset securitization on 
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originators through empirical study, identifying firm specific and issue specific 
characteristics influence the consequences of adoption of asset securitization. 
As the second largest securitization market in the world, the United Kingdom pioneers 
European securitization market. There are distinct collateral characteristics, special 
regulatory and accounting treatments, as well as certain unique structural features 
present in the UK market. However, there is seriously lack of empirical studies 
focusing on the specific market. This study, thus, is going to give a primary look at the 
market. 
The most important feature of this thesis is that the study focuses solely on the direct 
relationships between asset securitization and the three aspects, cost of capital, overall 
risks and share prices. This is critical since users with different goals should 
understand how effective this tool could meet their targets and what might be the price 
to pay, while most studies could not provide the full answer. Secondly, unlike 
previous studies mostly target on the changes of market, this test goes inside firm who 
securitize and try to identify characteristics influence the results. Finally, whereas 
most studies investigate US market this study is on UK market. 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of an overview of asset securitization literature, description of 
research design and methodology, and three empirical studies. Each empirical study 
contains reviewing of previous literature, methodology, findings and conclusions. 
Chapter 1 states the aims and contributions of the study as well as describes the 
structure of the study. 
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Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical and empirical literature on asset securitization. 
Starting from definition and structure of asset securitization, advantages and 
disadvantages suggested by previous researches are viewed, followed by discussion of 
regulatory and accounting issues. The UK securitization market is described in the 
end. 
Chapter 3 discusses data collection, methodology and research design in addition to 
the statistical software that will be used in this thesis. 
Chapter 4 to 6 contain empirical studies investigating effects of asset securitization on 
originators, including effects on cost of capital, effects on risks, and effects on share 
price. 
Finally, a summary and the conclusions are provided in chapter 7. The chapter 
summarizes the results from preceding chapters, and discusses the findings. In 
addition, the contributions to the existing literature, limitations of this study and 
extension for further research are described. 
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Chapter 2 
An Overview of Asset Securitization 
2.1. Introduction 
Over last two decades, asset securitization market has been emerged as an active and 
well developed market. Following the United States of America who is still far in 
front of the others, the rapid progresses made by European countries and some Asia 
countries in securitization market are rather impressive. As a well known funding and 
risk management tool, asset securitization has played an important role in modern 
financial world. 
An introduction to asset securitization is given in this chapter, including definition and 
structure, advantages and disadvantages, and regulatory and accounting treatments. 
Briefly, securitization is distinguished by isolating assets securitized from the business. 
This characteristic makes securitization become more attractive in capital market, 
since investors could make the decision based on the quality of specific asset rather 
than financial circumstances of whole business. The asset that can be securitized have 
to: (1) support itself through internally generated cash flow; (2) the security available 
to collateralize the cash flows is valuable; (3) the asset has to have credit support; (4) 
the asset has to be relatively homogeneous. 
Previous literature suggests that advantages of asset securitization are: reduction of 
cost of funds, achievement of reliable and constant funding source, reduction of credit 
exposure, achievement of liquidity enhancement, diversification and favorable 
9 
regulatory/accounting treatment. The disadvantages are relative to risks inherent in 
securitization transaction and changes of capital structure caused by securitization. 
From regulatory perspective, several countries have set up their own framework of 
securitization. The 1988 Basel Accord (Basel I) encouraged banking innovations such 
as asset securitization to shroud the credit risk embedded in banking books by 
allowing for regulatory capital arbitrage. While Basel II tends to remove regulatory 
incentives for securitization by placing strong penalties on the transactions not 
qualifying for new criteria of securitization framework (Odenbach, 2002). From 
accounting point of view, the central issue in asset securitization is to account 
securitization as sales or financings (Eugene, 1992, and Perry, 1993). 
As the second largest securitization market in the world, United Kingdom pioneers 
European securitization market. -There are distinct collateral characteristics, special 
regulatory and accounting treatments, as well as certain unique structural features 
present in the UK market. 
Structuring of the chapter is as follows. The second section describes definition and 
structure of asset securitization, expressing the basic mechanism of the technique. The 
third section analyzes advantages and disadvantages of securitization, explaining 
incentives to securitize, also the possible problems. Regulatory and accounting issues 
are discussed in section four. Finally, the UK securitization market is reviewed, 
followed by summary of previous empirical studies on effects of asset securitization 
in section five. 
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2.2. Definition and Structure of Asset Securitization 
During the pre-deregulation, cartel era of 1933-1980, banks and other portfolio 
lenders operated with very high costs and highly structured ways of doing business. 
Securitization is created as a substitution of more efficient public capital markets of 
less efficient, higher cost, financial intermediaries in the funding of debt instruments 
(Kendall and Fishman, 1996). In 1980s, with the housing market booming, 
securitization market grew rapidly mainly U. S. based, and mortgage loan was the first 
and most popular type of financial asset to be securitized. The first MBS 
(mortgage-backed securities) were issued by the Government National Mortgage 
Association (GNMA) in the mid 1970s. And ABS (asset-backed securities) were 
introduced by First Boston (bank) in 1985, and made its debut in the United Kingdom 
in 1987, where is the origination of ABS in Europe. 
Norton, Spellman and Dupler (1995) define asset securitization as the process of 
converting a pool of illiquid, relatively homogeneous receivables and other financial 
assets into a tradable security that can be placed and traded in the capital markets. The 
definition indicates assets pooled together have to be homogeneous, further, 
securitization is a process of converting illiquid assets into tradable ones. The 
definition given by Kendall and Fishman (1996) is very similar except mentioning of 
credit enhancement involved in the process, which is as follow: 
"securitization as a process of packaging individual loans and other debt instruments, 
converting the package into a security or securities, and enhancing their credit status 
or rating to further their sales to third-party investors" (Page 1-2). 
Nowadays, more and more types of assets (mortgage debts, leases, loans, credit card 
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balances etc... ) access securitization market. Asset securitization is widely accepted as 
funding and risk management tool. Prior to the advent of securitization, receivable 
financing was primarily provided by bank lending. Comparatively, securitization has 
proven to be a more efficient funding source by allowing originators to access the 
capital directly with securities which are liquid and tradable. Corporations that 
securitize assets could transfer part of the risks to a wider group of investors, and the 
same time, better value and control their overall risks. It is then described as an 
arrangement for raising funds through the issuance of marketable securities backed by 
predictable future cash flows from revenue producing assets (Sing, Ong, Fan and 
Sirmans, 2004). 
Thus securitization is a process of converting. The target of this process is to transfer 
the illiquid assets which are not readily marketable into liquid and tradable 
asset-backed securities that are sold in the securities market. Secondly, securitization 
is concerned only with the isolation of financial assets, not the entire business. This 
characteristic makes securitization become more attractive in capital market, since 
investors could make the decision based on the quality of specific asset rather than 
financial circumstances of whole business. The last but not least, not all assets can be 
securitized, they have a number of characteristics: (1) the asset must support itself 
through internally generated cash flow; (2) the security available to collateralize the 
cash flows is valuable, then this security can be realized by the SPV; (3) the asset 
either has a distributed risk characteristic or is backed by a suitably-rated credit 
support; (4) the asset has to be relatively homogeneous. 
To initiate a securitization, an originator must first create a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) in the parlance of securitization. The SPV is legally separate from the 
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company, or the holder of the assets. Typically a company sells its assets to the SPV. 
The payment streams generated by the assets can then be repackaged to back an issue 
of bonds. Or, the SPV can transfer the assets to a trust, which becomes the nominal 
issuer. In both cases, the securities are exchanged with an underwriter for cash. The 
underwriter then sells the securities to investors. Unlike other bonds, securities 
backed by mortgages usually pay both interest and a portion of the investor's 
principal on a monthly basis. The process of structuring an asset-backed security is 
depicted graphically as Figure 2.1 (Kendall, 1996). 
Figure 2.1 Basic structure of asset-backed securities 
(Source: Leon T Kendall and Michael J. Fishman, A Primer on Securili_alion, MIT Press, Cumhridge, 
Massachusetts, 1996, pp. 3) 
There are six key participants in the process of securitization based on Figure 1. The 
loan originator assures that the borrower meets his or her obligations and that the 
rights of investors in the collateral are protected throughout the life of the contract. 
Alter asset sale, usually the assets continue to be serviced by the originator, and 
13 
Investors 
indeed most borrowers are unaware that their loans have been securitized. The trust is 
a special purpose vehicle (SPV) created solely to purchase the loans and issue 
asset-backed securities backed on that collateral, which normally with good ratings 
from a national credit-rating agency. The SPV finances its purchase with the issuance 
of ABS to investors, most of whom are institutional investors who hold the securities 
to maturity. In practice, SPV is organized by originators. The guarantee of highly 
rated credit enhancers is enhancement added to the bundle of rights purchased by 
investors. The underwriter is responsible for pricing and marketing the securities to 
investors. Finally, investors play a vital role in the success of securitized markets. 
Originators have to meet their requirements to ensure the asset-backed securities are 
valuable in exchanging funds they need. 
In order to study the different role played by originator, it will be useful to view 
securitization as two distinct, but related, phenomena, disintermediation-type 
securitization and off-balance-sheet securitization. The fundamental economic 
distinction between them is that only the former results in disintermediation in a 
meaningful economic sense (Berger and Udell, 1991). By disintermediation-type 
securitization, it means a movement away from intermediated bank loans towards 
direct financing of debt by capital markets. This may involve the sale of loans without 
recourse, or it may simply involve a shift in borrowing patterns away from bank-held 
debt and towards other forms of finance. In either case, the originator no longer acts 
as the principal monitor to ensure that the loan is repaid. The second type of 
securitization involves shifting assts from on the balance sheet to off the balance sheet 
through a loan sale with recourse, a standby letter of credit, or a loan commitment that 
backs up a third party loan. Under off-balance-sheet securitization, the bank retains 
the credit risk of the loan without supplying the funds directly and continues its role of 
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monitoring because of its credit exposure. Off-balance-sheet securitization allows a 
bank to downsize its on-balance-sheet assets, reducing regulatory taxes such as 
reserve requirements, deposit insurance premiums, and capital requirements in some 
cases, while continuing the traditional roles of monitoring and bearing credit risk 
(Benveniste and Berger, 1987, Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987, and Pennacchi, 1988). 
As a conclusion, securitization is a method of funding receivables of certain kind. It 
involves converting a portfolio of receivables into asset-backed securities which can 
be freely traded. Not all receivables can be securitized, and not all originators are 
capable of meeting the requirements of the rating agencies. The basic technique is 
characterized by the bankruptcy remote structure of SPV (special purpose vehicle), 
and the isolation of financial assets from business. 
2.3. Advantages and Disadvantages 
Establishing the primary rationale for the securitisation activity, is a vital part of the 
preparation for a securitisation transaction, since it influences the sorts of 
administrative tasks which need to be developed as well as the transaction structures 
themselves. A review of the literature indicates that there are a number of advantages 
of asset securitization as funding and risk management tool for originator: 
(1) To reduce cost of funds (e. g. Morrissey, 1992, Bryan, 1988a and Benston, 1992). 
Morrissey (1992) asserts that securitization will result in lower capital costs when 
originators possess low credit ratings and quality asset portfolios. Hill (1997) 
highlights that securitization could reduce an organization's cost of capital 
considering savings on information and transaction costs, plus securitization 
makes firms' assets more transparent and thereby reduces uncertainties from 
15 
capital market. It has to be noticed that securitization can be a cheap source of 
funds, but the attractiveness of securitization for this reason depends primarily on 
the costs associated with alternative funding sources. Comparing to the full costs 
of balance sheet intermediation, securitization is cost efficient for financial 
intermediaries (Bryan, 1988a). 
(2) To achieve reliable and consistent funding source (e. g. Kendall and Fishman, 1996 
and Twinn, 1994). A securitization transaction transforms assets into highly rated 
securities. As a result it provides companies with an additional, reliable source of 
funding at a relatively stable cost that is generally attractive to a company when 
viewed on either a debt or combined debt and equity basis. Securitization may 
also provide a way for an originator to reduce its maturity mismatches while 
continuing to earn a steady source of income (Twinn, 1994). Securitization allows 
such a mismatch to be passed on to the investors. In addition, securitizations 
characterized by a revolving purchase of asset allow an originator to choose the 
maturity of the issued liabilities in such a way as to best manage interest rate 
exposure (Elmgren, 1995). 
(3) To reduce credit exposure to particular assets (Twinn, 1994). It is used to manage 
credit risk. If the originator feels overexposed to the public, it can securitize 
preferred assets, or, if a particular class of lending becomes large in relation to the 
balance sheet as a whole, in either case securitization can remove some of the 
assets from the balance sheet. It allows the aggregate credit exposure faced by the 
originator to be better distributed. 
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(4) To achieve assets' liquidity enhancement (Finnerty, 1988, and Bartlett, 1989). 
Asset securitization converts the illiquid assets into liquid ones through credit 
enhancement, which provides a degree of assurance that investors will receive 
timely coupon and principle payments, even if the principle and interest payments 
due from the underlying borrowers are not received (Twinn, 1994). Finnerty (1988) 
observes that asset-backed securities are more liquid, and therefore potentially 
more attractive to potential investors, than individual mortgages or other assets 
held on firms' balance sheets. He notes that if organizations securitize assets so 
they indirectly become publicly traded, lenders' liquidity risks will be reduced 
resulting in lower required yields. 
(5) To diversify the sources of funding which can be accessed (Hess and Smith, 1988, 
and Zweig, 1989). Diversification is a type of strategic benefits result in 
securitization. Hess and Smith (1988), Zweig (1989), Greenbaum and Thakor 
(1987), and Pavel and Phillis (1987) suggest that securitization provides a means 
to reduce risks, to diversify portfolios, and to fund new assets and operations. The 
ABS market itself, also, is highly diverse in terms of structures, yields, maturities 
and collateral (The Bond Market Association, 1998). The assets- backed securities 
represent many sectors of business activity, from credit card receivables to auto, 
boat and recreational vehicle loans, and from equipment leases to home-equity 
and back loans. In addition, the ABS sector offers investors the ability to diversify 
their fixed-income portfolios away from more traditional concentrations in 
government, money market and corporate debt securities. O'Connell, Ratnatunga 
and Smyrnios (2000) find evidence from Australia that firms choosing to 
securitize benefit more significantly from diversification rather than previously 
suggested by the literature. 
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(6) To realize favorable regulatory and accounting treatments (e. g., Pavel and Phillips, 
1987, Hull, 1989, and Twinn, 1994). Asset securitization allows the originator to 
remove the assets from its balance sheet, transferring the relevant risks to the 
investors in accordance with supervisory rules and free capital for other uses (e. g., 
Pavel and Phillips, 1987, Hull, 1989, and Twinn, 1994). It also reduces capital 
requirements level, improving financial ratios (Elmgren, 1995). Finally, it could 
solve the problem of overexposure (Twinn, 1994 and Elmgren, 1995). 
For originators, problems may arise either directly, from the launching of issues, or 
indirectly, through their effect on its lending decisions (e. g. Twinn, 1994, Kaufman, 
1999). 
Most obviously, the originator is affected by risks inherent in asset securitization, such 
as interest rate risk (the risk associated with changes in yield required for resale in 
the secondary market), credit risk (the risk associated with failure of credit-card 
account holders to pay off balances), prepayment risk (the risk associated with the 
business cycle and/or interest rate movements), and securitization risk (the risk that 
the trust structure will not function as contractually agreed) (Kane, 1995). All kinds of 
risks inherent in asset securitization are described and analyzed in details in Chapter 5, 
Effects of Asset Securitization on Risk. 
When asset securitization is considered as one of funding options by originator, it 
affects lending decisions, changes capital structure. Problems could arise such as 
irrational borrowing (Jobst, 2003). If originators create an ABS "pipeline" - that is, 
make loans using a small amount of capital, with the intention of securitizing them to 
release funds to make further loans - this may also create risks for them. If the 
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environment were to become unfavorable for securitization, such originators might be 
unable to make new loans. Moreover, securitization may lead to a reduction in the 
average quality of the originator's on-balance-sheet asset (Twinn, 1994). This happens 
if the originator selected the best-quality assets to securitize. 
Overall, previous literature suggests series of advantages and disadvantages of asset 
securitization to originator. The advantages include: reduction of cost of funds, 
achievement of reliable and constant funding source, reduction of credit exposure, 
achievement of liquidity enhancement, diversification and favorable 
regulatory/accounting treatment. The disadvantages are relative to risks inherent in 
securitization transaction. It may also cause problems to the business. The literature 
indicates there is trade-off in adoption of asset securitization. Good knowledge of the 
technique and securitization industry is the first step of successful securitization. 
2.4. Regulation and Accounting Issues 
Some countries set up their own framework of securitization based on development of 
national market. Moreover, the banking industry, the biggest industry on securitization 
market, is also under strict control of Basel I and Basel II (Odenbach, 2002). In 1998, 
the Basel Committee proposed the first Basel Capital Accord (Basel I ). All 
international banks are required to possess own funds of at least 8% of their risk 
weighted assets. For loans fully secured by mortgages over owner-occupied property, 
or property rented by the owner, 50% risk weighted is required. Basel I does not 
contain specific rules on asset securitization except residential mortgage backed 
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securities. But the rapid growing in the area promotes introducing new rules to fill the 
gap. Some counties started to frame national securitization rules, such as United 
States, United Kingdom and Germany. 
Basel II, proposed in 1999, is essentially on attempt to create standardized capital 
adequacy rules at a global level. It firstly set out future treatment of asset 
securitization in the "Supporting Document" (2001). The risk weights for residual 
mortgage backed securities are reduced to 40%. Accordingly, an originator should 
disclose in the context of securitizations the quantitative data about the assets 
securitized, the asset types securitized, the role played by the originator, the maximum 
exposure arising from resource/credit enhancement provided and aggregate data 
regarding liquidity facilities provided by the originator. It is a declared objective of 
Basel II to remove regulatory incentives for securitization (Odenbach, 2002). 
However, some scepticism should be allowed. For instance, Basel II has not 
proposed further on-balance sheet advantages for banks that are able to reduce overall 
credit risk through risk diversification so that it could become attractive to securitize 
these portfolio. 
Basel I and Basel II differentiate between traditional and synthetic structures of 
securitization, the two main structural alternatives for a securitization, by setting out 
the criteria for recognition of risk transference for transaction. In a traditional 
securitization, credit risk is transferred to third party and assets are legally isolated 
from the originator. The investors should only have claim to the underlying pool of 
assets. In a synthetic securitization, the originator buys credit protection from the 
capital market but remains the legal and beneficial owner of the assets securitized. 
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Comparatively, the traditional securitization is legally complex and therefore 
expensive to complete; while the synthetic securitization limits the amount of credit 
risk transferred. From an originator's perspective, a synthetic securitization provides a 
credit hedge but does not raise finance, also, it does not have any accounting effects as 
the relevant assets are remained in the originator's balance sheet (Perry, 1993). 
Therefore, originators could choose between traditional and synthetic securitization to 
meet different objectives. In current environment, securitization has been widely used 
by banks for capital relief, lower funding costs and credit transfer. Especially for 
lowly or non-rated banks, the regulatory compliance is proved to be difficult and 
expensive, asset securitization is more attractive. 
The central accounting issue in asset securitization is to account securitization as sales 
or financings (Eugene, 1992, and Perry, 1993). An originator transfers a portfolio of 
loans to SPV, often the originator retains an interest in the entity after the 
securitization is completed. Its balance sheet is heavily influenced by whether 
securitization is treated as a sale or a secured loan. Two approaches are generated 
respectively, predominant-characteristics paradigm and financial-components 
paradigm. 
Under one approach, the predominant-characteristics paradigm, if an originator retains 
any of the risks or rewards of ownership of the assets in the SPV, those assets remain 
on the originator's balance sheet and the securities issued by the SPV are recognized 
as liabilities. Under another approach, the financial-components paradigm, 
securitization is treated as sales if legal ownership is transferred to a SPV. Thus, 
financial assets are replaced with cash. The originator then derecognizes the 
transferred assets but recognizes any interests retained. 
21 
The financial-components paradigm is advocated because it treats all parties with an 
interest in an existing SPV in the same manner and those interests created by 
securitization are evaluated the way the financial marketplace evaluates them (Perry, 
1993). This is also consistent with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
("GAAP"). As a result, most securitization transactions are structured to qualify as a 
sale for GAAP under FASB 77 (Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement 
No. 77,1983). While in most instances a securitization does not change the amount of 
capital held as reserves by the originator against the expected credit losses on a pool 
of receivables, the securitization does remove the receivables and their associated 
liabilities from the originator's balance sheet to likely improve an originator's 
financial ratios (such as debt to equity ratio). 
Later in this study, companies' accounting data are tested and analyzed to find effects 
of asset securitization on originators. The reasons to do so are, the first, the accounting 
data provide constant basis which could be compared; the second, the business should 
be considered as a whole when investigate effects of asset securitization. On the other 
hand, there are also limitations from the use of accounting data. Although this study 
targets the UK securitization market, companies who access the market are world 
wide, thus different regulatory and accounting rules are obeyed. Further, problem may 
arise due to annual basis of accounting data, which makes it difficult to recognize the 
effects immediately. 
2.5. Asset Securitization in the UK 
This study focuses on UK securitization market. Although the United Kingdom is the 
second largest securitization market in the world, there is a lack of systematic study 
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on it. Further, there are clear differences from other countries of UK market to be 
clarified. Therefore, this section is to review UK securitization market and find 
characteristics of the market. 
Securitization began in the United States as a result of the housing credit market 
collapse during the Great Depression, when Congress passed the National Housing 
Act of 1934 (Kendall and Fishman, 1996). This act was designed in part to create a 
secondary market in mortgages, thus reducing the reliance of financial institutions on 
local core deposits. The first public structured financing came in 1970 when the newly 
created Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) began publicly 
trading "pass-through" securities. In the early 1980's this secondary market for 
securitized mortgages began to expand significantly and in the mid 1980s the 
securitization market evolved to include non-mortgage receivables such as auto loans 
and credit cards. 
The United Kingdom is the origination of asset securitization in Europe. In 1985, the 
first securitization issue arranged in London for the international market was MINI, a 
£50 million refinancing of Bank America Finance Limited UK residential property 
mortgages. The mortgage-backed securities market grew rapidly in the 1980s with 
housing market booming, and has dominated UK securitization market ever since. In 
early stage, the UK market distinguishes from the US market by variable rate without 
pre-payment penalties (Karley and Whitehead, 2002). 
Securitization has evolved in three primary investor markets, the public market, the 
private market and the commercial paper market, each with their own characteristic 
structures and each of focusing initially on specific asset types. The securitization of 
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consumer assets began with, and in sheer volume remains dominated by, residential 
mortgages which have ideal cash-flow characteristics and benefit from a high degree 
of contract standardization. The development of the securitization market as a 
standard funding option across most industries, though, has been the result of a 
constantly expanding universe of securitizable non-mortgage asset types. Modem 
securitization market includes all types of financial assets, including car loans, 
consumer and credit card debt, corporate or wholesale finance, commercial mortgages, 
leases and swap receivables, and government debt. 
Current UK securitization market is still the second largest in the world, leading the 
European securitization market. According to ESF (European Securitisation Forum) 
Securitisation Data Report (Summer 2007), collateral originated in the United 
Kingdom accounts 51.82 percent of European securitization market in 2006, an 
increase from 45.4 percent in 2005. UK new issue activity rose 39.3 percent to $145.0 
billion in 2005, compared to the $105.8 billion in 2004 (ESF Data Report, Winter 
2006). RMBS (Residential Mortgage-backed Securities) have continued to be the 
largest European securitized sector, and UK accounted for 51 percent of total 
European RMBS issuance in 2006. RMBS' market share decreased from 49 percent of 
total securitized issuance in 2004 to 44 percent in 2005, which resulted from a slower 
UK housing market relative to the UK housing sector expansion in 2005. According 
to the European Mortgage Federation, gross mortgage lending in the UK during 2005 
was 3.8 percent lower than 2004. However, UK gross mortgage lending hit new high 
in 2006. A significant trend in UK RMBS is the growth of the buy to let product 
sector that now accounts for about 9 percent of the primary market mortgage volume, 
about triple its share at the beginning of the decade. Entering 2007, the crush of US 
sub-prime mortgage market may worry UK mortgage lenders, therefore, affects 
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mortgage lending volume. It would suggest that overall'RMBS issuance growth could 
very well moderate further this year. The CDO (Collateralized Debt Obligations) 
sector continues to develop and grow, finishing the year as the second largest volume 
sector. CDO issuance in 2005 hit $46.8 billion, an increase of 85.6 percent from the 
$25.3 billion issued in 2004. Securities collateralized by loans, including leveraged, 
commercial, corporate, consumer and small business loans, totaled $39.2 billion in 
2005, accounting for 12.2 percent of total securitized issuance and ranking third in 
terms of issuance volume. CMBS was the fastest growing product sector in 2005 with 
issuance totaling $37.7 billion, more than the double the $15.2 billion issued in 2004. 
The framework of asset securitization is set out country by country. The issuing into 
specific market, therefore, requires the analysis of country specific factors. The next, 
distinct collateral characteristics, special regulatory and accounting treatments present 
in the UK, as well as certain unique structural features are analyzed. 
First of all, UK mortgage market has a variable rate tradition considering collateral 
(Coles and Hardt, 2000). As the biggest portion of UK securitization market, MBS 
(mortgage-backed securities) market moves closely to housing market. The majority 
of residential mortgage loans are variable rate loans. The mortgage loan interest rates 
are either on an established market index, such as Libor, or adjusted to meet funding 
costs or to meet competition. Increasingly, mortgage interest rates have been tied to 
Libor plus a spread that covers servicing and administrative expenses. The originator 
usually serves as administrator and continues to adjust the interest rates throughout 
the life of the security. The coupon rate promised to investors then becomes the basis 
for adjusting the mortgage rates. With variable rate (Libor plus a spread), the yield 
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above interest rate available is fixed to investors at the first place, thus, prepayment 
risk is rather small in the UK market. 
Secondly, there are special regulatory and accounting treatments in the UK 
(Thompson and Rudin, 1991, and Baums, 1996). The vital issues are capital adequacy 
requirement, how to transfer receivables and protection of SPV from originator 
insolvency. 
The Bank of England institutes strict capital requirements to regulate banks (Baums, 
1996). The purpose is to ensure banks can have reduced need for capital only if they 
have no risk from the loans sold out. Since most issuances of mortgage-backed 
securities in the UK have left the originator with some interest rate risk, banks have 
still had to provide fully in capital for the loans involved. A small number of 
issuances have attempted to deal with this problem by laying off the interest rate risk 
to another institution. From this point of view, UK's originators suffer from much 
more regulatory costs comparing to US companies, and securitization remains 
relatively costly and capital intensive. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the central debate from the accounting point of 
view is whether a securitization is a sale or a financing. In the UK, since asset 
securitizations are often undertaken for capital adequacy reasons, the structure of 
these transactions often relies on the financial institution's ability to treat the transfer 
of loans as a sale (Baums, 1996). The main issue here is how to transfer the 
underlying receivables. In the UK, there are two main methods of transferring a 
receivable, assignment (including legal and equitable assignment) and 
sub-participation. Equitable assignment, although less costly and easier to implement, 
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is a riskier form of assignment because legal assignment has priority over equitable 
assignment and leaves little doubt that the transaction is a "true sale" to SPV. Legal 
assignment, however, includes a statutory requirement to give written notice to the 
account debtor. This notice requirement can pose problems for a potential originator 
of overexposure. If transfers receivables through sub-participation, the seller must not 
have any obligation to fund the repayment of the sub-participation loan in order to 
realize the "true sale". As a result, each of the methods has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. 
Thirdly, in the UK, according to the law, the SPV has to be owned by trust whose 
share capital is owned by a third party not linked in any way to the originator. This 
guarantees the bankruptcy-remoteness of the SPV. However, in circumstances where 
the originator acts as the paying and servicing agent for the SPV, it could hold money 
on behalf of the SPV. In the UK, the most common way of protecting the SPV's 
interest is to set up a separate account into which all payments that the originator 
receives are placed, and to provide that effectively is a trust account for the SPV. 
Finally, the unique structural features relating to the function of the administrator and 
credit enhancement may affect credit ratings of securities (Falconer, 1991). The 
responsibilities of the administrator generally go beyond normal loan servicing 
functions and may include adjusting the collateral pool as a function of prepayment 
patterns. Prepayment risk is lessened by providing additional advances on mortgages 
within the pool or by purchase of additional mortgages to compensate for the decline 
in the balance of the pool. Further loan advances and/or substitutions introduce 
additional risk of delayed payments and default in the collateral pool. Rating agency 
examines closely the parameters of those transactions that permit the administrator to 
27 
modify the collateral pool and evaluates both the effect of the modifications and the 
adequacy of the credit enhancement. 
2.6 Empirical Studies on Effects of Asset Securitization 
The literature suggests the effects of asset securitization on originators could be 
investigated from three aspects, the effects of cost of capital, the effects on risks and 
the effects of share price. Previous empirical studies on those topics are rather limited, 
which are summarized in Table 2.1,2.2 and 2.3. These studies are corn references 
followed by this thesis. More specifically, the effects of asset securitization on cost of 
capital are examined in Chapter 4, followed by the effects of asset securitization on 
risks described in Chapter 5. Finally, the effects of asset securitization on share price 
are investigated in Chapter 6, which represents the external effects of securitization on 
originators. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Design and Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research design and methodology to be applied in the study. 
Section two summarizes research objectives. Section three describes the applied 
methods to be used by the study, T -test, regression analysis and event study. Section 
four describes sample and data collection, followed by description of the statistical 
software chosen for this study in section 5. Conclusion is made in section 6 as a 
finish. 
3.2 Research Objectives 
This section outlines the research objectives. The aim of this study is to examine 
effects of asset securitization on originators. Through literature review, it is found that 
asset securitization is considered as effective funding and risk management tool (Jobst, 
2005). It offers comprehensive benefits, which suggests positive effects on share price 
for issuing companies (Lockwood et al, 1996). On the other hand, other researchers 
argue asset securitization is costly funding source, and may bring new risks to 
originators (e. g. Benston, 1992, and Kaufman, 1999). If potential benefits of asset 
securitization are untrue, the positive wealth effects may also be in doubt. Thus, 
whether asset securitization reduced cost of capital is the focus of arguments in the 
area of corporate finance. Secondly, from risk management point of view, asset 
securitization could affect overall risks of originator from both directions. Finally, 
wealth effects of asset securitization have to be included in the study because it is 
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highly valued by any potential issuer. The three aspects described above consist of the 
study, which is to examine the effects of asset securitization on originators. 
Accordingly, the objectives of the studies are as follow: 
Firstly, to examine the effects of asset securitization on originators from three aspects: 
the effects on cost of capital, the effects on risks and the effects on share price. 
Through the tests, some evidence of whether asset securitization offers a range of 
benefits suggested by theories in real life is to be provided. It is critical when 
originators use it to achieve different targets. 
Besides, to clarify factors influence the consequences of adoption of asset 
securitization. Not all companies benefit from asset securitization, and previous 
literature suggests it may result in different characteristics of the assets securitized 
(such as size and collateral type) and of the company itself (for instance, the industry 
it belongs to, the capital structure, and financial slack). Therefore, companies have to 
take these factors into account when they make the decision to securitize or not. 
3.3 Research Methods 
3.3.1 T -test 
T -test appears in all three empirical studies, which are Chapter 4,5 and 6. It is widely 
adopted for hypothesis testing, which is introduced by William Sealy Gosset. This 
test-of-significance method is to verify the truth or falsity of a null hypothesis by 
using sample results, showing that the means of two normally distributed populations 
are equal. As a result, the key idea behind tests of significance is that of a test statistic 
35 
(estimator) and the sampling distribution of such a statistic under the null hypothesis 
(Gujarati, 2002). In the case oft-test, t distribution is used, and a statistic is considered 
to be statistically significant if the value of the test statistic lies in the critical region, 
in which case the null hypothesis is rejected. 
The test could either be one-tail or two-tail. When the alternative hypothesis is 
composite rather with a certain direction, the test will be made two-tail or two-side. 
Very often such a two-side alternative hypothesis reflects the fact that there is no 
strong priori or theoretical expectation about the direction in which the alternative 
hypothesis should move from the null hypothesis. 
In Chapter 4 and 6, two-tail t-test is employed to find out whether the cost of capital 
and the share price of the originator are influenced by asset securitization due to 
conflicting results by previous studies. To illustrate the two-tail t-test, suppose that: 
HO: B=O 
HI: B #0 
Under the normality assumption the variable 
t_ 
ß'ß 
_ß JVar(ß) 
Se 6) 
A follows the t distribution with n-2 degree of freedom, where 8 is the true value of 
/3, 
VVar( 
) is the standard error of 6, and n is the number of observations. The t 
36 
value can be computed from the sample selected, and the confidence interval is: 
A 
Pr - t-2, a'2 :5ß :5 t-2, a/ 2 
1-a 
Se(ß) 
Where -ti_2, a/2 and t_2 a, 2 are the values of t obtained 
from the t table for a /2 
level of significance and n-2 df (degree of freedom). Therefore, the null hypothesis is 
rejected if 
A 
A 
t=A> tal2 when ß>0 
Se(ß) 
or 
A 
A 16 
A< -ta, 2 when 
ß <0. 
Se(ß) 
The exact level of significance is measured by p value (the probability value). P value 
is the lowest significance level at which a null hypothesis can be rejected (Gujarati, 
2002). For a given sample size, as absolute value oft increases, the p value decreases, 
and one can therefore reject the null hypothesis with increasing confidence. 
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3.3.2 Regression using Cross Sectional Data and Panel Data 
In order to test the effects of asset securitization on originators, method of regression 
is employed in all three empirical studies. Generally speaking, regression analysis is 
concerned with the study of relationships between dependent variable and one or 
more independent variables, with a view to estimating and or predicting the mean or 
average value of the former in terms of known of fixed values of the latter (Gujarati, 
2002). 
The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method is used in determining estimators of 
coefficients, which defines the sample regression in such a way that the sum of the 
sample residuals is as small as possible, as a result of which the estimators are as 
closely aligned as possible to real values. Since data vary from sample to sample, 
estimates will change, which results in the requirement to measure the reliability or 
the precision of the estimates. The precision of the regression model is determined by 
its standard error. The standard error is simply the standard deviation of the Y values 
about the estimated regression line and is often used as a summary of the goodness of 
fit of the estimated line. The goodness of fit is determined by RZ , which measures the 
proportion or percentage of the total variation in Y explained by the regression model. 
Data used for empirical analysis could be time series data, cross-sectional data, or 
panel data. A time series is a set of observations on the values that a variable takes at 
different times (Gujarati, 2002). The data could be collected at different time intervals, 
for instance, at daily, weekly, monthly or annually basis. Cross-sectional data refers to 
data collected at the same point of time. It differs from time series data which follows 
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one subject's changes over the course of time. Analysis of cross sectional data usually 
consists of comparing the differences among the subjects without regard to 
differences in time, while time series data relate to a sequence of observations over 
time on an individual, or a group of individuals. The distinction is between 
observations which form a time series - so that time, t, is the identifying index - and 
those which relate to a particular point in time - so that the individual entity, i, is the 
identifying index, which is cross sectional data. For this study, cross sectional data 
analysis is useful to clarify which firm specific characteristics influence the 
consequences of securitizing assets. However, time series data is replaced by panel 
data in order to cover the time-varying factors, since the identification of time series 
parameters traditionally relies on notions of stationary, pre-determinedness and 
uncorrected shocks, while panel data sets have enriched the set of possible 
identification arrangements, and make it possible to think more carefully about the 
nature and sources of identification of parameters of potential interest. 
Panel data analysis is also necessary in order to get rid off unobserved heterogeneity. 
Panel data is defined as repeated measures of one or more variables on one or more 
observations, or repeated cross-sectional time series (Bruderl, 2005). Panel data 
regression differs from a regular time series or cross-section in that it combines both 
in a double subscript on its variables, such as: 
Y. =a+ßiý'il +ßiX; 2 +...... +ßrß'; 1 +ur 
where the i subscript demotes the cross-sectional dimension whereas t demotes the 
time-series dimension. Y, is the dependent variable and X , XZ, ... X,, are the 
explanatory variables. a is the constant and ßßl ,f2... A are the slopes of the 
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explanatory variables. The slopes of explanation variables reflect the fact that any of 
the predictor variables X,, , X21... X;, provide a partial explanation or prediction for 
the value of Y. The error terms are assumed to have the properties: 
E(u, )=0, 
Var(u; )= a2, 
Cov(u,, uu)=0fori# j. 
These relationships state that the error terms are assumed to have normal distribution 
with mean 0 and variance 62 , and that error terms must be independent. Most of the 
panel data applications utilize one-way error component model for the disturbances, 
with: 
ut, =A + V, º 
Where u, denotes the unobservable individual specific effect and v denotes the 
remainder disturbance. Note that A, is not time variant and it accounts for any 
individual specific effect that is not included in the regression. The remainder 
disturbance v, varies with individual and time and can be thought of as the usual 
disturbance in the regression. 
Previous literature (e. g. Hsiao, 2003, and Baltagi, 2003) suggests benefits of panel 
data are: 
(1) Panel data give the researches a large number of data points, increasing the degree 
of freedom, variability and efficiency, and reducing collinearity among 
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explanatory variables. The large number of data points is very important when 
using financial accounting data (as what this study does), which are published 
annually. 
(2) Panel data allow study individual dynamics, which can not be addressed using 
either pure cross sectional or time series data sets. They are better able to study the 
dynamics of adjustments and are able to identify and measure effects that are 
simply not detectable in pure cross sectional and time series data. They also 
provide a dynamic picture of the samples' financing behavior over a long term 
period. 
(3) Panel data give more information on the time-ordering of events. They allow 
researchers to construct and test more complicated behavior models than purely 
cross sectional or time series data. There are fewer restrictions can be imposed in 
panels than in a purely time series study, and moreover, panel data are usually 
gathered for a micro level units, like individuals. Therefore, many variables can be 
more accurately measured at the micro level and biases resulting from aggregation 
over individuals are eliminated. 
(4) Panel data allow control for individual unobserved heterogeneity. Time series and 
cross sectional data not controlling for this heterogeneity run the risk of yielding 
biased results. 
Since unobserved heterogeneity is the problem if non-experimental research, the latter 
benefit is especially useful. As a result, panel data analysis is necessary for this study 
due to two reasons: the first, as a non-experimental research, this study may suffer 
from the problem of unobserved heterogeneity; the second, observations (events) are 
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characterized by time-ordering variables. 
Another issue has to be raised considering panel data analysis, the choice between 
fixed-effects model and random-effects model. Since panel data alone does not 
remedy the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, a special regression model has to be 
applied. The differences between the two models focus on how to treat the 
unobservable individual specific effects A. For fixed effects estimation method, A, 
is considered as fixed constants, while for random effects model, it is treated as 
random variable u;, . With fixed effects regression, the effects of time-constant 
covariates can not be estimated, and use of random effects regression would be more 
appropriate. If Cov(X;, , v, )#0, the random effect estimator will 
be biased, and fixed 
effect model gets unbiased estimates. Finally, the fixed effects model is an appropriate 
specification for focusing on specific sets of firms. The random effects model is an 
appropriate specification if we are drawing n individual randomly from a large 
population. In this case, n is large and a fixed effects model would lead to an 
enormous loss of degree of freedom. Based on our sample choice, fixed effects model 
is more appropriate since specific sets of firms are included (only the firm who 
securitized assets from 1993 to 2005 on the UK market). However, there is a lack of 
references which model should be adopted, and the time-constant variables included 
in are considered to be important. Therefore, both of models are run and report results, 
employing Hausman test to provide statistic support. 
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3.3.3 Event Study 
In Chapter 6, in order to find the response of stock market to the news of 
securitization, an event study is adopted. 
Event study is a method to measure the impact of specific event on the value of a firm 
by using financial market data (Mackinlay, 1997). Such a study comes from the fact 
that, given rationality in the market place, the effects of an event will be reflected 
immediately in security prices, therefore, the impact is constructed by analyzing 
changes of share price in short-term in order to remove other events' influences. This 
methodology is adopted widely in all kinds of fields, such as accounting, finance, law, 
even medical study. But overall, the majority of its applications are the effects of an 
event on the price of a security of a firm. The event study includes three tasks, (1) 
define the event of interest and event window, (2) measure abnormal return, and (3) 
test the null hypothesis designed. The process is then described as follow. 
The first, event day normally is the day of announcement made to the public, and the 
event window is the period which will be examined to identify the impact of this 
specific event. Considering the impact may not happen on the exact day of event, the 
time prior and after the event are also of interest. For instance, when firms have to 
report or provide information to certain institutions before the announcement 
officially made to the market, pre-event abnormal returns could be observed. 
The second, abnormal return is the actual ex post return of the security over the event 
window minus return of the firm over the event window. The normal return is defined 
as the expected return without the event taking place (Mackinlay, 1997). The 
abnormal return is the difference between a firm's security return and expected 
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normal return. There are two main methods to measure the normal return, constant 
mean model and market model. For both models, normal return of the security is 
calculated over estimation window, which is normally using the period prior to the 
event window. The difference is while the constant mean model assumes the mean 
return of the security is constant through time, the market model assumes a stable 
linear relation between the market return and the security return examined. The 
market model is considered more appropriate for this study due to two reasons. Firstly, 
the data are collected over a long term, 13 years exactly, and the constant mean 
assumption could not stand over such a long period. Secondly, by using the market 
model, the change of share price caused by the market moving is removed from the 
abnormal return. The normal return ER;, is derived from the market model 
relationship can be mathematically described as: 
ER = ar + ß, R., ý' sir , 
Where 
Rmt = the return on a value-weighted market portfolio in period t; 
a,, A3, = security specific parameters to be estimated and vary from one security to 
another. a, represents the intercept and ß; is known as systematic risk and 
expresses the covariance between the returns on security i and the returns on the 
market index. 
s;, = random disturbance term of security i in time period t. This stochastic error 
term assumes to be independently normally distributed and satisfies the normal 
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assumptions of a linear regression model. 
Thus the expected return for period t is calculated by: 
AA ER;, = a, +, 6, R.,. 
The parameters a; and A are calculated by regressing monthly returns for security 
ion the daily returns of the market index. 
Finally, define the null hypothesis and determine the techniques for aggregating the 
abnormal returns of each individual firm in the sample. More detail of the event study 
processing is provided in Chapter 6.3.1. 
3.4 Sample and Data Collection 
A sample of 740 public offerings of securitized assets issued by 196 firms over the 
period January 1993 through December 2005 is obtained from Fitch rating and ABS 
reports. ' Those two web sides provide detailed information of asset securitization 
including issuing date, amount of the issue, collateral, issuer, and originator. Therefore, 
the type of assets and industries included in this study totally depend on availability of 
information during the time. The length of the data applied purely depends on the 
availability of data. Nevertheless, the period from 1993 to 2005 almost represents the 
history of UK securitization market considering after the first issue in 1985, the 
securitization market grew with housing market booming, but only till the end of 
1990s, the prime mortgage lenders entered the securitization market in search of 
1 Fitch ratings is an international rating agency provide issuer and bond ratings, and research banks, corporations. 
sovereigns, structured and municipal finance. ABSreports is the official web side of Markit, a private company 
provides data. valuation and trading processing service of derivative. 
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alternative financing sources, the UK securitization market has developed 
significantly ever since. Therefore, it is appropriate time length to study. 
Due to availability of daily share prices, the sample is reduced to 542 issues by 133 
companies. Very significant amount of companies are not UK originated companies, 
and further more, the sample includes multi-international groups. Considering the 
company who act as originator could be issuing securities across countries, and 
traditionally, one of its financing arms locally will organize the issuing, while several 
subsidiaries of the group company may be involved in the process. Therefore, asset 
securitization typically impact capital and liquidity planning for the whole group, not 
for single subsidiaries in isolation, accordingly, the accounting and financial data of 
the group will be analyzed in this study. Datastream provides companies' information 
across countries. Accounting and financial data of originators are gathered from 
Datastream on annual basis. 
Based on the industry originator belongs to, the sample contains 307 issues by banks, 
164 issues by other financial institutions, 26 issues by auto companies, 15 issues by 
real estate companies, 22 by retailers, and 8 issues by other industries. 2 While based 
on the type of assets securitized, there are 110 ABS (including WB-ABS, CC-ABS, 
SL-ABS), 155 CDO-ABS, 177 RMBS, and 100 CMBS. 3 Here WB-ABS stands for 
whole-business asset-backed securities, CC-ABS stands for credit card asset-backed 
securities, and SL-ABS stands for student loan asset-backed securities. The sample is 
summarized in Table 3.1 and 3.2. 
Banks are treated as separated group different to other financial institutions in the 
2 Industry is defined by Datastream using code IND. 
3 Type of assets is defined according to European Securitization Forum Data Report. 
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study. As traditional channel of funding, banks normally occupy the first place on the 
list for borrowers, specially attracting those SME (small to medium sized enterprises). 
Respectively, they have the comparative advantage in the market. But at the same 
time, they are also more strictly controlled by regulatory rules. Besides, comparing to 
other financial institutions, banks have more complicated funding sources and 
influence finance market more strongly. 
Table 3.1 Sample based on industry 
Industry Observations Percentage Mean 
size m$ 
Min 
size m$ 
Max 
size m$ 
Auto 26 4.8% 898.52 161.67 2,000 
Banks 307 56.64% 1649.98 1.26 25,300 
Financial 
institutions 
164 30.26% 668.45 3.85 4,000 
Real estate 15 2.77% 914.97 84.8 4315.83 
Retailer 22 4.06% 644.49 92.64 2358.75 
Others 8 1.48% 397.56 18.69 883 
Total 542 100% 1237.29 1.26 25300 
Table 3.2 Sample based on collateral type 
Asset 
class 
Observations Percentage Mean 
size m$ 
Min 
size m$ 
Max 
size m$ 
ABS 110 20.30% 1034.73 62.56 24000 
CDO 155 28.60% 983.87 1.26 25000 
CMBS 100 18.45% 792.39 14.55 5291.4 
RMBS 177 32.66% 1836.47 3.85 25300 
Total 542 100% 1237.29 1.26 25300 
Accordingly, banks are still the biggest issuers over all, and average size per issue for 
banking industry is the largest, nearly 1,237 million US dollars per issue. It is 
understandable since as the origin of the technology, banking industry is characterized 
by well-diversified assets, and has the advantage of pooling different quality assets 
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into different issues. 
RMBS (residential mortgage-backed securities) proved to be the most well adopted 
one, and UK prosperous housing market could be a reason. 
3.5 Statistical Software 
There are many statistic software programs, which are widely used among 
econometrics or statisticians to evaluate statistical outcomes. The. popular choices 
include E-Views, Gauss, LIMDEP, RATS, SAS, SPSS and Stata. Statistical software 
packages in general vary in size, complexity, cost and the amount of programming 
required from the user. This study use Stata due to the advantage in analyzing panel 
data. It provides sufficient and clear results. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter describes research objectives, the type of methods used in the following 
empirical studies, the process of data collection and choice of statistical software. The 
objectives of the study are highlighted as firstly, to examine how asset securitization 
affects originators in terms of cost of capital, risks and share price; secondly, to clarify 
firm-specific and issue-specific factors make the results distinguishable. Further, three 
main research methods are discussed, T -test, OLS regression analysis and event study, 
followed by data collation and sample processing. Finally, Stata is used to carry out 
the empirical analysis of this study. 
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Chapter 4 
Effects of Asset Securitization on Cost of Capital 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the effects of asset securitization as funding tool. Previous 
literature suggests asset securitization reduces cost of capital due to: (1) it offers 
competitive rate of funding by separating the assets securitized from the risk of the 
firm, regardless of the firm's credit rating (Morrissey, 1992); (2) it reduces 
"information costs" under information asymmetry (Frankel, 1991); (3) it mitigates the 
regulatory capital charge and achieves greater specialization in areas of comparative 
advantage (Hill, 1997). In contrast, Benston (1992) contended that securitization 
could not lower capital cost, as lower funding costs resulting from securitizing quality 
assets are offset by higher funding costs on the remaining portfolio, which is 
consistent with MM model. Moreover, securitization also introduces new costs 
(Henderson and Barings, 1997). 
As a result, the question of whether asset securitization reduces overall cost of capital 
remains unsolved. This research is going to examine, firstly, changes of cost of capital 
after originators securitizing assets; secondly, to clarify which firm specific 
characteristics influence the consequences, including credit rating, growth 
opportunities, firm size and leverage level. 
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An empirical study is provided by testing a sample containing 542 issues on the UK 
securitization market from 1993 to 2005. The findings are: (1) the cost of capital is 
reduced after adoption of asset securitization; (2) reduction of cost of capital is not 
direct benefit from asset securitization; (3) the effects of asset securitization are asset 
collateral specific; (4) companies with disadvantages in information costs saving are 
affected more significantly by asset securitization. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 2, literature review introduces costs 
associated with assets securitization, and explains how asset securitization changes 
cost of capital. Methodology and results are described in section 3 and 4, followed by 
conclusions in section 5. 
4.2. Literature Review 
4.2.1 Introduction 
From finance point of view, asset securitization first of all, reduces cost of capital (e. g. 
Morrissey, 1992, Bryan, 1988a and Benston, 1992). Secondly, it provides reliable and 
constant funding source to the originators, thus protecting originators from asset 
substitution or underinvestment (Twinn, 1994). Thirdly, it reduces agency cost under 
information asymmetry, also mitigates the regulatory capital charge (Jobst, 2005). 
Finally, it offers flexibility since it allows originators to raise money from the assets 
without loosing the possession forever, since they can redeem those assets when the 
securities come to maturity (Thomas, 2004). However, at the same time, there are 
costs associated with issuing of ABS (Henderson and Baring, 1997). And the costs 
saved through securitization could be offset by higher cost of finance through the rest 
of portfolio, leaving the overall cost of capital remains unchanged (Benston, 1992). 
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As a result, the question of whether asset securitization reduces cost of capital for 
originators remains unsolved. This empirical study is going to examine the problem 
using cross sectional and panel data collected from UK securitization market. The 
objectives of this study, therefore, are to investigate how asset securitization affects 
overall cost of capital of originators, and provide empirical evidence on the benefit of 
cost reduction suggested by previous literature. 
4.2.2 Costs associated with asset securitization 
The cost of securitization is frequently expressed as a percent per annum over an 
inter-bank rate. Typically, the investment bank arranging the securitization calculates 
the cost of securitization as the coupon rate on the ABS issued by the SPV plus the 
front end expenses and fees, amortized over the life of the ABS. Costs associated with 
asset securitization could be divided into two categories, front-end expenses and 
running costs according to previous literature (Baums, 1996, Bradt, 1991, Norton, 
Spellman and Dupler, 1995, Kendall and Fishman, 1996, Henderson and Barings, 
1997). 
Firs of all, front-end expenses include arrangement fee, underwriting and rating fees, 
legal and accounting costs, and marketing expenses (Bradt, 1991). Which items will 
be incurred in front-end expenses depend on the market in which a transaction takes 
place. For instance, fees paid to arrangers may fall under several headings. In some 
cases, fees will be paid for undertaking a feasibility study while in other cases fees 
will be paid in respect of structuring and underwriting. 
Rating fees are usual both there and in the short term capital markets, but optional in 
the private capital markets and in the banking market. These tend to be around three 
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basis points of the size of the deal, capped at a level reflecting a medium sized 
transaction. Rating fees for more exotic transactions are by negotiation. 
Underwriting fees can be as little as 10 basis points flat for short maturity, 50% 
weighted mortgage-backed sterling securities (Henderson and Barings, 1997). They 
will increase from this level as the maturity of the bonds increases, as the rating on the 
bonds decreases, and as the novelty or complexity of the transaction increases. There 
is a weaker consensus about the scale for arrangement fees in the banking and private 
placement markets. The intermediaries in these markets are generally committing to 
take overhead but not always credit risk when they accept mandates. Given the major 
time and personnel resources required to complete asset-backed transactions and the 
likelihood that these intermediaries can be expected to deal with smaller fundraisings 
than public capital markets underwriters, their fees, as a proportion of the transaction, 
are likely to be higher. 
Legal fees are payable to advisers. Documents are principally prepared by counsel to 
the originator and arranger although some ancillary facility providers promote their 
own standard form agreements. Counsel to other participants reviews only those 
documents that affect their client's interests. The total legal bill nevertheless 
comprises many line items for the advice given to some or all of. (1) 
Originator/issuer/borrower; (2) arranger/sponsor; (3) security trustee; (4) note/bond 
trustee/facility agent; (5) rating agency; (6) individual ancillary facility providers. 
Apart from the number of parties involved, legal fees are largely determined by the 
existence of appropriate precedents and the extent of original thought, time and 
research required addressing new issues. Whether billed directly or packaged, the 
costs of all parties' legal advice are for the account of the originator or issuer. This 
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being the case, the ability of potential participants to cap or control their legal costs 
can be an important factor in their appointment. Some accounting costs will be 
incurred in any asset-backed transaction. At a minimum, they will relate to the 
originator's accounting presentation. In jurisdictions where accounting standards have 
been deliberately drafted to address the consequences of securitization techniques 
there should be little need for further technical advice. Naturally, the converse applies 
in countries whose standards are silent or unclear. Accountants also sample and audit 
the purchased assets on behalf of the SPV. The extent of this task reflects the asset 
class, the trends in historical performance and the previous securitization experience 
of the originator. 
Marketing expenses are highly variable according to the novelty of the transaction and 
the breadth of targeted distribution. At their lowest, they simply comprise the costs of 
producing, often in-house, an information memorandum for club or limited 
syndication. The largest scale efforts involve road shows in several investment 
centres, preliminary red herrings, final prospectuses and the reimbursement of the due 
diligence costs of key investors. Depending on how local accounting standards and 
relevant regulators deal with front-end expenses, they will be recognised in the 
financial statements of either the originator or the SPV - although in fact both routes 
result in the burden falling on the originator. The tax treatment accorded to them is 
often the deciding factor. Whichever income statement they appear in, will generally 
amortize front-end expenses on straight line basis over the estimated average life of 
the transaction. For originators and issuers raising funds in a currency other than the 
one in which they report on a statutory basis the further question of exchange rates 
arises. 
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Secondly, running costs happen when servicing outstanding obligations to investors 
or lenders (Bradt, 1991). Servicing costs or the yield to investors and lenders, 
generally track the high end of the margin curve range for instruments of like credit 
quality and average life. Some premium is required for the frequent and 
time-consuming need to monitor these credit-intensive structures. Investors and 
lenders seek additional compensatory yield pickup if they anticipate uncertain 
amortization or limited liquidity. In particular, liquidity has been constrained in 
non-US jurisdictions because of the low volumes and the relatively earlier stage of 
development of the investor bases. They are also less sophisticated and shallower 
markets than the US domestic market and lack the range of comparative issues that 
US investors have in their domestic sphere. 
Running costs highly depend on the structure of securitization transaction. Foremost 
among structural facilities are liquidity facilities supporting commercial paper 
issuance and surely bonds providing total credit enhancement. It is a standard 
requirement that rated conduit commercial paper is fully backed by liquidity which 
may be drawn unconditionally. Such liquidity is most frequently provided by the 
originator's relationship banks not in respect of the originator's own credit, but that of 
a diverse asset pool selected according to credit quality criteria that may well exceed 
the creditworthiness of the originator. A number of conduits are structured and rated 
to standards that restrict purchases only to portfolios originated by investment grade 
credits and that are enhancement to investment grade standard before they benefit 
from any programme-wide credit enhancement. For this mainstream of conduit 
business there is a market consensus on the pricing of liquidity commitments that 
tracks the prevailing pricing for other banking commitments. Most conduit facilities 
are committed for less than one year. The revenue they earn is in the nature of fee 
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income because they are capital free (from a regulatory view point) to the banking 
providers assume they are lending their creditworthiness as backstop and do not 
expect to be called upon to lend cash. In practice, drawings are rare. But, once draw, 
liquidity facilities become fully-weighted assets and typically earn higher margins 
than equivalent credits. 
Financial guarantee pricing is more varied but the guarantors start from at least as 
demanding a point as liquidity providers - often requiring investment grade 
originators (or standby services) and portfolios. As credit rather than liquidity risk 
takers, they are also concerned with the ability of the originator as asset administrator, 
to protect and maximize the quality of the collateral. The cost of financial guarantee 
credit enhancement occurs in two parts. The paper that carries a full financial 
guarantee is sold with a margin reflecting the high credit rating of the guarantor. This 
element of cost falls into the servicing category. The issuer also pays a usually 
undisclosed guarantee fee. Some guarantors offer the option of payment by annual fee 
or an appropriately discounted up-front lump sum. 
Overall, costs associated with asset securitization vary cross different issues (Norton, 
Spellman and Dupler, 1995). The fixed costs mainly incur when the originators set up 
the management and control system at the beginning; others, such as legal rating 
agency and underwriting fees, and the costs of credit enhancement, may vary with 
each specific transaction. These expenses can be significant, especially for new 
issuers who lack infrastructure and reputation (Twinn, 1994). Predictably, total costs 
and the time it takes to complete a transaction are correlated. Likewise, a transaction's 
degree of novelty as to asset class jurisdiction and structure is the principal influence 
on both (Henderson and Barings, 1997). Further, the costs on structuring different 
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type of assets also very and change the overall costs of issuing (Norton, Spellman and 
Dupler, 1995). Finally, only when originators continue providing services after 
issuing, running costs will affect the overall cost of capital of originators. Originators 
evaluate each borrower. But once the loans are pooled and loan-backed securities are 
issued, the performance of the whole portfolio is evaluated by the markets. If 
originators hold securitized assets afterwards, valuation of their assets and obligations 
will be timelier, less expensive, and arguably more accurate. 
4.2.3 Asset securitization and capital structure decision 
Corporate finance theories have been developed over decades, and could be 
recognized by specialists as two catalogues, modem finance and post-modem finance. 
The difference between the two theorem focuses on the argument of whether financial 
policy affects the value of company. For "modem finance" theorem, which the 
Modigliani and Miller model represents for, value is created on the left-hand side of 
balance sheet when companies make good investment, while how companies finance 
those investments on the right-hand side of the balance sheet is largely irrelevant. In 
the contrast, "postmodern" finance theorem goes further by treating financial policy 
as critical in enabling companies to make valuable investments. 
Under different capital structure theories, motivations to securitize as an alternative 
financial source for efficient cost of capital are explained differently. We start with 
MM model (Modigliani and Mille) that cost of capital is irrelevant with capital 
structure. The most important assumptions to make M&M proposition are: 
(1) There are no costs associated with bankruptcy or financial distress; 
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(2) There are no taxes or transactions costs; 
(3) Corporate investment decisions are not influenced by financial choices, 
including decisions to hedge various price risks; 
(4) Reliable information about the firm's future earnings prospects is costlessly 
available to investors and managers alike; 
(5) Individuals and firms have equal access to all security markets, including the 
ability to issue identical securities on the same terms. 
Consistent with the theory, Benston (1992) contended that securitization could not 
lower capital cost, as lower funding costs resulting from securitizing quality assets are 
offset by higher funding costs on the remaining portfolio. This is because removal of 
high quality assets from asset pool to which other uncollateralized debt-holders can 
increases risks of bankruptcy they face, and thus, interest rates they demand. 
Therefore, when firms' debts mature and they seek to refinance, they will have to pay 
rates that reflect expectations by potential debt-holders of higher risks in the future. 
However, first of all, the analysis of the benefits associated with asset securitization as 
a funding alternative to traditional on-balance sheet debt finance also needs to 
consider the role of equity in the capital structure. The assessment of securitization on 
the basis of the cost of debt alone essentially ignores the leverage effect of 
securitization on overall cost of capital. Through true sale structure, asset 
securitization changes the balance sheet composition of the asset originator, and 
percentage of equity is reduced afterwards. When the debt-to-equity ratio changes, if 
the required return on equity remains the same, the cost on equity is reduced 
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eventually. Most sellers of portfolios into asset-backed structures must provide either 
more collateral than the amount of funds they raise or additional cash. Both sources of 
over-collateralization perform the effective role of capital support - bearing losses 
before investors. What is important is that each originator's definitive calculation of 
costs, and comparison with other forms of funding, should take into account the 
gearing and return on capital achieved by securitizing. Therefore, the all-up cost of a 
securitization, including the cost of capital, may be lower than the cost if balance 
sheet debt, even when the debt cost of securitization is higher than that of the 
on-balance sheet debt. We illustrate the effect of securitization on overall cost of 
capital, which is measured by WACC (weighted average cost of capital), using the 
example described in Table 1. 
Table 4.1: Analyze cost of capital with and without securitization 
On-Balance sheet Securitization 
Cost of debt LIBOR + 30 basis points LIBOR + 35 basis points 
Debt/equity 1: 1 50: 1 
Cost of equity LIBOR+ 10 percent LIBOR+ 10 percent 
, Weighted average cost of 
finance LIBOR + 5.15 percent LIBOR + 0.54 percent 
Source: Henderson and Barings, 1997, Asset securitization: current techniques and 
emerging market applications, Euromoney Publications PLC, pp 35. 
Note here assume that originators calculate cost of capital at weighted average cost of 
capital, which is also adopted in the empirical study. While it is a central motive 
among originators that securitization enhances capital efficiency, there is no universal 
convention on how to calculate the cost of capital. Each structure and originator will 
yield a unique result. WACC is chosen by this study due to two reasons: (1) according 
to Mclaney's (2004) survey study, WACC is widely used to calculate the overall cost 
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of capital, 53.4% exactly; (2) in order to achieve consistent data for the empirical 
study later. 
The second, assumptions of MM model would not stand in real world, all costs 
involved have to be considered. Hill (1997) highlighted that securitization could 
reduce an organization's cost of capital, notwithstanding the Modigliani and 
Miller-inspired argument of Benston (1992). She based this contention on 'real world' 
violations of some of the Modigliani and Miller assumptions such as the absence of 
information and transaction costs. Securitization allows economies of scale and scope 
in acquisition and dissemination of information about organizations' receivables, and 
enables firms to learn more about characteristics and behaviour of their receivables. 
Moreover, securitization makes firms' assets more transparent and thereby reduces 
uncertainties for capital market investors. Since asset pools are pre-specified in 
securitization transactions, this facilitates actuarial analysis of investor risks, thus 
mitigating levels of information asymmetry between investors and firms. 
Under the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) issuers- with severe 
information asymmetry problems would prefer to issue secured debt, which carries 
lower agency cost, because investors receive their repayment directly from a 
diversified pool of asset exposures insulated from the issuer (Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers, 1999). The trade-off theory would restrict this choice only to cases where the 
marginal benefit of debt outweighs the associated amount of agency and financial 
distress cost. Hence, under the pecking order and trade-off theory asset securitization 
is the refinancing instrument of choice for cash-strapped issuers, whose high agency 
costs of asymmetric information debar them from other forms of external finance. 
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4.2.4 Asset securitization and Cost of Capital 
Propositions concerning whether securitization lowers funding costs are contentious. 
The motivations to believe so are either securitization itself offers low rate of finance, 
or it reduces possible costs comparing to other alternative funding sources. 
Morrissey (1992) asserts that securitization achieves low capital cost when originators 
possess low credit ratings and quality asset portfolios, owing to investors pricing 
credit risk for asset-backed securities separately to that of originators. Since 
securitization is characterized by isolating assets securitized from the business, 
investors could make the decision based on the quality of specific asset rather than 
financial ability of whole business. Further, as off-balance-sheet finance, 
securitization is cost efficient for almost any financial intermediary, even those with 
high credit standings, when one considers the full costs of balance sheet 
intermediation (Bryan, 1988a). 
Previous literature suggests information costs and regulatory costs could be reduced 
through asset securitization (e. g. Morrissey, 1992, and Bryan, 1988a). 
Frankel (1991) argues for most of originators, securitization reduces information 
costs, the costs that company faces when attempting to raise outside capital. 
Securitization allows economies of scale and scope in acquisition and dissemination 
of information about organizations' receivables, and enables firms to learn more about 
characteristics and behaviour of their receivables. Since asset pools are pre-specified 
in securitization transactions, this facilitates actuarial analysis of investor risks, thus 
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mitigating levels of information asymmetry between investors and originators (Hill, 
1997). Securitization, therefore, makes originators' assets more transparent and 
thereby attracts capital market investors by reducing uncertainties for them. 
Respectively, the information costs in achieving external finance by originators are 
reduced. 
The benefit of reducing regulatory costs through asset securitization is suggested by a 
number of researchers due to the factor that securitizing asset requires no allocated 
equity as support (e. g. Hill, 1997, and Jobst, 2005). The loss reserves held by an 
originator against expected future losses are deemed sufficient to provide for the 
expected risk of the receivables; catastrophic risks have been transferred to the 
securitization investor. The amount of equity required by the market to be held against 
the receivables, pre-securitization, is therefore generally greatly in excess of what 
would need to be held against the receivables when viewed on a stand-alone basis. As 
a result, if equity requirements are conventionally viewed as a function of the balance 
sheet's debt/equity ratio, then no equity or only a fraction (related to the recourse 
provided) of that required by conventional debt financing is required to fund assets 
through a securitization. The effect on the all-in cost of capital, assuming any of a 
range of balance sheet debt/equity ratios and costs of equity can be dramatic. 
In contrast, Benston (1992) contended that lower funding costs resulting from 
securitizing quality assets are offset by higher funding costs on the remaining 
portfolio. The argument is consistent with MM Model that capital structure is 
irrelevant to overall cost of capital. Under the case, asset securitization could not 
affect cost of capital of originators. However, firstly, originators no longer securitize 
their best assets and leave the rest of portfolio in greater danger (Wolfe, 2000). As the 
61 
securitization market becomes established, investors have become more sophisticated 
than before. With fair return rate to the risk, investors demonstrate willingness to 
accept securities backed by less quality assets. Under the circumstances, originators 
now begin to issue ABS backed by different quality assets with different return rate to 
attract investors in all classes. Asset securitization, therefore, offers greater flexibility 
to originators. Secondly, in "real world", some of the Modigliani and Miller 
assumptions such as the absence of information and transaction costs are rather untrue. 
Overall, securitization could reduce the originator's cost of capital. 
Existing empirical studies focus mostly on mortgage market. The studies are 
motivated by the factor that securitization has emerged from relative obscurity to 
become a major factor in the mortgage market since mid 1980s. A single equation 
time series regression approach is commonly used to explain short-run interactions 
between securitization and mortgage rates. In general, these studies found that 
securitization tended to lower the interest rate spread on home loans (e. g Hendershott 
and Shilling 1989, Nothaft, Gabriel and Rothberg, 1989, and Jameson, Dewan and 
Sirmans 1992). Kolari, Fraser and Anari (1998) contribute to the study technically by 
employing cointegration analysis to deal with the problem of nonstationarity of 
mortgage market yields, theoretically, by extending the effects in long term. It is 
found that there is a 10% increase in the level of securitization as a proportion of total 
mortgage originations reduces the yield spread on home mortgage loans by as much 
as 20 basis points, which indicates securitization plays an important role in decreasing 
the cost of home loans in the long run. Todd (2001) extends the literature by 
examining the effects of securitization on loan origination fees and adjustable-rate 
mortgages. Although there is no evidence that securitization reduces the coupon rates 
on fixed-or adjustable-rate mortgages, it appears to lower mortgage loan origination 
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fees, resulting in substantial savings for consumers. In the study by Nothaft and 
Freund (2003), securitization did not lower credit costs, which is consistent with 
Todd's finding. But by facilitating the integration of the multifamily mortgage market 
into broader capital markets, securitization helps to create new sources of credit as 
some traditional portfolio investors reduced their share of loan holdings. It appears 
that researchers have yet to go inside firms and study forces driving securitization 
transactions by obtaining perceptions of relevant staff. It has not been identified 
whether certain factors, both exogenous and endogenous to firms, might discriminate 
between firms that securitize and those that do not. 
In sum, asset securitization could reduce the cost of capital due to: (1) it offers 
competitive rate of funding by separating the assets securitized from the risk of the 
firm, regardless of the firm's credit rating; (2) it reduces "information costs" under 
information asymmetry; (3) it mitigates the regulatory capital charge and achieves 
greater specialization in areas of comparative advantage. Previous studies generate 
conflicting empirical evidences on whether asset securitization lowers overall cost of 
capital. The firm specific characteristics which affect consequences of adoption of 
securitization are to be clarified. 
This proposed research is going to give a primary look at the effects of asset 
securitization on cost of capital. Firstly, changes of cost of capital around originators 
securitize assets are to be examined. Secondly, to clarify which firm specific 
characteristics influence the consequences, including credit rating, growth 
opportunities, firm size and leverage level. In following empirical study, the questions 
will be investigated. 
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4.3. Methodology 
In order to find whether asset securitization affects cost of capital of originators, three 
tests are adopted. The t-test is going to find for the sample, whether use of 
securitization influences overall cost of capital; the second is regression using cross 
sectional data, which expresses the relationship between cost of capital and amount of 
funds raised through asset securitization; finally, a regression using panel data 
provides more details about which factors and how they affect the changes of cost of 
capital for originators. The changes of cost of capital after each issue are calculated, 
and the sample will be split into two groups. Group One contains observations with 
negative changes (Ay < 0), and Group Two includes the rest of sample with positive 
changes and no changes (Ay >_ 0). The results for both groups will be compared in 
order to clarify the key factors to the effects. 
4.3.1 Testing Changes of Cost of Capital 
In this section, t-test is used to find out, firstly, whether the cost of capital is changed 
after securitization; secondly, whether the change is negative or positive. The 
two-tailed t-test is considered to be appropriate because previous literature debates on 
the sign of change of cost of capital. The postulate is as follow: 
Ho: Ayr =0 
H, : Ay # 0. 
Where y;, = cost of capital of company I on event year t (the year firm securitized 
assets). 
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If the originator issued more than once during event window, each issue is treated as 
one individual observation. It is expected that Ay,, proved to be statistically 
significant with negative sign, which indicates cost of capital is reduced after 
securitization based on the sample tested. 
Accounting data used by the study is on annual basis. This could lead to a problem 
that how to recognize the time of change. Firstly, there is gap between cost of capital 
changes and it is recognized by accounting. Secondly, the issuing time could be before 
or after the ending day of accounting year. Therefore, the gap and order between the 
issuing date and accounting date become key to decide how to calculate Ay,. For 
instance, if the issuing time is too close to the end of accounting year, the accounting 
data could not record the change. In that case, cost of capital of the issuing year 
should be compared with cost of next year rather than the year before. The 
measurement adopted is as follow: 
Table 4.2: Measuring changes of cost of capital (Ay, ) 
Originator Order Gap Ay, 
tIi tIi<tAi <3months =y", - Y, 
tIi<tAi _3months = yr - y, _, tli>tAi _3months = y, - y, _, 
tAi tIi>tAi >3months = yr+1 - Y, 
Where, t= event year; 
tIi = originator i issuing date; 
tAi = originator i accounting year ending date. 
And tIi <tAi means company i's issuing date is earlier than the same year ending date for 
accounting; t= event year (the year firm securitized assets), t -1 = the year before event year, 
t+1 = the year after event year. 
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According to the survey by Mclaney, Pointon, Thomas and Tucker (2004), the frequency of 
companies computing the cost of capital could be annually, or quarterly, or monthly. The 
majority of companies review the cost of capital annually (53.9%), and 18.1% of companies 
do it quarterly, only 4.7% monthly. Accordingly, for most companies, one-month is too short 
to assess any change of the cost of capital, while the gap between issuing data and accounting 
year ending data is unlikely to be twelve-month in same year. As a result, three-month is used 
as a benchmark by this study when calculate the change of cost of capital. 
4.3.2 Hypotheses and Variables 
First of all, the dependent variable, the cost of capital is measured by WACC 
(weighted average cost of capital). A corporation's cost of capital is defined as the rate 
of return the firm must earn on new investment in order to maintain the market price 
of its existing common stock unchanged (Brigham and Gordon, 1968). Modem 
cost-of-capital theory commences with Modigliani and Miller (1958,1963), who use 
arbitrage arguments to model the effect of leverage changes on a firm's cost of equity 
and its weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Several subsequent models have 
dealt with all factors affecting a firm's cost of capital, including the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966); the 
arbitrage pricing theory (APT) of Ross (1976); and the Fama-French (1997) 
three-factor model. 
According to Mclaney's (2004) survey study, 53.4% firms of UK sample use WACC 
to calculate the overall cost of capital. More empirical evidence suggests widespread 
use of the CAPM by practitioners to calculate cost of equity capital (Arnold and 
Hatzopoulos, 2000 and Al-Ali and Arkwright, 2000). Book and market value 
measures are equally popular when calculating the cost of debt, with firms tending to 
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employ an after-tax long term borrowing rate. Therefore, we are going to use those 
dominating methods to measure the dependent variable y. 
y= CostofDebtx WeighsO, (Debt +CostojEquity x WeightsOfEquity, , 
Where Cost of Debt = after-tax long term borrowing rate, Cost of Equity 
=r1 +ß(rm -rf). 
Following the measurement mentioned in previous chapter, the change of cost of 
capital (Ay, ) is calculated. Based on the results, the sample could be divided into two 
groups: all companies reduced their cost of capital through securitization construct 
Group One; while the companies that the overall cost of capital remained same or 
even increased, are included in Group Two. Accordingly, for different group, different 
sign of coefficient may be expected under same hypothesis. 
Hypothesis One: The cost of capital of originator is changed through asset 
securitization. 
The issue of whether securitization influences cost of capital remains unsolved 
(Benston, 1992, and Hill, 1997). As a financial innovation, asset securitization 
separate risks between assets being securitized and the originator, pricing the assets 
just by its own, therefore, by securitizing its best assets, originators save money. Even 
further, more and more issues on lower rating assets also seem cost efficient, since 
with the market development, investors are willing to invest in this sort of securities 
with lower expected return. However, there is no proof against the argument that what 
is saved through asset securitization could be offset by higher funding costs on the 
rest of portfolio held by the originator; furthermore, there are certain costs associated 
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with securitization. This hypothesis represents this question, whether originators' 
overall cost of capital remains unchanged after asset securitization, and a two-tail 
t-test is adopted for the purpose. The measurement of changes of cost of capital is 
described in chapter 4.3.1. 
Hypothesis Two: Asset securitization provides low cost funding source, therefore 
reduces overall cost of capital. 
This is to test the direct relationship between asset securitization and cost of capital in the 
regressions. Previous literature suggests asset securitization is a low cost funding source (Bryan, 
1988a). The originator, therefore, could save costs of capital by raising funds through asset 
securitization. A negative sign is expected between the cost of capital (y) and securitization ratio 
(se) in the regressions. 
This securitization ratio (Se) is measured by two methods, natural logarithm of the 
issuing size, and the ratio of issuing size to total assets, following preview references 
(e. g. Dionne and Harchaoui, 2003). 
In order to identify the factors that affect the cost of capital, the following hypotheses 
are tested. The hypotheses are made to find out the relationships between the change 
of cost of capital (e y) and the independent variables. Moreover, due to the reason 
that only the companies in Group One (the group with negative Ay) reduce the cost of 
capital through securitization, the results of this specific group should be focus. 
However, the results of the full sample and Group Two (the group with 
positive Ay and Ay =0) are also provided and compared for further details. 
Hypothesis Three: Securitization offers competitive rate of funding by separating the 
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assets securitized from the risk of firm, regardless of the firm's credit rating. 
"True sale" of assets distinguishes asset securitization from other funding tool. 
Researchers suggest that asset securitization reduces cost of capital by separating the 
credit risk of securitized assets from risk of the firm (Morrissey, 1992). The securities 
backed by the assets are priced without considering the owner's credit ratings. Under 
this case, firms with bad credit ratings could achieve cheaper funds by securitizing 
their good quality assets. As a result, those companies tend to raise funds through 
securitization in order to save costs. For companies with good credit ratings, it is 
easier for them to find alternative funding sources. Thus, the benefit offered by 
securitization to good rated companies is not as great as it to bad rated ones. In 
another word, lower the credit ratings, more cost-saving will be. A negative 
relationship between ey and credit rating is then expected to satisfy the hypothesis. 
The dummy variable (rating) is constructed as: 
Rating= 6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 
Rating= 5 if Moody's rating is AA; 
Rating= 4 if Moody's rating is A; 
Rating= 3 if Moody's rating is BBB; 
Rating= 2 if Moody's rating is BB; 
Rating= 1 if Moody's rating is B; 
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Rating= 0 for all the other lower ratings. 
Hypothesis Four: Asset securitization reduces information costs under information 
asymmetry for originators. 
The "information costs" could be defined as the costs that company faces when 
attempting to raise outside capital (Hill, 1997). They are decided by growth option (g), 
size (size) and leverage level (lr) of the company. Companies with fewer growth 
options, smaller size, and higher leverage tend to pay more as information costs. Hill 
(1997) argues that by carving up the evaluation of a company's securities into tasks 
amenable to greater specialization, securitization may effectively lower total 
information costs for all of its securities, debt and equity, moreover, such 
cost-reduction benefits should be greatest -for those companies that are less 
well-known to the financial community. Asset securitization, therefore, offers an 
opportunity for the smaller company with comparative disadvantages to compete with 
the others. If decline of information costs results in overall cost reduction, companies 
with fewer growth options, smaller size and higher leverage, should have more 
significant cost reduction than the others. Accordingly, in Group One, which contains 
all companies with reduced cost of capital through asset securitization, an inverse 
relationships between reduction of cost of capital (Ay, ) and growth options (g) is 
expected, the firm size (size) is predicted to be negatively related to Ay, , and 
leverage ratio (lr) should positively affect Ay,. 
Suggested by De Jong and Veld (2001), the variable of growth opportunities (g) is 
measured by market-to-book ratio. The market value of the firm is calculated as the 
market value of equity multiplied by number of shares outstanding plus liabilities plus 
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preferred stock minus balance-sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credits. The net 
book value is used as denominator. Firm size is calculated as the natural logarithm of 
gross total assets, averaged between the beginning and the end of the year (De Jong 
and Veld, 2001). Leverage ratio is measured as book value of debt divided by book 
value of assets (De Jong et al, 2006). 4 
Hypothesis Five: Experienced originators enjoy more savings on cost of capital 
through asset securitization. 
Costs associated with asset securitization vary cross different issues. The expenses can 
be significant for new issuers who lack infrastructure and reputation (Twinn, 1994). 
While for experienced originators, the costs in issuing the securities should be lower. 
In Group One (Ay<O), positive sign between Ay, and frequency of issuing (fe) is 
expected. 
Here in our sample, the average frequency during last 12 years is calculated as 4.56, 
therefore, the dummy frequency is defined as: Fe =1 if the firm issued more than 5 
times over sample year, =0 otherwise. 
Hypothesis Six: Originators' costs of capital differ in type of assets securitized. 
Costs associated with asset securitization vary across different issues. Henderson and 
Barings (1997) suggest the costs of issuing differ in type of assets securitized (AS). 
Taking the issuing costs into account certainly makes difference when calculate the 
overall cost of capital. Types of asset being securitized are varied in the sample, 
including ABS (containing WB-ABS (Whole-business asset-backed securities), 
4In Datastream, leverage ratio is measured as current liabilities plus long-term debt and other liabilities, divided 
by the sum of current assets, long term receivables and investments. 
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CC-ABS (credit-card ABS), project finance, SL-ABS (student loan ABS)), CDO 
(collateralized debt obligations), RMBS (residential mortgage-backed securities), and 
CMBS (commercial mortgage-backed securities). The ABS is defined as base group. 
The effects are expected to be different on asset collateral. The dummy variable Asset 
is measured as follow: 
Dummy asl, =1 for CDO, =0 otherwise; 
Dummy as2, =1 for CMBS, =0 otherwise; 
Dummy as3; =1 for RMBS, =0 otherwise. 
4.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Most of data used in this study were gathered from Datastream. Table 4.3 provides 
description of each variable along with DS codes of the database. 
Table 4.3: Data description 
Variable Description Datastream Codes 
Cost of capital Cost of debt*percentage of debt*(1-tax rate) + (WC01251/1301)*[1301/(1301+3 
(WACC) cost of equity * percentage of equity , 05)]*(1-WCO1451/WCO1401) Cost of debt = after-tax long term borrowing +[FTSEI00+beta*(GILTS-FTSEI 
rate, 00)]*[305/(1301+305)] 
Cost of equity (CAMP) =rf+ 83(rm -rf 
Growth Market-to-book ratio MTBV 
opportunities( 
G) 
Firm size(Size) Natural logarithm of total assets LN 392 
Leverage (Total liabilities)/(Total assets) WC03351/WC02999 
ratio Lr 
Securitization (1) natural logarithm (issue size of (1) LN(se) 
ratio securitization) (2) Sec/392 
(se) (million (2) (Issue size of securitization)/total assets 
USA dollar 
As mentioned before, the whole sample will be split into two groups based on the sign 
of Ay for each issue. Group One contains all observations with negative Ay, while 
72 
the rest belong to Group Two. The descriptive statistics are provided separately in 
Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Statistics of variables 
Whole sample 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
cc 542 0.0334 0.0579 -0.6281 0.2491 
0 cc 542 -0.0064 0.0476 -0.6122 0.2059 
542 2.1131 1.3211 . 23 17.2 
size 542 18.3274 2.1381 9.8456 25.3096 
Ir 542 0.8797 0.2031 1.20e-06 0.9992 
cr 542 3.4654 9.5886 0.04 86.3 
Se l 542 6.3168 1.2372 0.23 10.14 
Se2 542 0.0945 0.3490 5.73e-07 4.5473 
E Fe 542 0.7325 0.4431 0 1 
rating 542 4.2657 1.1110 0 6 
Group One: Ay<O 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
cc 313 0.0304 0.0683 -0.6281 0.2491 
A cc 313 -0.0286 0.0468 -0.6122 -0.0001 
313 2.2360 1.3722 0.37 9.64 
size 313 18.1135 2.1874 9.8457 21.1181 
Ir 313 0.8873 0.1754 2.91e-06 0.9992 
Se l 313 6.2111 1.1869 1.35 10.14 
Se2 313 0.1103 0.4005 5.91e-06 4.5473 
Fe 313 0.6901 0.4632 0 1 
rating 313 4.3035 1.1577 0 6 
Group Two: Ay>=0 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
cc 229 0.0376 0.0393 -0.0983 0.2184 
A cc 229 0.0239 0.0280 0 0.2059 
229 1.9452 1.2313 0.23 17.2 
size 229 18.62 2.0373 12.2242 25.3096 
Ir 229 0.8693 0.2359 1.20e-06 0.9900 
Se l 229 6.4612 1.2915 0.23 10.09 
Se2 229 0.0729 0.2620 5.73e-07 2.7644 
Fe 229 0.7904 0.4079 0 1 
rating 229 4.2139 1.0440 0 6 77d 
The whole sample containing 542 issues are split into two groups, Group One with 313 
observations and Group two with 229 observations. Therefore, firstly, the number of 
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issues leading to reduction of cost of capital is comparatively more in the sample. 
Secondly, for the two groups, the means values of most variables are not significantly 
different with each other except growth opportunities (g) and frequency (fe). More 
specific, average market-to-book value equals to 2.2360 in Group One, while 1.9452 in 
Group Two; mean value of frequency equals to 0.6901 in the first group, and 0.7904 for 
the latter. Accordingly, Group One (A y<O) is characterized by better growth 
opportunities but less frequency of issuing comparing to Group Two (Av >_ 0). More 
details and stronger proof are expected through results of regressions described in the 
next chapter. 
Table 4.5: Correlation matrix 
Variables cc g 
cc 1 1.0000 
size Ir Se l Set Fe rain 
g -0.0063 1.0000 
(0.8841) 
Size 1 -0.2702* -0.0765 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0751) 
Ir 0.0207 -0.0262 0.3383* 1.0000 
(0.6312) (0.5425) (0.0000) 
Sel 0.0421 -0.0774 0.0386 -0.2297* 1.0000 
(0.3277) (0.0717) (0.3692) (0.0000) 
Se2 0.3649* 0.0235 -0.5748* -0.1919* 0.0429 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.5854) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3129) 
Fe 0.0628 -0.0178 0.1715* 0.0760 0.0597 -0.0646 
(0.1441) (0.6792) (0.0001) (0.0770) (0.1653) (0.1329) 
Rating 1 -0.0262 0.0999 0.1078 0.1223* 0.0427 -0.0547 
(0.5422) (0.0201) (0.0120) (0.0044) (0.3207) (0.2038) 
*Correlation is significant at I°-ö level. 
1.0000 
0.0696 1.0000 
0.1057) 
Table 4.5 indicates there is no need for multicollinearity test caused by significantly 
high correlations. One of the variables. securitization ratio (Se2) has high correlations 
with size of the company (size) and leverage ratio (lr) is predictable due to the 
measurement of variables, where total assets are used in all three calculations. Finally, 
the cost of capital (cc) is expected highly related to the size of the company (size), and 
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securitization ratio (Se2), which should be consistent with the result of regression 
analysis in the next chapters 
4.4 Results and Findings 
4.4.1 Two-tailed T -test 
As mentioned before, Hypothesis One is going to test whether cost of capital changed 
after securitization for the sample (Ay, ). Table 4.6 presents the results of test one. 
Table 4.6: Results of Two-tailed T -test 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval 
Ay, 542 -0.0064 0.0020 0.0476 -0.0104 -0.0024 
Ho: IAy, =o 
HI: Ay, <0 HE Dytoo HI: Ayr>O 
t= -3.1231 
P<t=0.0009 
t= -3.1231 
P>Itl=0.0019 
t= -3.1231 
P>t=0.9991 
The mean of Ay, is -0.64%, and the t-statistic and P value of mean less than zero is 
statistically significant (t=-3.1231, P=0.0009). The result strongly suggests that the 
cost of capital is reduced after securitization. In next section, the reasons of the 
reduction are to be found through regression analysis. 
4.4.2 Cross sectional regression 
Estimation results for sample regression are reported in Table 4.7, followed by 
S The nor mality test (Shapiro-Wilk test) is provided in Appendix 4.1. The results could not reject the null 
hypothesis that the distribution is normal. Therefore, regression analysis is allowed for the study. 
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analysis on two groups by running same regression. 
Table 4.7 Cross sectional regressions using full sample (dependent variable y, 1) 
Full Sample 
Variables Coe. Coe. 
t 
G -0.0013 -0.0015 
-0.71 -0.86 Size -0.0077 -0.0023 
(-5.95)*** (-1.59) 
Lr 0.0445 0.0428 
(3.48)*** *** 
Sel 0.0009 
(0.40) 
Se2 0.0522 
6.0*** 
Fe 0.0086 0.0070 
(1.54) (1.29) 
Rating 0.0021 0.0022 
(0.40) (1.02) 
As l (CDO-ABS) -0.0173 -0.0233 
(-2.23)** (-3.22)*** 
As2(CMBS) -0.0027 -0.0112 
(434) (-1.43) 
As3(RMBS) 0.0105 0.0053 
(1.52) (0.79) 
_cons 
0.1200 0.0293 
(4.63)*** (1.07) 
No. of observations 542 542 
F 8.79 14.16 
R2 0.1294 0.1933 
Adjusted RI 0.1147 0.1796 
This table explains effects of asset securitization on cost of capital on originators from the cross sectional 
regression using full sample. 
y, = P. +Q, G, +/I2Size, +ß, Lr, +/i4Se, +Q5Fe, +/i6Rating, +j6, Asl, +ß`As2, +Q9As3, + 
i =1,2,......, 542. 
Where y, = cost of capital of firm i using WACC method, 
G, = Growth opportunities of firm i= market-to-book value, 
Stýe, = firm size of i= Ln(total assets), 
Lr, = leverage ratio = (total liabilities)/(total assets), 
Se 1= In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing), 
Se2 = (size)/(total assets), 
Fe, (Dummy) = frequency of issuing ABS =1 if the originator has issued more than 5 times during 
1993-2005; =0 otherwise, 
Rating, (Dummy) =6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; =2if BB; =1 if B; =0 for all 
the other lower ratings; 
Dummy at, =I for CDO, =0 otherwise; Dummy as2, =1 for CMBS, 0 otherwise; Dummy as3, =1 
for RMBS, -0 otherwise. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
"Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t -test. 
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For the full sample of 542 issues, first of all, the securitization ratio is positively 
related to the cost of capital, which is against hypothesis two. The result is statistically 
significant (ß4 = 0.0522, t-statistic =6.50). 6 There fore, securitization is not an 
economical funding option. Secondly, mixed results are generated considering the 
hypothesis of information costs saving. Only the leverage is proved to be positively 
related to the change of cost of capital (/33= 0.0428, t-statistic = 3.57). Finally, costs 
of capital differ in types of assets securitized. Issuing of CDO is proved to be 
favorable considering cost efficiency (ß7 = -0.0233, t-statistic = -3.22). The value of 
R2 is on a reasonable level, 0.1933 exactly, which indicates the explanatory power of 
the regression. 
6 Since securitization ratio is measured in two different ways, different results are reported. We quote coefficients 
and t-value appeared in regression with higher R-squared in our analysis. 
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Table 4.8: Cross sectional regressions of Group One (dependent variable y, 1) 
Group One (A y<O) 
Variables Coe Coe 
(t) (t) 
G -0.0007 -0.0009 
(-0.27) (-0.34) 
Size -0.0089 -0.0023 
(4.33)*** -1.01 
Lr 0.0557 0.0542 
(2.35)** (2.41)*** 
Sei 0.0017 
(0.49) 
Se2 0.0552 
(5.01)*** 
Fe 0.0139 0.0127 
(1.66)* (1.58) 
Rating 0.0004 0.0013 
(0.11) (0.38) 
As l (CDO-ABS) -0.0150 -0.0233 
-1.26 (-2.09)** 
As2(CMBS) 0.0025 -0.0079 
(0.21) (-0.66) 
As3(RMBS) 0.0135 0.0085 
(1.25) (0.81) 
_cons 
0.1215 0.0118 
(3.10)*** (0.28) 
No. of observations 313 313 
F 4.80 7.96 
R3 0.1248 0.1912 
Adjusted R2 0.0988 0.1671 
This table explains effects of asset securitization on cost of capital on originators from the cross sectional 
regression for Group One. 
Y, = Qo + ß, G, +, 6, Size, + /33Lr, +, 6, Se, + Q5Fe, + ß6Rating, + ß, Asl, + /3 As2, + AAs31 + s, i=1,2........ 313. 
Where yi = cost of capital of firm i using WACC method, 
G, = Growth opportunities of firm i= market-to-book value, 
Size, = finn size of i= Ln(total assets), 
Lr, = leverage ratio = (total liabilities)/(total assets), 
SeI = In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing), 
Set = (size)/(total assets), 
Fe; (Dummy) = frequency of issuing ABS =1 if the originator has issued more than 5 times during 
1993-2005; 0 otherwise, 
Ratings (Dummy) =6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; =2if BB; =1 if B; =0 for 
all the other lower ratings; 
Dummy aSl, =1 for CDO, =0 otherwise; Dummy aS2, =1 for CMBS, =0 otherwise; Dummy 
as3, =1 for RMBS, =0 otherwise. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t-test. 
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Table 4.8 displays results of same regression as above for Group One. The group 
contains 313 observations with negative Ay, representing originators who reduced 
cost of capital after securitizing assets. Again, the securitization ratio positively affects 
the cost of capital, and the result is statistically significant (, 64 = 0.0522, t-statistic 
=5.01). Further, higher the leverage ratio (ß3= 0.0542, t-statistic = 2.41), higher the 
cost of capital will be. Finally, the securities issued as CDO lead to lower cost of 
capital (ß7 _ -0.0233, t-statistic = -2.09). 
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Table 4.9: Cross sectional regression of Group Two (dependent variable y,, ) 
Group Two 
(Ay ? 0) 
Variables Coe Coe 
(t) (t) 
G -0.0014 -0.0020 
-0.69 -1.05 
Size -0.0068 -0.0031 
(-4.94)*** (-1.94)** 
Lr 0.0354 0.0342 
(3.14)*** (3.26)*** 
Sel -0.0005 
(-0.21) 
Se2 0.0451 
(4.10)*** 
Fe -0.0038 -0.0062 
-0.60 (-1.02) 
Rating 0.0049 0.0040 
1.94** 1.68* 
As l (CDO-ABS) -0.0204 -0.0232 
(-2.53)*** (-3.08)*** 
As2(CMBS) -0.0094 -0.0138 
(-1.11) -1.69 
As3(RMBS) 0.0062 0.0011 
(0.87) (0.16) 
_cons 
0.1262 0.0626 
(4.49)*** (2.19)** 
No. of observations 229 229 
F 6.31 8.66 
R2 0.2059 0.2625 
Adjusted R2 0.1733 0.2321 
This table explains effects of asset securitization on cost of capital on originators from the cross sectional 
regression for Group Two. 
y, = Qo + PG, +, 6, Size, + Q3Lr, + ß4Se, + ß3Fe, + Q6Rating, + Q7Asl1 + ß1As 2, + Q9As3, + s, i=1,2........ 229. 
Where y, = cost of capital of firm i using WACC method, 
G, = Growth opportunities of firm i= market-to-book value, 
Size, = firm size of i= Ln(total assets), 
Lr, = leverage ratio = (total liabilities)/(total assets), 
Se I= In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing), 
Set = (size)/(total assets), 
Fe, (Dummy) = frequency of issuing ABS =1 if the originator has issued more than 5 times during 
1993-2005; =0 otherwise, 
Rating, (Dummy) =6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; =2if BB; =1 if B; =0 for all 
the other lower ratings; 
Dummy as], =I for CDO, =0 otherwise; Dummy as2, =I for CMBS, =0 otherwise; Dummy as3, 
=1 for RMBS, =0 otherwise. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t-test. 
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The results of Group Two (Ay >_ 0) with 229 observations are described in Table 4.9. 
The value of R2 increased dramatically to 0.2625, which indicates the regression 
explains dependent variable much better. On the other hand, thereby, there are 
unobserved factors causing the negative changes of cost of capital in Group One. 
Panel data analysis is confirmed to be necessary by the situation. The other findings 
are: firstly, the results confirm a positive relationship between the securitization ratio 
and the cost of capital (, 84= 0.0451, t-statistic =4.10). Secondly, the effects are 
influenced by three firm-specific characteristics, size, leverage level and credit ratings 
of the firm. More specific, size of the firm affects cost of capital in a converse way 
(, ß2 = -0.0031, t-statistic =-1.94), while leverage ratio and credit rating positively 
affect the cost of capital (. 83= 0.0342, t-statistic = 3.26; /j6 = 0.0040, t-statistic = 
1.68). Finally, costs of capital differ in types of assets securitized. Issuing of CDO and 
CMBS are both proved to be negatively related to the change of cost (ß7= -0.0232, 
t-statistic = -3.08; /18=-0.0138, t-statistic=-1.69). 
Consequently, the findings of the regression using cross sectional data are: 
Firstly, asset securitization itself is a costly funding option, which is conflicting to 
Morrissey's opinion (1992). Secondly, asset securitization reduces information costs 
for companies suffering high leverage level. Thirdly, the effects of asset securitization 
on cost of capital are specific by asset collateral, more specific, issuing of CDO 
reduces cost of capital. 
Further, comparatively, in Group One (0 y<O), securitization affects cost of capital 
more significantly (ß4 = 0.0552 for Group one and 0.0451 for Group two, both are 
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statistically significant). Besides, unlike companies in Group Two, their costs of 
capital are not influenced by size, growth opportunity and credit ratings of companies, 
which may explains why the value of RZ is much higher in testing Group Two than 
in testing Group One. And, it suggests there are unobserved reasons causing the 
reduction of cost of capital. 
4.4.3 Regression using panel data 
In this section, panel data is used to find relationships between changes of cost of 
capital and the variables. Issues by same originator at same year are merged into one, 
because technically panel data analysis does not allow string variable. By doing so, 
the number of observations is reduced from 542 to 272. Respectively, each of the two 
groups contains less observations (162 for Group One, and 110 for Group Two). 
Random effect estimators are proved to be more appropriate than fixed effect 
estimators based on Hausman test. 7 But the results using fixed effects model are also 
provided in Appendix 4.2. 
7 Results of Hausman test are reported in Appendix 4.2. It tests «hether the coefficients estimated by the random 
effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the fixed effects estimators. 
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Table 4.10: Panel data analysis of whole sample 
Variables RE RE 
Reg. Reg. 
No. of Observations 272 272 
G -0.0085 -0.0086 
(-3.28)*** (-3.31)*** 
Size -0.0039 -0.0055 
(-1.33) -1.76 
Lr 0.0485 0.0465 
(1.27) (1.22) 
Sel -1.33e-06 
(0.00) 
Se2 -0.0114 
(-1.27) 
Fe -0.0075 -0.0054 
-0.49 -0.35 
Rating -0.0010 -0.0010 
(-0.15) -0.15 
As l (CDO-ABS) -0.0072 -0.0061 
-0.65 -0.55 
As2(CMBS) -0.0049 -0.0035 
-0.44 -0.32 
As3(RMBS) -0.0046 -0.0033 
-0.39 (-0.29) 
_cons 
0.0450 0.0751 
(0.86) (1.32) 
Within- RZ 0.0722 0.0782 
Between -R2 
0.0234 0.0278 
Overall- R2 0.0109 0.0183 
Wald Chi-squared 12.46 14.20 
Prob. 0.1887 0.1155 
This table explains the relationship between asset securitization and change of cost of capital (0 y). 
Ay,, = a, + a, G, + a2S[. -ew +a3Lr, +a4Se +a5Fe, +a6Ratingý +a7As1 +a8As2,, +a9As3,, +U,, 
i= 1 
, 
2,..., 272. 
Where y; = cost of capital of firm i using WACC method, 
G; = Growth opportunities of firm i= market-to-book value, 
Size, = firm size of i= Ln(total assets), 
Lr, = leverage ratio = (total liabilities)/(total assets), 
Sei = In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing), 
Se2 = (size)/(total assets), 
(Dummy) = frequency of issuing ABS =I if the originator has issued more than 5 times during 
1993-2005; 0 otherwise, 
Rating, (Dummy) =6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; =2if BB; =1 if B; =0 for 
all the other lower ratings; 
Dummy aSl, =I for CDO, =0 otherwise; Dummy as2, =1 for CMBS, =0 otherwise; Dummy 
as31 =1 for RMBS, =0 otherwise. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t-test. 
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Table 4.10 summarizes panel data analysis using random effects model for full sample. 
The overall R squared value becomes minimal, indicates the independent variables 
included could not explain changes of cost of capital, and there are certain critical 
factors waiting to be found. 8 T he only statistically significant coefficient belongs to 
growth opportunity (at =-0.0086, t-statistic = -3.31). Respectively, more growth 
opportunities, less changes of cost of capital will be. 
8 Since random effects model is adopted, the overall R squared value should be the one reported under normal 
circumstances. However, Stata provide all three R Squared values, giving more sufficient information comparing 
to other software package. 
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Table 4.11: Panel data analysis for Group One (A y<O) 
Variables Hypothesized Sign RE RE 
Reg. Reg. 
(z) (z) 
G -0.0047 -0.0050 
(-1.50) (-1.65)* 
Size - -0.0018 -0.0042 
-0.57 (-1.20) 
Lr + 0.0367 0.0344 
(1.07) (1.02) 
Sel - -0.0001 
-0.03 
Se2 - -0.0180 
-1.54 
Fe + -0.0140 -0.0104 
(-0.78) (-0.56) 
Rating - -0.0017 -0.0018 
(-0.24) (-0.25) 
As l (CDO-ABS) 0.0001 0.0014 
(0.08) (0.14) 
As2(CMBS) -0.0049 -0.0039 
-0.51 (-0.42) 
As3(RMBS) 0.0052 0.0047 
(0.51) (0.48) 
_cons -0.0113 
0.0356 
-0.20 (0.54) 
Within- RZ 0.0368 0.0776 
Between-R2 0.0253 0.0198 
Overall- R2 0.0010 0.0105 
Wald Chi-squared 4.68 7.25 
Prob. 0.8610 0.6122 
This table explains the relationship between asset securitization and change of cost of capital (0 y). 
Ay,, = ao + a, G, + a2Si: e,, + a3L,, + a4Se,, + a, Fe, + a6Rating, + a, Asla + a$As2a + a9As3,, + u 
i=1 
, 2,..., 162. 
Where y; = cost of capital of firm i using WACC method, 
Q; = Growth opportunities of firm i= market-to-book value, 
SiZei = firm size of i= Ln(total assets), 
Lr, = leverage ratio = (total liabilities)/(total assets), 
Sei = In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing), 
Set = (size)/(total assets), 
Fe, (Dummy) = frequency of issuing ABS =I if the originator has issued more than 5 times during 
1993-2005; =0 otherwise, 
Rating, (Dummy) =6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; =2if BB; =1 if B; =0 for 
all the other lower ratings; 
Dummy QSl, =I for CDO, 0 otherwise; Dummy as2, =I for CMBS, =0 otherwise; Dummy 
as3, =I for RMBS, =0 otherwise. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
"Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed West. 
Running the regression using panel data in Group one, as described by Table 4.11, the 
results are similar to the one in full sample. Again, the R squared value is extremely 
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minimal, which indicates the regression could not explain changes of cost of capital. 
Table 4.12: Panel data analysis for Group Two (A y_0) 
Variables RE RE 
Reg. Reg. 
(z) (z) 
G -0.0041 -0.0039 
(-2.96)*** (-2.73)*** 
Size -0.0050 -0.0061 
(-3.58)*** (-3.75)*** 
Lr 0.0044 0.0120 
(0.24) (0.63) 
Se l -0.0040 
(-2.46)*** 
Se2 -0.0038 
(-0.78) 
Fe 0.0002 -0.0004 
(0.03) -0.07 
Rating -0.0024 -0.0032 
-0.72 (-0.95) 
As l (CDO-ABS) -0.0052 -0.0048 
(-0.76) -0.67 
As2(CMBS) -0.0005 0.0013 
-0.08 (0.18) 
As3(RMBS) -0.0063 -0.0078 
-0.87 -1.03 
_cons 
0.1647 0.1544 
(6.14)*** (5.31)*** 
RZ 0.1781 0.2103 Within- 
R2 0.3614 0.3063 Between- 
Overall- R2 
0.2544 0.2047 
Wald Chi-squared 36.87 29.61 
Prob. 0.0000 0.0005 
This table explains the relationship between asset securitization and change of cost of capital (0 y). 
Ay;, =a0 +a, G +a2Size + a3Lr,, +a4Se +a5Fe, +a6Rating, +a7Asl +a$As2 +a9As3;, +v,, 
i=1,2,... '110. 
Where y; = cost of capital of firm i using WACC method, 
G; = Growth opportunities of firm i= market-to-book value, 
Size; = firm size of i= Ln(total assets), 
Lr, = leverage ratio = (total liabilities)/(total assets), 
Sei = In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing), 
Se2 = (size)/(total assets), 
Fe, (Dummy) = frequency of issuing ABS =I if the originator has issued more than 5 times during 
1993-2005; =0 otherwise, 
Rating; (Dummy) =6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; =2if BB; =1 if B; 0 for 
all the other lower ratings; 
Dummy aSl, =I for CDO, =0 otherwise; Dummy as2, =1 for CMBS, =0 otherwise; Dummy 
as3, =1 for RMBS, =0 otherwise. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t-test. 
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However, same random effects model provides much more significant results for 
Group Two, which is summarized in Table 4.12. The R squared value is as high as 
0.2544. The findings are: firstly, the securitization ratio is negatively related to the 
change of cost of capital (a4 =-0.0040, s-statistic = -2.46). Thus, more funds are raised 
through securitization, less extent the cost-increase will be. Although based on 
previous test, securitization is costly and will increase overall cost of capital, the 
group of companies still benefited from it, since otherwise their costs of capital are 
even higher. Secondly, companies with disadvantages in information costs saving, 
which have less growth opportunities and smaller size, are affected more significantly 
by asset securitization (a, =-0.0041, s-statistic =-2.96; a2=-0.0050, s-statistic=-3.58). 
Their costs of capital increased more than other companies which do not have the 
problem. Therefore, for weaker companies, asset securitization may free cash flow 
required, but it is a costly activity and they have to pay the price in the future. 
Overall, only Group Two is well explained by the random effects model. The results 
using fixed effects model are provided in Appendix 4.3, which are similar and not 
more significant than the results using random model. It is found that stronger 
companies, here which means bigger companies with more growth opportunities, are 
less affected be asset securitization. Although securitization is not a cheap funding 
option for them, it could decrease the costs through diversification. Asset 
securitization could convert future cash flow into immediate cash, solving liquidity 
problem for originators. However, for smaller companies with less growth 
opportunities, adoption of asset securitization increases cost of capital significantly. 
They have to take it into account when making decisions to securitize or not. 
In sum, by examining all three steps, the T -test, and regressions using cross sectional 
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and panel data, it is found that, firstly, cost of capital is reduced after adoption of asset 
securitization based on the sample. However, securitization activity is positively 
related to the cost of capital, which indicates reduction of cost of capital is not direct 
benefit from asset securitization. Securitization itself is costly. Secondly, companies 
suffering high leverage level benefit from asset securitization as result of lower 
information costs. Thirdly, the effects of asset securitization are asset collateral 
specific. CDO is proved to be cost efficient. Finally, there is significant difference in 
R squared values when running the same regression using two sub-samples (one with 
i y<O and the other with Dy >_ 0). Group Two is better explained by regression given, 
which indicates there are unobserved factors related to lower cost of capital for 
originators. 
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter gives a primary look at the effects of asset securitization on cost of 
capital. Asset securitization affects cost of capital either directly - by offering 
competitive funding rate - or indirectly, by changing capital structure. Either way, 
cost of capital measured by WACC should be affected by adoption of asset 
securitization, which was examined in this empirical study. 
Previous literature suggests asset securitization reduces cost of capital due to: (1) it 
offers competitive rate of funding by separating the assets securitized from the risk of 
the firm, regardless of the firm's credit rating (Morrissey, 1992); (2) it reduces 
"information costs" under information asymmetry (Frankel, 1991); (3) it mitigates the 
regulatory capital charge and achieves greater specialization in areas of comparative 
advantage (Hill, 1997). However, at the same time, securitization also introduces new 
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costs (Henderson and Barings, 1997). The costs associated with asset securitization 
vary cross different issues. Experienced originators have the advantages in expenses 
saving (Twinn, 1994). Further, the costs on structuring different type of assets also 
very and change the overall costs of issuing (Henderson and Barings, 1997). 
Benston (1992) contended that securitization could not lower capital cost, as lower 
funding costs resulting from securitizing quality assets are offset by higher funding 
costs on the remaining portfolio, which is consistent with MM model that capital 
structure is irrelevant with overall cost of capital. However, first of all, the role of 
equity in the capital structure has to be considered in thinking of the benefit associated 
with asset securitization as a funding alternative to traditional on-balance sheet debt 
finance. The second, assumptions of MM model would not stand in real world, all 
costs involved have to be considered (Hill, 1997). 
As a result, the question of whether asset securitization reduces overall cost of capital 
remains unsolved. Previous empirical studies generate conflicting evidences, and the 
firm specific characteristics which affect consequences of adoption of securitization 
have not been clarified. 
This research examines, firstly, changes of cost of capital after originators securitizing 
assets. Secondly, clarify which firm specific characteristics influence the 
consequences, including credit rating, growth opportunities, firm size and leverage 
level. T-test, regressions using cross-sectional and panel data are adopted in empirical 
study using a sample containing 542 issues on UK securitization market over the 
period January 1993 to December 2005. Six Hypotheses are tested, which are 
summarized as Table 4.13. 
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Table 4.13: Hypotheses Summary 
Hypotheses under Investigation Expected Approved 
Sign 
Hypothesis One: The cost of capital of originator is changed Yes 
through asset securitization. 
Hypothesis Two: Asset securitization provides low cost - No 
funding source, therefore reduces overall cost of capital. 
Hypothesis Three: Securitization offers competitive rate of - No 
funding by separating the assets securitized from the risk of 
firm, regardless of the firm's credit rating. 
Hypothesis Four: Asset securitization reduces information g: - No 
costs under information as inators mmetr for ori . y y g Size: - No 
Lr: + Yes 
Hypothesis Five: Experienced originators enjoy more + No 
savings on cost of capital through asset securitization. 
Hypothesis Six: Originators' costs of capital will differ in Yes 
type of asset securitized. 
It is found that the cost of capital is reduced after adoption of asset securitization, 
which is consistent with Kolari, Fraser and Anari (1998), but in contrast with Todd 
(2001) and Nothaft and Freund (2003). Other major findings are as follows. 
Firstly, reduction of cost of capital is not direct benefit from asset securitization. It is 
rather offered by asset securitization through diversification and changes of capital 
structure, since the results indicate securitization itself is a costly funding tool, which 
is conflicting to Morrissey's opinion (1992). 
Secondly, companies suffering high leverage level benefit from asset securitization as 
result of lower information costs. In securitization transactions, asset pools are 
pre-specified, mitigating levels of information asymmetry between investors and 
originators (Hill, 1997). Companies with high leverage level normally have to spend 
more on information costs in order to achieve external finance. But securitization 
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could make assets more transparent, and reduce uncertainties for capital market 
investors to attract cash inflow. 
Thirdly, effects of asset securitization on cost of capital are asset collateral specific. 
CDO is proved to be cost efficient on UK securitization market. The issuing expenses 
of asset securitization vary among different types of assets (Henderson and Baring, 
1997). However, the result may arise due to selection of sample. 
Finally, companies with disadvantages in information costs saving, which have less 
growth opportunities or smaller size, are affected more significantly by asset 
securitization. Their costs of capital increased more than other companies which do 
not have the problem after securitizing assets. Therefore, for these companies, asset 
securitization may free cash flow required, but it is a costly activity and they have to 
pay the price in the future. 
The R squared values changed significantly when running same regression using two 
sub-samples (one with A y<O and the other with Ay >_ 0). The latter group is better 
explained by regression given, which indicates unobserved factors related to reduction 
of cost of capital for originators. According to previous literature, the unobserved 
factors could be the maturity, the novelty or complexity of securitization transaction 
(which affect the issuing fees, suggested by Henderson and Barings (1997)); the tax 
treatment according to local accounting standard (which changes the market expenses, 
suggested by Bradt (1991)); and finally, whether the originator continues to serve the 
assets after securitizing ( which influences the running costs of securitization, 
suggested by Bradt (1991)). Unfortunately, the information mentioned above is hard 
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to achieve and therefore, is not included in the regression, which leaves a gap for 
further research. 
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Chapter 5 
Effects of Asset Securitization on Risks 
5.1 Introduction 
This test investigates the relationship between asset securitization and risks faced by 
originators. Previous literature suggests asset securitization realizes risk reduction not 
only directly through the issue, but also by affecting the lending decision (e. g. Murray, 
2001, and Jobst, 2003). As risk management tool, asset securitization reduces credit 
risk and interest rate risk (Ong, 2000), and offers better estimation and control of risk 
(Benston, 1992). However, asset securitization may also create new problem for 
originators (e. g. Bradt, 1991, Kravit, 1997, and Jobst, 2005). Consequently, the effects 
of asset securitization on risks remain unsolved. 
The existing empirical studies on the topic are limited, and it is a lack of study on the 
UK market. Therefore, an empirical study is provided by testing the sample contains 
542 issues by 133 companies from 1993 to 2005 on UK securitization market. This 
chapter aims to assess: (1) asset securitization reduces leverage level significantly; (2) 
the consequences of using asset securitization as risk hedging tool are related to 
certain firm-specific characteristics, including credit ratings, company size, cost of 
capital, and industry belongs to; (3) in long-term, macro-economic factors play 
important role in long run to affect risks of originators; (4) asset securitization is 
highly valued by the originator to handle future risks under volatility of 
macro-economy. 
This study contributes by investigating why firms securitize assets for risk 
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management, also providing empirical evidence on effects of asset securitization on 
credit risks. 
The structure is as follows. Risks associated with asset securitization, and the role 
securitization plays in risk management is reviewed in section 2. Methodology of 
empirical study is introduced in section 3, and findings are described in section 4, 
followed by conclusions in section 5. 
5.2 Literature Review 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Asset securitization is characterized by involving the structure of SPV (Special 
Purpose Vehicles), the bankruptcy-remote entities. It has been widely adopted as a 
risk management tool, which allows issuers to shift or reallocate different types of 
risks to the participant with comparative advantages to handle specific risk. Studies of 
effects of asset securitization are continuous. For instance, Benston (1992) suggests 
asset securitization could be used for purpose of risk reduction. Rosenthal and 
Ocampo (1988) think securitization is meaningful from risk management point of 
view because originators could get better estimation and control of risks. On the 
contrast, some researchers argue instead of reducing risks, securitization actually 
increases overall risks (e. g. Kaufman, 1999). Therefore, the effect of asset 
securitization on originators as risk management tool is still an unsolved problem. 
The next in this section, two questions will be reviewed, which risks are associated 
with asset securitization, and why asset securitization could be used as risk 
management tool. Suggested by previous literature (e. g. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 
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1994, and Jobst, 2005), asset securitization brings new risks to originators. The risks 
fall into three primary categories, credit, structure and legal/tax risk. Nevertheless, the 
process of asset securitization involves refined and complicated financial structures, 
which could make different risks better relocated among different participants. The 
motivation of using asset securitization as risk management tool is due to it. 
5.2.2 Risks in Asset Securitization 
It has to be noticed in thinking about the risks inherent in asset-backed securities that 
risks associated with the underlying pool of loans are unchanged by securitization, 
securitization alters only the distribution of the risk among the various parties 
involved (Twinn, 1994). Jobst (2005) summarizes the risks in asset securitization as 
shown in Figure 5.1, which gives general idea of investment risks of asset 
securitization for all participants involved. Although the participants are independent, 
if one of them does not properly evaluate the risk it shares from the process, this may 
lead to a systemic problem. For the originator, who initiates the process by making or 
purchasing the pool of assets, the effects of asset securitization on risks differ from 
others. Not only it takes the risks inherent in asset-backed securities, the originator 
has to consider what happened to overall risks after securitization due to changes of 
capital structure. When a company plays more than one role in a securitization 
transaction, risks suffered by it could become even more complicated. For instance, if 
after the sale, the asset securitized continues to be serviced by the originator, the risks 
associated with asset are still held by the originator. In another case, when banks 
securitize loans acting as originators, if they also provide credit enhancements for 
other parties in exchange of return, asset securitization may increase the danger that in 
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adverse circumstances the originator will have a greater exposure than they are able to 
deal with. 
Figure 5.1: Fundamental investment risks in asset securitization. 
Credit Risk Structure Risk Legal Risk 
Market Risk Liquidity Risk Operational Risk 
Reference Portfolio: Interest Rate Risk: Liquidity Agency Fundamental legal 
Risk: Cost of: Framework & 
  degree of   reinvestment risk ("- Compliance: 
diversification & interest rate term " balance sheet-based   adverse selection " trade law 
asset correlation structure) liquidity risk: " ex ante/ex post moral " tax law 
  asset granularity " interest rate prepayment risk (ý- hazard " national/internation 
" domicile of assets differential (base maturity mismatch)   principal-agent al supervisory 
risk) " market-based problem regulation 
liquidity risk: high 
Structural Provisions: Currency risk trading costs and loss 
of market power of Implementation of 
" internal (credit issuers due to low legal claims: 
enhancement through market volume in 
over-collateralization primary/secondary   corporate law 
or excess spread) markets   insolvency law 
  external   private law 
(counterparty risk of 
third-party guarantee) Data availability: 
  security design: " confidentiality & 
senioritisation and data disclosure 
tranche specification   banking laws 
Source: Jobst, Andreas, 2005, Asset securitization as a risk management and funding tool: What does it hold in 
store for SMEs?, working paper series, ppl2. 
As a result, to investigate the risks inherent in asset securitization on originators, 
several critical issues should be clarified. First of all, whether the risk is transferred 
from the originator to the purchaser through securitization; secondly, if it does, the 
extent to which the risk on the assets securitized has been transferred; finally, if it 
remains, whether securitization offers better control of overall risks. In order to 
investigate those problems, risks in asset securitization for originators, including 
credit risk, structure risk, and legal/tax risk, will be examined one by one. 
Firstly, credit risk results from the inability of the originator to fulfill the obligation 
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(Sing, Ong, Fan and Sirmans, 2004). In another word, the originator has to maintain 
the ability to repay the investors of securitized assets in the underlying reference 
portfolio fully and timely. The key of transferring credit risk is the sale of asset to SPV. 
As long as the "true sale" has legally taken place, the creditors of the originator would 
have no recourse to the asset sold to SPV in the event of bankruptcy of the originator. 
Further, analyzing the transfer of credit risk in a securitized asset sale involves an 
assessment of whether the originator may be morally obligated to cover defaults 
above and beyond its legal obligations. This assessment is influenced by the 
importance of securitization to its core business and the investment community's 
perception of these securities. 
Things become complicated when the originator applies structural provision to 
mitigate credit risk (credit enhancement). Credit enhancement could be defined as a 
contractual arrangement that provides some degree of added protection to other 
parties to the securitization transaction (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2002b). It can take the forms of either internal or external credit enhancement, such as 
partial guarantees, over-collateralization, tranche subordination, lines of credit, letters 
of credit, asset purchase obligations, cash collateral accounts, spread accounts, etc. 
Under the case of internal method, securitization activities are risk retention. Banks 
normally enjoy the advantage of providing internal credit enhancement. Respectively, 
the credit risks associated with assets securitized remain within originators. While for 
small financial institutions and non-financial companies, they have to invite third 
party who can provide credit enhancement, but achieve risk off-lay through 
securitization. 
In order to hedge the credit risk, the originator has to value the credit risk of 
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asset-backed securities properly. Only taking into account the uncertainties, the issue 
could then be better designed and structured by determining the fixed coupon rate, 
floating rental rate and notional principal. According to previous literature, qualifying 
the residual credit risk or contingent liability to the originator requires an in-depth 
review of the structure of the transaction and characteristics of collateral pool. In a 
cash flow structure (the fully supported transaction by originator), the actual amount 
of funds generated by the collateral as well as the amount and timing of payments 
received by investors are estimated (e. g. Bradt, 1991 and Hill, 1997). In a market 
value structure (the partially supported transaction by originator), the market value of 
the collateral is sensitive to certain factors, the liquidity-of asset, the frequency with 
which it is market-to-market, and interest rate and exchange rate movements (e. g. 
Bradt, 1991, and Norton, Spellman and Dupler, 1995). On the other hand, the 
evaluation of credit risk is also applied to the analysis of characteristics of collateral 
pool. In the process, the collateral is tested mathematically to determine the effect of 
economic environment to the issuer, such as interest rate movements, and severity of 
expected losses over time (e. g., Pavel, 1986, and Zweig, 1989). The range of credit 
losses forecast for the underlying collateral is an indication of the level of credit 
enhancement consistent with a desired rating. And the contingent liability may entail 
significant credit risk to the originator because it absorbs the "first loss" or equity risk 
in the assets transferred. Duffle and Huang (1996) propose default-risky model to 
value the credit risk in swap transaction in 1996. After it, Sing, Ong, Fan and Sirmans 
(2004) firstly use the framework to evaluate credit risks associated with ABS deals in 
Singapore, suggesting the rental dynamics of the securitized real estate are critical in 
determining the credit risks of ABS deals, and therefore the fixed rate (coupon rate) 
and floating rate (rental cash flow) should be adequately determined to reflect the 
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changes of risks. In practice, different issuer may take personalized approach to 
analyze the credit risk, involving different factors regarding securitization transaction. 
Secondly, the structural risk results from the failure of mechanisms channeling the 
payment stream from the supporting collateral or from third parties to investors on a 
timely basis (Bradt, 1991). In Figure 1 by Jobst (2005), the structure risk could be 
further split into three catalogues, market risk (risk arising from adverse effects of 
interest rate and exchanges rate movements), liquidity risk (risk of mismatch), and 
operating risk (risk related to adverse selection). The structure of securitization 
provides a means of channeling the cash flow generated by the collateral pool and 
reallocate the risks among different participants. The reliability and strength of the 
structure is thus a central factor determining whether or not the securitization activity 
proceeds as planned. 
Comparing to credit risk, structure risk is more relative to the movement of market. 
The most common structural factors employed by originator to reduce structure risk 
include management of cash flows, adoption of risk hedge techniques, and structural 
arrangement. They are described further below. 
Well management cash flows could reduce liquidity risk. Liquidity risk is caused by 
maturity mismatch, and is defined as upset the scheduled amortization and the 
timeliness of contractually agreed repayment to investors (Jobst, 2005). Market based 
liquidity risk arises from high trading cost associated with a small market volume of 
outstanding securitized debt issues and low trading activity in asset securitization 
markets (Duffie and Gdrleanu, 2001). In the process of securitization, the originator 
not only protects promised payment to investors, but also protects the cash flow 
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generated by the underlying collateral until it is distributed to investors. The 
multi-class transaction is a mechanism used for the purpose. Since the cash flow is 
allocated to investors on either a pro-rata basis or sequentially by maturity in 
multi-class transaction, the sequential order reduces the exposure of losses to the 
classes with the earliest maturities because these classes are likely to be repaid before 
the credit enhancement is depleted. Moreover, during the interim period between the 
collection of funds from the underlying pool and the payment of proceeds to investors, 
the cash flow generated by asset securitized may be combined with funds of a party 
related to the transaction, for instance, the servicer. To protect it, a clear identification 
of investors' fund through loan-by-loan accounting or a provision requiring that the 
collection of funds be deposited daily into a separate account until paid to investors 
could be incorporated into the transaction's structure. In the UK, the secondary 
securitization market is fairy thin, and investors may therefore suffer a price penalty if 
the try to buy or sell a large amount (Twinn, 1994). However, the extent of this risk 
should diminish as the market develops. 
Use of derivatives decreases risk associated with unexpected macro-economic 
movements or changes of industry. The risk stems from effects of interest rate and/or 
exchange rate movements, which is called basis risk or reinvestment risk. It occurs 
when interest accrues on the securities for a different increment of time than that of 
the underlying collateral (Bradt, 1991). The reinvestment risk is frequently hedged by 
standard derivative tools, such as cross-currency swaps and interest rate swaps. 
Additionally, the incorporation of credit enhancement can improve the credit quality 
of the security by absorbing collateral losses, either internal or external to the 
transaction. Internal enhancement can take the form of a `senior/subordinated' 
structure, spread account, or overcollateralization; while external enhancement 
100 
includes corporate guarantees, surety bonds, insurance policies, or letter of credit. 
Those techniques are used to reserves against potential losses or to cover unexpected 
expenses. 
Finally, structural arrangement is used to handle operational risk which stems from 
information asymmetry. In the presence of asymmetric information, originators might 
be imposed on problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (Jobst, 2005). Moral 
hazard occurs when the originator attempts to pursue own economic incentive 
conflicting with investors' interest, leading to substantial agency cost on securitization 
transaction. Adverse selection problem happens when investors form negative beliefs 
about the actual quality of securitized assets, and request a reservation utility in the 
form of a lower selling price and/or higher return as compensation. 
The detrimental effects of moral hazard are generally resolved through a subordinated 
security design, and a first loss position (FLP) or credit enhancement. Originators 
indicate their willingness to bear expected loss from the securitized assets through the 
amount of credit enhancement provided as an effort choice against moral hazard 
(Frost, 1997, and Jobst, 2003b). In dealing with adverse selection, originators 
suppress the pecuniary charge associated with the lemons premium9 by soliciting 
increased transparency about the true value of securitized assets through signaling and 
screening mechanisms (Jobst, 2005). Additional internal and external resources are 
commonly used as a costly signal of asset quality (Thomas and Wang, 2004). The 
common internal and external resources include reserve funds, variable proceeds from 
excess spread, second loss positions, and liquidity facilities. 
9 Lemon problem occurs in the securitization market when investors are short of information about true valuation 
of assets securitized. They then assume all transactions to be of poor quality, and request compensation (lemon's 
premium) in forms of a lower selling price or higher return for the anticipated risks. 
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Thirdly, legal and tax risk arise from the nature of the security interest in the collateral 
and the effect of possible competing third party claims (Kravit, 1997). Asset 
securitization involves a multitude of legal issues affecting originators, such as trade 
law compliance of true sale structures, the implementation of legal claims, 
information disclosure under divergent national banking laws and income tax liability 
(Jobst, 2005). 
As mentioned previously, asset securitization is characterized by "true sale" structure. 
In practice, although originators may recognize a transfer of assets as a sale for 
accounting and tax purpose, the standards for treating transactions as sales are more 
conservative because the assets would not be part of the originators' estate in the 
event of its bankruptcy. This involves an analysis of the facts concerning the 
transaction, and may involve analyzing legal opinions rendered by nationally 
recognized bankruptcy counsel (Kravit, 1997). For instance, the assets and related 
liabilities would be recapitalized on the originator's books, and the transaction would 
be viewed as a secured financing involving an uncertain transfer of risk. Besides, in 
many countries, withholding taxes might be another source of potential risk (Bradt, 
1991). Withholding taxes could be imposed on interest and dividend payments to 
minimize the likelihood of tax avoidance by national subject to some countries' tax 
laws. That could result in double taxation of foreigners. 
5.2.3 Asset Securitization and Risk Management 
Risk management is a transmission and control mechanism, which encapsulates 
different approaches chosen by firms between the risk-return profiles of alternative 
(investment) strategies to maximize shareholder value (Jobst, 2005). The benefit of 
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risk reduction by asset securitization is suggested by previous literature (e. g. Finnerty, 
1988, Goldberg, Burke, Gordon, Pinkes and Watson, 1988, Bartlett, 1989, and 
Benston, 1992). From risk management point of view, asset securitization allows 
originators to reallocate, commoditize and transfer different types of risks to other 
parties who can better handle it. In this section, three issues are to be clarified in 
thinking of why asset securitization is used by originators for risk management: 
(1) Which risk could be affected by asset securitization? 
(2) How could securitization reduce the risk? 
(3) Which factors may influence the consequences? 
By investigating the three issues, the role of asset securitization in risk management 
could be come to clear. 
The effects of asset securitization on risks are either direct, from the launching of 
issues; or indirect, through the change of capital structure (Twinn, 1994, Kaufman, 
1999, Murray, 2001, and Jobst, 2003). For the direct effects, asset securitization 
converts illiquid assets into tradable ones, improving liquidity of assets; it segregates 
risks in assets securitized from insolvency through "true sale"; and, it transfers 
interest rate risk to investors of securities, reducing possible capital losses caused by 
unexpected interest rates increasing. The indirect effects are due to the change of 
capital structure. In order to achieve optimal capital structure, it is vital for the 
originator to properly assess whether the trade-off between envisaged benefits and 
attendant drawbacks of securitization yields positive payoffs to both issuers and 
investors. 
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Start with liquidity risk, which is caused by difficulty to raise immediate cash flow 
(Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994). Securitization dramatically alters the liquidity of 
the asset originator by converting illiquid assets into tradable ones (Thomas and Wang, 
2004). Firstly, the assets with expected future cash inflows could be exchanged for 
immediate cash. Secondly, asset securitization frees funds for originators to pay off 
debts with different durations. Thirdly, since through securitization, the originator 
could continue to earn a steady source of income, the possibility of maturity 
mismatches is also decreased. 
The credit risk is defined as the risk due to uncertainty in a company's ability to meet 
its obligations (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994). Asset securitization is considered 
as a reliable and constant funding source, therefore, may lead to decrease in firm risk 
through reduced leverage and to earnings smoothing through a timing of receivable 
sales (Zweig, 1989). Two basic sources of credit risk reduction are offered by asset 
securitization, the structure of "true sale" (e. g. Ong, 2000, and Odenbach, 2002), and 
better estimation and control of risk (e. g., Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988, and Benston, 
1992). 
In a typical securitization transaction, the originator transfer the assets through "true 
sale" to SPV (special purpose vehicle), creating a "bankruptcy-remote" structure. This 
arrangement distinguishes asset securitization from other traditional financial tools 
(Ong, 2000). After the "true sale" of assets, the originator removes assets securitized 
from balance sheets, segregating risks in the assets from insolvency. 
The originator operating within a securitized market are able to constantly re-access 
the risk relationship involved and alter its portfolio behavior accordingly. Therefore, 
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asset securitization allows the issuing company to specialize in bearing only those 
risks in which they have a comparative advantage, while shifting other risks to other 
participants involved in the process (e. g. guarantors and investors). Securitization can 
also be used to deal with the problem of over-exposed (Twinn, 1994). The originator 
could solve the problem by securitizing the assets it prefers, better distributing the 
aggregate credit exposure. 
Companies will suffer interest rate risk when interest rates increase unexpectedly, 
which results in capital losses. The risk is market-oriented, and could be reduced by 
diversifying the duration of fixed income investments that are held at a given time 
(Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994). Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988) and Benston 
(1992) estimate that asset securitization lowers concentration of credit risks through 
diversification of assets, thus reducing the impact of credit losses. Total risks are 
reduced when assets from different areas and industries, not perfectly correlated with 
each other, are pooled. 
Leland and Skarabot (2003) provide a simulation model for how securitization can 
improve an originator's capital structure as long as the volatility of securitized assets 
is substantially different from the volatility of the assets that remain on balance sheet. 
This explanation for securitization seems appropriate for non-financial firms where 
productive assets' characteristics differ from the fix-income assets (mainly 
receivables) securitized; however, it providers an unsatisfying rationale for 
securitization of banks, whose securitized assets exhibit the same characteristics as 
those left on balance sheet. Sing, Ong, Fan and Sirmans (2004) firstly apply a 
theoretical default-risky swaps valuation model to evaluate credit risks in ABS bonds 
in Singapore, suggesting rental dynamics and interest rate volatility are critical in 
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determining the default risks of ABS deals. Further sensitive analysis by Sing, Ong, 
Fan and Lim (2005), several factors are clarified to affect ABS credit spreads, 
including property value volatility, the correlation coefficient parameter and the 
recovery rate. The credit enhancements reduce uncertainty in the ABS transactions, 
and at the same time, increase the credit rating of the bond tranches. The ABS bonds 
have also a higher credit rating than the corporate rating of the originator because of 
the bankruptcy-remote feature built-in to the ABS deals. 
However, not enough empirical studies have been done so far to clarify the 
relationship between asset securitization and risks. Dionne and Harchaoui (2003) 
establish the first empirical investigation on relationship between securitization and 
risk. They find over the estimation period, there is positive relationship between 
securitization and credit risks for banks in context of the rapid growth of 
off-balance-sheet activities in Canada. Moreover, securitization activity affects 
negatively on capital ratios. Therefore, once securitization activity is controlled, banks 
with higher capital ratios are the more risky banks. Thomas et al (2004) investigate 
why banks securitize assets for the purpose of risk management using funding choice 
model between securitization and subordinate debt. They find securitization is 
associated with the changes of capital adequacy, particularly when the supply of 
assets increases and liquidity of reserves decreases, the amount of securitization with 
risk retention issued next term (next quarter) by banks will increase, while on the 
other hand, no evidence to support securitization with off-lay is caused by changes in 
capital. Accordingly, securitization is an appropriate liquidity management tool. Both 
studies estimate bank industry without concern of non-banks. Since banks have to 
maintain certain capital structure under regulation, and are characterized by high 
leverage ratio, the results for non-banks are therefore expected to be different. Also, 
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the studies did not consider the impact of macro-economy. Since movements of 
interest rates and government bonds highly influence investors' decisions, affect the 
risks suffered by originators accordingly, they should be taken into account. 
It is a lack of empirical study targeting on the UK market. This paper is going to do so 
by using the UK securitization market data during 1993 to 2005. The potential 
contributions are extending the study from a single industry to cross industries, as 
well as identifying factors that influence the effects of securitization on originators' 
risks. 
5.2.4 Potential Problems 
As risk management tool, asset securitization helps the originator to better evaluate 
and control risks, but at the same time, it may also create new problem for originators. 
First and foremost, securitization may encourage irrational lending by allowing 
originators to borrow more than they could otherwise, therefore increase total amount 
of credit extended, which in turns increase risk (Kaufman, 1999). Securitization 
creates a "pipeline" structure, which is making loans using a small amount of capital, 
with the intention of securitizing them to release funds to make further loans (Wolfe, 
2000). If the environment were to become unfavourable for securitization, originators 
might be facing substantial prepayment/interest risk, and unable to make new loans. 
Moreover, in "asset-based financing", the financing obtained is wholly secured by 
assets, but the collateral is not necessary structurally isolated from the credit and 
liquidity of the business of which it forms a part, and the collateral often extends 
beyond financial assets (Elmgren, 1995). 
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It has also been suggested that securitization may lead to a reduction in the average 
quality of the originator's assets on book (Twinn, 1994). The signalling model 
developed by Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) suggests under information asymmetries, 
originators tend to securitize their better assets with low probabilities of default, 
because the purchase of credit enhancement involved in securitization would signal 
credit quality of the asset securitized to investors. Under the case, removing the best 
assets to securitize will leave the rest of portfolio into greater danger. 
Further, securitization removes the illusion of price stability for non-marketable assets, 
and as a result, when the security price has gone down, the originator could not stop 
the falling. This is consistent with the opinion of Bernstein and Siegel (1979) that if 
originators suffer from weak financial status, securitization may increase risk for 
originators, leading to a decrease in quality and stability of earnings. 
Besides, even if asset securitization has been accepted as risk hedging tool, the 
efficiency as risk management tool may reduce due to certain factors. For instance, 
since originators sell assets to SPV in order to create default-risk-free structure, their 
incentives to monitor those assets to assure that credit quality maintained could be 
diminished (e. g. Kaufman, 1999). If investors were offered some kind of recourse that 
allowed them to return non-performing assets to the originator, the originator's 
objective in the securitization of transferring the risk could be defeated. As a solution, 
UK supervisory authorities try to ensure that banks and other regulated institutions are 
not exposed in this way, by limiting the types of recourse allowable if the assets are to 
be excluded from the balance sheet for capital adequacy purposes. 
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The final issue is how to recognise the benefit of risk reduction offered by asset 
securitization. Murray (2001) argues although securitization does affect the 
appearance of income statement and balance sheet, it could not change the basic 
nature of the business underlying the statements, and long-term effect has to be taken 
into account. Murray (2001) thinks securitization increases risks for originators 
because it fails to shift the burden of defaults on securitized assets to investor in the 
manner assumed in accounting and regulatory treatment. Accounting rules permit 
companies to book one-time gains upon the sale of assets to SPV, which is calculated 
as the present value of the lifetime earnings of those assets, thus, inflate short-term 
earnings and equity. The result can be higher leverage in an economic sense and 
pressure on profit margin, therefore, securitization increases risk for originators. 
In sum, the effects of asset securitization on risks for originators are still a problem to 
be answered. Previous literature suggests risks inherent in asset securitization include 
credit risk, structure risk (including market risk, liquidity risk and operating risk), and 
legal and tax risk (e. g. Bradt, 1991, Kravit, 1997, and Jobst, 2005). As risk 
management tool, asset securitization realizes risk reduction not only directly through 
the issue, but also by the change of capital structure (e. g. Murray, 2001, and Jobst, 
2003). Asset securitization improves liquidity of assets (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 
1994). It reduces credit risk by providing reliable and constant funding source (Zweig, 
1989), segregating risks in assets securitized from insolvency through "true sale" 
(Ong, 2000), and better estimating and controlling of risk (Rosenthal and Ocampo, 
1988, and Benston, 1992). Finally, it lowers interest rate risk through diversification 
(Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988, and Benston, 1992). 
On the other hand, asset securitization may also create new problem for originators. 
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Firstly, securitization may encourage irrational lending through pipeline structure 
(Kaufman, 1999). Secondly, it has also been suggested that securitization may lead to 
a reduction in the average quality of assets (Twinn, 1994). Thirdly, if originators 
suffer from weak financial status, securitization may lead to a decrease in quality and 
stability of earnings (Bernstein and Siegel, 1979). 
Consequently, the effects of asset securitization on risks remain unsolved. The 
existing empirical studies on the topic are limited, and it is a lack of study on the UK 
market. This research is going to investigate the relationship between asset 
securitization and risks of originators using the sample collected from the UK market. 
Further, certain firm-specific characteristics suggested by literature, including credit 
ratings, company size, overall cost of capital, and industry belongs to, will be 
examined to clarify the effects. Finally, macro-economic variables will also be 
considered by the study. 
5.3 Methodology 
Cross sectional and panel data regressions are adopted for the test. 10 Credit risks 
suffered by originators are measured into three different ways, leverage ratio, debt 
ratio and bad debt provision ratio. Each ratio will be taken as dependent variable each 
time to run the regression. Since one variable, securitization ratio, is measured by two 
different methods, six regressions are included for both cross sectional and panel data 
analysis, therefore, twelve regressions are given overall. A sample of 542 public 
offerings of asset backed securities by 133 companies over the period January 1993 
through December 2005 is tested, same as the one described in Chapter 3.4. 
10 Literature review of regressions using cross sectional data and panel data is provided in Chapter 3.3.2. 
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Firstly, hypotheses and variable measurement are provided, followed by summary of 
descriptive statistic. 
5.3.1 Hypotheses and Variables 
Risks suffered by originators vary, and each type of risk could not be considered in 
isolation. As mentioned before, asset securitization could influence credit risks, 
liquidity risks and interest rate risks for originators, and this empirical study focuses 
on credit risks. Dionne and Harchaoui (2003) measure credit risk by two alternative 
variables: the provisions for banks un-coverable loans to total assets or by the total of 
risk-weighted assets to total assets. Kolari etc. (1998) proxy credit risk associated with 
default by the percentage of seasonally adjusted dollar volume of loans that started 
foreclosure during the quarter. Todd (2001) also measures credit risk using two ratios, 
the spread between corporate bonds rated AAA and those rated BAA, and 
delinquency rate on conventional loans. This research focuses on effects of 
securitization on individual originator rather than the whole industry, further, the 
sample contains non-financial companies, thus certain data used by previous studies 
are not achievable. Accordingly, three financial ratios are taken as measurements of 
credit risks by this study, which are: 
(1) Leverage ratio (Lr). The leverage ratio, measured as current liabilities plus 
long-term debt and other liabilities, divided by the sum of current assets, long 
term receivables and investments, is used to estimate company's ability to 
meet its obligations. Companies with high leverage ratios may be at risks of 
bankruptcy if they are unable to make payments of their debt, also may have 
difficulties to find new lenders in the future. 
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(2) Debt ratio (Dr), which is calculated as total loans divided by total assets. This 
measurement of financial leverage removes sources of funds other than direct 
borrowing comparing to previous method. Loan capital has the advantage of 
comparatively low costs, but at the same time, suffers high risk. Therefore, 
this ratio takes into account the major high risk assets. 
(3) Bad debt provision ratio (Pr). Suggested by Thomas et al (2004), the ratio of 
provisions to loans measures credit shock to banks, and affects securitization 
as a proportion of assets. Provision for bad debt represents losses that the 
company expects to take as a result of uncollectable or trouble loans. Lower 
bad debt provision indicates optimistic opinions on future potential risks. 
Six hypotheses are to be tested by this study. They are described as follows. 
Hypothesis One: Asset securitization affects risks of originator. 
There is no conclusion drawn on whether asset securitization affects risks positively 
or negatively. Previous literature suggest asset securitization could reduce risk 
through improving liquidity of assets (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994), segregating 
risks in assets securitized from insolvency through "true sale" (Ong, 2000). It also 
offers better estimating and controlling of risk (Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988, and 
Benston, 1992). Finally, it lowers interest rate risk through diversification (Rosenthal 
and Ocampo, 1988, and Benston, 1992). However, asset securitization may also create 
new problem for originators, including encouraging irrational lending (Kaufman, 
1999), shifting quality of assets (Twinn, 1994), and making future earnings less stable 
(Bernstein and Siegel, 1979). 
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The independent variable, Securitization ratio (SE), is measured by two methods, the 
natural logarithm of the funds raised through securitization, and securitization as a 
proportion of total assets. The sign of the coefficient could not be decided based on 
previous studies. Some researchers (e. g. Zweig 1989) think securitization offers an 
alternative funding tool other than direct loans, thus may lead to decrease in firm risk 
through reduced leverage. In contrast, other researchers suggest by permitting firms to 
originate and hold assets off the balance sheet, asset securitization has generated much 
higher levels of leverage (e. g. Thomas et al, 2004). 
Hypothesis Two: Originators with higher credit ratings have higher leverage levels, 
but lower bad debt provision ratios. 
Companies with good credit ratings normally have advantage to raise funds through 
direct borrowing, which may encourage them to borrow more and significantly 
increase their leverage level. At the same time, good ratings could also gain them 
better chance to attract investors on securitization market, which may encourage 
companies raise funds through securitization. From either aspect, the leverage ratio is 
expected to be higher for companies with good credit ratings. High leverage level 
increases the possibility of bankruptcy in general, thus, the level of bad debt provision 
should be examined. Lower level of provision ratio indicates that the credit risk is still 
acceptable for the company. As a result, positive relationships between leverage ratio 
and credit ratings are expected, while negative sign is expected between provision 
ratio and credit ratings of originators. 
Dummy variable rating (Rating) is measured as: 
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Rating= 6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; =2 if BB; =1 if B; 
=0 for all the other lower ratings. 
Hypothesis Three: Risks of originators are influenced by the size of company. 
Size (Size) is used to take into account the greater diversification possibilities enjoyed 
by larger firms. Dionne and Harchaoui (2003) think banks use securitization for 
capital arbitrage to keep funding costs as low as possible. While from risk point of 
view, when securitization activities involved, reported capital ratios may not represent 
their true risk, controlling risks become more difficult. Accordingly, for larger size 
firms, who take more frequent use of the securitization instrument, must bear larger 
credit risk. In another word, positive relationship between size and credit risk should 
be expected. However, on the other hand, large companies use asset securitization as a 
supplementary asset funding mechanism rather than a surrogate for traditional 
on-balance-sheet funding. Accordingly, the effects of securitization should be less 
significant for larger companies, since smaller size companies more frequently use 
securitization to fund big projects, and their financial ratios of the year are more likely 
affected by the activity (Jobst, 2003). Overall, it is difficult to tell the sign of the 
coefficient of size. 
Hypothesis Four: Originators with higher cost of capital bear higher risks. 
Cost of capital (Cc) is an opportunity cost. Clearly, the higher the cost of capital for 
on balance sheet financing, the more attractive is securitization for originators. In 
similar study, Dionne and Harchaoui (2003) employ return on equity to measure cost 
of capital, which is believed to be more appropriate because their study focuses on 
banking industry, the variable has to be bank-specific characteristic, in which case, 
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cost of equity represents cost of capital. While in this cross-industry study, WACC is 
adopted to eliminate any differences among industries, moreover, according to 
Mclaney's (2004) survey study, 53.4% firms of UK sample use WACC to calculate 
the overall cost of capital, and more empirical evidence suggests widespread use of 
the CAPM by practitioners to calculate cost of equity capital (Arnold and 
Hatzopoulos, 2000 and Al-Ali and Arkwright, 2000). As a result, the cost of capital 
(CC) variable is captured by WACC (weighted average cost of capital) in this study. 
Higher return from the market is associated with higher risk in general, thus, cost of 
capital should have a positive relationship with credit risk. 
Hypothesis Five: Movements of macro-economy affect risks suffered by originators. 
The market risk inherent in asset securitization is highly related to macro-economy 
(Jobst, 2003 and 2005). Changes of economy will affect efficiency of asset 
securitization as risk management tool (Thomas and Wang, 2004). 
Two variables are included as macro-economic factors: volatility of one-year interest 
rate (In) and the spread between 10-year and 1-year government bond (Sp) (Kolari, 
Fraser and Anari, 1998). The volatility of one-year interest rate (In) is calculated as 
the residual of the regression below performed from year 1993 to 2005. 
Rft = ßo +ß1R., +Er, 
Rf= annual return on one year government bond 
R. = annual return on market portfolio (FTSE 100) 
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More significant the volatility, the economy is more unstable, and companies are 
under more risky economic environment, and positive relationship is expected 
between In and risk. 
Again, recommended by Kolari etc. (1998), the spread between 10-year and 1-year 
government bond captures the general shape of yield curve of government bond. 
Higher the spread (Sp), lower the cost of refinance on the market available to the 
borrowers, originators in turns suffer more prepayment risks. As a result, positive 
relationship is expected between Sp and risk. 
Hypothesis Six: Effects of asset securitization on risks are industry-specific. 
A firm's hedging decision would depend on what business the firm is in. Jobst (2005) 
advices while banks and other financial institutions view securitization as an 
expedient means to evade inconsistent regulatory capital charges for credit exposures 
of similar risk, non-financial entities would employ securitization for the liquidity 
management of existing trade receivables. Previous studies on the topic are limited in 
banking industry, which is characterized by high leverage, strict capital requirement, 
and possibility of acting multi-roles in securitization. Those characteristics not only 
distinguish banks from non-financial entities, but also other-financial institutions. 
Therefore, by expanding sample to cross industry, different effects are expected to be 
found. 
The dummy variable industry (Ind)' 1 is measured a s: 
Dummy indl; =1 if the issuer belongs to Auto industry, =0 otherwise; 
11 Originators included in the sample belong to different industries. The information is found from Datastream 
(using the code of IND). 
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Dummy ind2, =1 if the issuer belongs to Banks, =0 otherwise; 
Dummy ind3, =1 if the issuer belongs to financial institutions, =0 otherwise; 
Dummy ind 4, =1 if the issuer belongs to real estates, =0 otherwise; 
Dummy ind5; =1 if the issuer belongs to retailers, =0 otherwise. 
5.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
The measurements of variables are summarized in Table 5.1. The DataStream codes 
are provided in last column. 
Table 5.1: Data description 
Variable Description Datastream Codes 
Leverage ratio Lr (Total liabilities /Total assets) WC03351/WC02999 
Debt ratio (Total loans)/(Total assets - Customer liabilities WC15043 
(Dr) on acceptances) 
Bad debt provision ratio (Bad debt provision)/(Total loans) 818/WC0227I 
(Pr) 
Securitization ratio (3) Natural logarithm (issue size of (3) LN(se) 
(se) (million USA dollar) securitization) (4) Sec/392 
(4) (Issue size of securitization)/total assets 
Credit rating (rating) Rating= 6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 
if A; =3 if BBB; =2if BB; =1 if B; =0 for all the 
other lower ratings. 
Firm size(Size) Natural logarithm of total assets LN 392 
Cost of capital (WACC) Cost of debt*percentage of debt*(1-tax rate) + (WCO1251/1301)*[1301/(1301+305)]*(1- 
cost of equity * percentage of equity , WC01451/WC01401) 
Cost of debt = after-tax long term borrowing rate, +[FTSE 100+beta* (GILTS-FTSE 100)] * [3 
Cost of equity (CAMP) = rf + 8(rm - r1) . 
05/(1301+305)] 
Spread Spread between 10-year and 1-year government AUKGVG5-[UKTRSBL(100-UKTRSB 
bonds L)]* 100 
Volatility of one-year Residual of regression: 
interest rate (in) R ft = 
80 +f1 Rmr + E! ,Rf =annual return 
on one year government bond, R. = annual 
return on market portfolio (FTSE 100 
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Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample. 12 In cross sectional 
regression, when the variable of bad debt provision is included in the equation, the 
sample is reduced due to data availability. The database, Datastream, only provides 
bad debt provision for banks and financial institutions. Exactly, the number of 
observation is reduced from 542 to 386 (including 304 issues by banks, and 82 issues 
by financial institutions). 
For the group of regressions using panel data, issues by same originator at same year 
have to be merged into one since technically string variable is not allowed. The 
number of observations is reduced to 272. Moreover, when the variable of bad debt 
provision is included in the equation, for the same reason mentioned above, 
observations are reduced further to 176 (including 142 issues by banks, and 34 issues 
by financial institutions). 
Table 5.2: statistics of variables 
Full sample 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ir 542 0.8797 0.2031 1.20e-06 0.9992 
dr 542 0.4416 0.2258 0.0168 0.9660 
deltalr 542 0.0002 0.0986 -0.5760 0.8806 
Deltadr 542 0.0053 0.0524 -0.3600 0.3219 
Se l 542 6.3168 1.2372 0.23 10.14 
Se2 542 0.0945 0.3490 5.73e-07 4.5473 
rating 542 4.2657 1.1110 0 6 
size 542 18.3274 2.1381 9.8456 25.3096 
cc 542 0.0334 0.0579 -0.6281 0.2491 
SP 542 -0.1819 0.8846 -2.2281 2.0634 
in 542 -0.4235 1.0157 -1.9411 2.0633 
12 The measurement of 0y is provided in Appendix 1. 
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Reduced sample 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dcv. Min Max 
Pr 386 0.0169 0.0326 -0.0002 0.3689 
DealtaPr 386 -0.0022 0.0213 -0.3365 0.07401 
Se l 386 6.3434 1.3524 0.23 10.14 
Set 386 0.0826 0.3060 5.73e-07 2.8066 
rating 386 4.5492 0.8996 1 6 
size 386 18.3693 2.0421 12.4404 25.3096 
cc 386 0.0330 0.0447 -0.0983 0.2491 
sp 386 -0.1485 0.8867 -2.2281 2.0634 
in 386 -0.4550 1.0003 -1.9411 2.0633 
Table 5.3: Correlation matrix 
Variables Ir dr Sel Se2 rating size cc sp in 
Ir 1.0000 
dr 
Sel 
Set 
rating 
Size 
cc 
sp 
III 
0.1543* 1.0000 
(0.0003) 
-0.2297* -0.0175 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.6839) 
-0.19I9* 0.1952* 0.0429 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3184) 
0.1230* 0.0906 0.0403 -0.0552 1.0000 
(0.0041) (0.0350) (0.3486) (0.1997) 
0.3383 * -0.2184* 0.0388 -0.5747 0.1087 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3674) (0.0000) (0.0114) 
0.0207 0.2617* 0.0421 0.3649* -0.0278 -0.2702* 1.0000 
(0.6312) (0.0000) (0.3284) (0.0000) (0.5177) (0.0000) 
0.0465 0.1282* -0.0193 0.0027 0.0613 0.0157 -0.0583 1.0000 
(0.2800) (0.0028) (0.6539) (0.9505) (0.1540) (0.7159) (0.1756) 
-0.0286 -0.1159* -0.1177* 0.0609 -0.0946 -0.2401* 0.1503* -0.7571* 1.0000 
(0.5069) (0.0069) (0.0061) (0.1567) (0.0277) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) 
*Correlation is significant at 1% level. 
Table 5.3 shows there is no need for control of collinearity. The volatility of one-year 
interest rate (In), however, has significant correlations with several variables, 
including debt ratio (dr), securitization ratio (Sel), company size (size), cost of capital 
(cc) and spread between 10-year and 1-year government bond (sp), which implies that 
interest rate risk is a strong factor affecting companies' decisions and financial ratios. 
Moreover, according to the first two columns, there are several variables significantly 
119 
related to leverage ratio (lr) and debt ratio (dr), which needs to be confirmed by 
regression analysis in the next chapter. 13 
5.4. Results and Findings 
In this section, cross sectional regressions are followed by panel data analysis, which 
is used in order to find the effects in long term. More over, first-difference estimators 
of dependent variables are used for panel data regressions, and the measurements are 
provided in Appendix 5.1. The results are as follow. 
5.4.1 Cross sectional regression 
As mentioned before, three dependent variables, leverage ratio, debt ratio and bad 
debt provision ratio are used to measure risks of originators for each regression, plus 
the variable of securitization is calculated into two different ways, giving six 
regressions to run in total. 14 
13 The normality test (Shapiro-Wilk test) is provided in Appendix 5.2. The results could not reject the null 
h 'pothesis that the distribution is normal. Therefore, regression analysis is allowed for the study. Y 
Considering the possibility that the effects of asset securitization could be delayed, dependent variables lagged 
are also tested (Yi+t ) for each equation. The results with y, and yt+t are both reported in Appendix 5.3, while 
in context, only the one with better p-value is explained in details. Only one lag of y is being applied to avoid 
noises caused by other events. 
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Table 5.4: Cross sectional regression (dependent variable LR,,, ) 
Leverage ratio 
Variables Coe. Coe. 
(t) (t) 
No. of observations 542 542 
Sel -0.0403 
(-6.41)*** 
Se2 -0.0080 
(-0.27) 
Rating 0.0359 0.0326 
(4.05)*** (3.54)*** 
Size 0.0314 0.0323 
(7.03)*** (6.07)*** 
Cc 0.3184 0.2738 
(2.30)** (1.83)* 
Sp 0.0255 0.0402 
(1.84)* (2.82)*** 
In 0.0271 0.0424 
(2.17)** (3.29)*** 
In 1(Auto) 0.2412 0.1952 
(3.06)*** (2.40)** 
In2(Banks) 0.1013 0.0729 
(1.58) (1.10) 
In3(Fin. Ins. ) 0.1707 0.1470 
(2.63)*** (2.19)** 
In4(R. Estate) -0.0504 -0.0701 
(-0.65) (-0.87) 
In5(Retailer) 0.0232 0.0049 
(0.31) (0.06) 
cons 0.2906 0.0726 
(2.65)*** (0.62) 
F 17.64 12.92 
R2 0.2680 0.2114 
Adjusted R2 0.2528 0.1951 
This table explains effects of asset securitization on risks for originators from the regression containing full sample 
of 542 issues: 
L& = a,, + a, Se, + a=Rating, + a, Size,., + a4Cc,,, + aSp, + a6ln, + a, ind 1, + aýind 2,1-1,2 ,,,,,,, 542 
+ aind3, +a,,, ind4, +a1oind5, +s, 
Equation 5.1 
where 
LR = leverage ratio = (total liabilities)/(total assets); 
Sei = In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing); Set = (size)/(total assets); 
Dummy Rating= 6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; =2if BB; =1 if B; =0 for all the other 
lower ratings; 
Size = firm size = Ln(total assets); 
Cc = cost of capital using WACC method; 
Sp = spread between 10-year and 1-year government bond; 
In = volatility of 1-year interest rate; 
Dummy indl, =1 if the issuer belongs to Auto industry, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind2, =I if the issuer 
belongs to Banks, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind3, =1 if the issuer belongs to financial institutions, =0 
otherwise; Dummy ind 4, =1 if the issuer belongs to real estates, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind5, =I if the issuer 
belongs to retailers, =0 otherwise. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t test. 
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The relationships between leverage ratio and independent variables are tested first. 
Estimation results for the Equation 5.1 are reported in Table 5.4.15 Accordingly, 
securitization ratio significantly reduced leverage ratio (a, = 0.0403, t-statistics = 
6.41), which is consistent with the results by Zweig's suggestions, but contrasts with 
the results by Dionne and Marchaoui (2003). Further, both the credit rating 
(a2 =0.0359, t-statistic=4.05) and cost of capital (a4 =0.3184, t-statistic=2.30) affect 
leverage ratio positively, as expected earlier, and the results are statistically significant. 
Based on our sample, larger the company size, higher the leverage level (a3 =0.0314, 
t-statistic=7.03). Therefore, the bigger company who can more frequently issue 
asset-backed securities, does not benefit on reduced leverage ratio offered by 
securitization, while in the contrast, it encourages the company to increase substantial 
lending. For the two macro-economy-related variables, Sp and In, are all positively 
related to the leverage level (as =0.0255, t-statistic=1.84; a6=0.0217, t-statistic=2.17), 
which could easily be explained that under higher volatility of economy, companies 
with high leverage ratios suffer bigger default risk. Finally, effects of asset 
securitization on risks are industry specific. The auto industry and financial 
institutions are proved to suffer very high credit risks comparing to other industries 
included in the sample (a7 =0.2412, t-statistic=3.06; a9 =0.1707, t-statistic=0.1707, 
t-statistic=2.63). 
15 Since securitization ratio is measured in two different ways, different results are reported. We quote coefficients 
and t-value appeared in regression with higher R-squared in our analysis. 
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Table 5.5: Cross sectional regression (dependent variable DR,,, +i 
) 
Debt ratio 
Variables Coe. Coe. 
(t) (t) 
No. of observations 542 542 
Se l -0.0073 
-1.07 
Se2 0.0149 
0.49 
Rating 0.0620 0.0613 
(6.42)*** (6.35)*** 
Size -0.0394 -0.0378 
(-8.10)*** (-6.77)*** 
Cc 0.6913 0.6603 
(4.58)*** (4.22)*** 
Sp -0.0157 -0.0121 
-1.04 (-0.81) 
In -0.0521 -0.0481 
(-3.83)*** (-3.56)*** 
In I (Auto) 0.4119 0.4028 
(4.81)*** (4.72)*** 
In2(Banks) 0.0449 0.0398 
(0.64) (0.57) 
In3(Fin. Ins. ) 0.1155 0.1111 
(1.64)* (1.58) 
In4(R. Estate) -0.0707 -0.0730 
(-0.83) (-0.86) 
In5(Retailer) -0.0516 -0.0570 
(-0.64) -0.71 
_cons 
0.8259 0.7599 
(6.93)*** 6.18 *** 
F 17.99 17.88 
R2 0.2719 0.2707 
Adjusted R2 0.2568 0.2555 
This table explains effects of asset securitization on risks for originators from the regression containing full sample 
of 542 issues: 
bo + b, Se,., + b=Rating, + b3Size,., + b, Cc,,, + b5Sp, + b6In, + bind 1, + b8ind 2,1=1,2,..... 542. 
+b9ind3, +bind 4, +b,. ind5, + 
Equation 5.2 
where 
DR = Debt ratio = (total loans)/(total assets - customer liabilities on acceptance); 
Sel = In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing); Se2 = (size)/(total assets); 
Dummy Rating= 6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; =2if BB; =1 if B; =0 for all the other 
lower ratings; 
Size =f inn size = Ln(total assets); 
Cc = cost of capital using WACC method; 
Sp = spread between 10-year and 1-year government bond; 
In = volatility of 1-year interest rate; 
Dummy indl, =1 if the issuer belongs to Auto industry, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind2, =I if the issuer belongs 
to Banks, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind3, =I if the issuer belongs to financial institutions, =0 otherwise; Dummy 
ind4, =I if the issuer belongs to real estates, 0 otherwise; Dummy ind5, =I if the issuer belongs to retailers, 
=0 otherwise. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t -test. 
123 
Table 5.5 indicates the relationships between debt ratio and independent variables. 
The effect on debt ratio is proved to be delayed based on the test. The regression 
explains yl+, better than yy with higher R squared value (0.2719 comparing to 
0.2444). 16 F irstly, the securitization ratio is not proved to affect next year's loan ratio, 
which indicates asset securitization has not become the surrogate for traditional 
on-balance lending. Secondly, higher the credit ratings, more loans originators will 
take (b2 =0.0620, t-statistic=6.42). Obviously, originators with high credit ratings 
could borrow from banks more cheaply and easily, and benefit from tax and cost 
advantages offered by direct loans. Thirdly, the size of company affects next term's 
debt ratio negatively (b3 =-0.0394, t-statistic=-8.10). As mentioned before, the average 
size of asset securitization normally reaches millions of dollar, therefore, smaller 
companies are more likely to be influenced by each issue. What's more, they could 
not securitize as frequently as big companies, which could lead to higher debt ratio 
after the event year. 
Cost of capital is positively related to next term's debt ratio (b4 =0.6913, 
t-statistic=4.58). The originator may decide to take more loans to reduce future overall 
cost of capital when it currently suffers high cost of capital. However, it has to be 
noticed that loans are also associated with high default risk, and may lead to difficulty 
to raise funds in the future. Besides, more volatile interest rate become, less loans the 
originator will take in the future (b6=-0.0521, t-statistic=-3.83). The amount of Loans 
is highly correlated with interest level, and bears the most significant interest rate 
risks over all different types of financing sources. Finally, again, the auto industry is 
proved to contain highest level of debt (b7 =0.4119, t-statistic=4.81). 
16 The results are provided in Appendix 5.2. 
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Table 5.6: Cross sectional regression (dependent variable PR,,, +i 
) 
Bad debt provision ratio 
Variables Coe. Coe. 
(t) (t) 
No. of observations 386 386 
Se l -0.0009 
(-1.05) 
Se2 -0.0077 
-1.53 
Rating -0.0041 -0.0042 
(-3.17)*** (-3.29)*** 
Size 0.0017 0.0012 
(2.36)** (1.49) 
Cc -0.1353 -0.1068 
(-4.86)*** (-3.29)*** 
Sp -0.0020 -0.0027 
-1.03 (-1.44) 
In -0.0031 -0.0041 
(-1.80)* (-2.35)** 
In(Banks) -0.0431 -0.0425 
(-12.36)*** (-12.26)*** 
cons 0.0335 0.0484 
(2.50)*** (3.62)*** 
F 27.83 28.10 
R2 0.3401 0.3422 
Adjusted R2 0.3279 0.3300 
This table explains effects of asset securitization on risks for originators from the regression containing 386 issues: 
pp,, +, 
= co + c, Sej., + c2Rating, + c3Size,., + c, Cc,., + c, Sp, + cbin, + c, ind 1, + v, t =1,2,...... 386. 
Equation 5.3 
where PR = bad debt provision ratio = (bad debt provision)/(total loans); 
SeI =In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing); Se2 = (size)/(total assets); 
Dummy Rating= 6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; =2if BB; =1 if B; =0 for all the other 
lower ratings; 
Size = firm size = Ln(total assets); 
Cc = cost of capital using WACC method; 
Sp = spread between 10-year and I-year government bond; 
In = volatility of 1-year interest rate; 
Dummy indl, =1 if the issuer belongs to banks, =0 if the issuers belongs to financial institutions. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t-test. 
In Equation 5.3, the bad debt provision ratio is used to find out the originator's 
judgment on future risks after securitizing assets. 17 Table 5.6 presents the results. 18 
The effects of bad debt provision are proved to be delayed, same as effects on debt 
17 The sample is reduced from 542 to 386 observations due to data availability. DataStream only provide bad debt 
provision for banks and financial institutions. Therefore, only these two industries are included in the test. 
18 A gain, the regression is proved to explain Y, +t 
better than y, due to higher R square value. All results are 
reported in Appendix 5.2. 
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ratio. Firstly, the coefficient of securitization ratio equals to -0.0077 with t-statistic of 
-1.53, which indicates future bad debt provision is reduced after originator 
securitizing assets. 19 Secondly, the credit rating is negatively related to next year's 
provision ratio (c2 =-0.0042, t-statistic=-3.29), so does the cost of capital of the event 
year (c4 =-0.1068, t-statistic=-3.29). Accordingly, originators suffering high cost of 
capital will reduce bad debt provision. It could be due to originators viewing 
securitization as effective risk hedging tool, thus expect fewer risks in the future. 
Finally, comparing to financial institutions, banks are more confident to control risks 
through securitization (c7 =-0.0425, t-statistic=-12.26). By securitizing less quality 
loans, banks could shift default risks to the third party, therefore, expect less risks in 
the future. 
Summarizing, first of all, asset securitization reduces leverage level, which is 
consistent with research of Zweig's (1989), but contrasts with Dionne and 
Marchaoui's (2003). Although securitization removes assets from balance sheet, it 
also decreases liabilities as alternative funding source. Based on the results, on the 
year of securitizing, the leverage ratio is decreased significantly. 
Secondly, asset securitization is viewed as effective risk management tool by 
originators, who reduce bad debt provisions of next year after securitizing assets. 
Thirdly, the firm-specific characteristics suggested by previous studies, including 
credit ratings, company size, overall cost of capital, and industry belongs to, are 
proved to be related to risks faced by originators. Originators with higher credit 
19 The t-value here is very close to 10% level significant. Moreover, the conclusion is also confirmed by testing 
regressions with y1(C1=-0.0167, t-statistic=-2.44), which is provided in Appendix 5.3. 
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ratings are confident to handle higher leverage level, and reduce bad debt provisions 
after securitizing, expecting less risk in the future. For smaller companies, default 
risks will increase more significantly than bigger companies after securitizing in 
forms of increased debt ratio. Originators which suffer high cost of capital will 
increase borrowing in order to reduce the costs, which brings new problem of higher 
risks to them. The last, the effects on risks are industry specific. Originators in auto 
industry suffer higher risks. 
Finally, the given regression well explains the variable of bad debt provision ratio. 
The value of R squared is as high as 0.3401. 
5.4.2 Panel data analysis 
In this section, panel data is used to find relationships between changes of risks and 
asset securitization in a long term. Hausman test is adopted in order to decide whether 
fixed effect or random effect model are more appropriate in this study. 20 The results 
statistically support the random effect model over the fixed effect model. The fixed 
effects model is provided in Appendix 5.5, which does not generate any different 
conclusions. The observations are merged from 542 to 272 to fulfill technical 
requirement of panel data analysis in this test. 
20 Results of Hausman test are reported in Appendix 5.4. A Hausman test tests whether random efIccta estim<Uion 
would be as good as fixed effects estimation. The null hypothesis is that random effects is consistent and efticieut. 
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Table 5.7: Panel data regressions (y= A leverage ratio) 
Random effects model 
Variables Coe. Coe. 
z z 
No. of observations 272 272 
Se l 0.0024 
(0.66) 
Se2 0.0199 
(1.74)* 
Rating -0.0057 -0.0059 
(-0.69) (-0.72) 
Size -0.0036 -0.0002 
(-0.93) (-0.05) 
Cc -0.0763 -0.0903 
-1.12 (-1.32) 
Sp 0.0193 0.0183 
(3.09)*** (3.02)*** 
In 0.0160 0.0156 
(2.61)*** (2.68)*** 
In 1(Auto) -0.0299 -0.0342 
(-0.54) -0.62 
In2(Banks) -0.0360 -0.0372 
-0.98 -1.02 
In3(Fin. Ins. ) -0.0717 -0.0762 
(-1.88)* (-2.01)** 
In4(R. Estate) 0.0228 0.0265 
(0.52) (0.61) 
In5(Retailer) -0.0203 -0.0206 
(-0.51) (-0.52) 
_cons 
0.1192 0.0744 
(1.52) (0.90) 
Within- R2 0.0562 0.0603 
Cross- R2 0.1688 0.1824 
Overall- R2 0.1251 0.1407 
Wald Chi-squared 29.00 31.93 
Prob. 0.0013 0.0008 
This table explains effects of asset securitization on risks for originators from the regression using panel data 
containing 272 observations: 
ALR = ao + a, Se + a2Rating, + a3Size,, + a, Cc,, + a5Sp + a6In,, + a, ind 1, + aind2, = 1,2 , .... 
272 
+ a9fnd3, + a, oind 4, + a1oind 5, + e 
Equation 5.4 
where 0 LR = change of leverage ratio; 
SeI = In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing); Se2 = (size)/(total assets); 
Dummy Rating= 6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; =2if BB; =1 if B; =0 for all the other 
lower ratings; 
Size = firm size = Ln(total assets); 
Cc = cost of capital using WACC method; 
Sp = spread between 10-year and 1-year government bond; 
In = volatility of 1-year interest rate; 
Dummy indl, =I if the issuer belongs to Auto industry, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind2, =I if the issuer belongs 
to Banks, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind3, =1 if the issuer belongs to financial institutions, 0 otherwise; Dummy 
ind4, =I if the issuer belongs to real estates, 0 otherwise; Dummy ind5, =I if the issuer belongs to retailers, 
=0 otherwise. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
"Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t-test. 
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Firstly, Table 5.7 indicates that more assets are securitized, the higher changes of 
leverage level (a, =0.0199, t-statistic=1.74) for originators will be. Secondly, under 
more unstable economic circumstances, the changes of leverage ratio become more 
significant in the same direction. Finally, financial institutions are proved to have less 
changes of leverage after securitization compared to other industries (a9 =-0.0762, 
t-statistic=-2.01). 
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Table 5.8: Panel data regressions (y= 0 debt ratio) 
Random effects model 
Variables Coe. Coe. 
(z) (z) 
No. of observations 272 272 
Se l 0.0032 
(1.32) 
Se2 0.0075 
(1.00) 
Rating -0.0033 -0.0027 
(-0.64) (-0.53) 
Size -0.0069 -0.0055 
(-2.92)*** (-2.07)** 
Cc 0.0532 0.0510 
(1.13) (1.07) 
Sp 0.0097 0.0085 
(2.14)** (1.91)** 
In 0.0052 0.0040 
(1.18) (0.95) 
In 1(Auto) -0.0452 -0.0428 
(-1.30) (-1.24) 
In2(Banks) -0.0333 -0.0318 
(-1.45) (-1.39) 
In3(Fin. Ins. ) -0.0440 -0.0437 
(-1.84)* -1.83 
In4(R. Estate) -0.0159 -0.0127 
(-0.58) -0.47 
In5(Retailer) -0.0483 -0.0469 
(-1.91)* (-1.86)* 
_cons 
0.1629 0.1528 
(3.33)*** (2.93)*** 
Within-R2 0.0513 0.0461 
Cross- R2 0.1666 0.1725 
Overall- R2 0.1486 0.1470 
Wald Chi-squared 29.72 29.26 
Prob. 0.0018 0.0021 
This table explains effects of asset securitization on risks for originators from the regression using panel data 
containing 272 observations: 
IR,, = ba + b, Se + b2Rating, + b3Size + b4Cc + b3Sp,, + bbin + blind 1, + bBind 2, i =1,2... 272 
+b9ind3, +bioind4, +b, oind5, + 
Equation 5.5 
where A DR = change of Debt ratio; 
Set = In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing); Set = (size)/(total assets); 
Dummy Rating= 6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; =2if BB; =1 if B; =0 for all the other 
lower ratings; 
Size = firm size = Ln(total assets); 
Cc = cost of capital using WACC method; 
Sp = spread between 10-year and I-year government bond; 
In = volatility of 1-year interest rate; 
Dummy indl, =1 if the issuer belongs to Auto industry, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind2, =I if the issuer belongs 
to Banks, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind3, =1 if the issuer belongs to financial institutions, =0 otherwise; Dummy 
ind4, =I if the issuer belongs to real estates, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind5, =I if the issuer belongs to retailers, 
=0 otherwise. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the I0% level using a two tailed t-test. 
"Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t -test. 
130 
The effects of asset securitization on changes of debt ratio are presented in Table 5.8. 
Accordingly, the smaller the company, the bigger the change of debt ratio after 
securitizing assets (b3 =-0.0069, t-statistic=-2.92). Comparing to the larger companies, 
smaller ones are more likely to be affected by securitization due to the amount of 
funds involved in. Moreover, in a long term, the change of debt ratio is positively 
affected by spread between long term and short term government bonds (b5=0.0097, 
t-statistic=2.14). Finally, financial institutions and retailers are not affected by asset 
securitization in making lending decisions ( b9 =-0.0437, t-statistic =-1.83; 
b, o =-0.0469, t-statistic=-1.86). 
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Table 5.9: Panel data regressions (y= A provision ratio) 
Random effects model 
Variables Coe. 
(z) 
Coe. 
(z) 
No. of observations 176 176 
Se l 0.0015 
(0.92) 
Set 0.0074 
(1.46) 
Rating 0.0019 
(0.51) 
0.0025 
(0.66) 
Size -0.0026 
-1.56 
-0.0018 
(-1.03) 
Cc -0.2103 
(-4.02)*** 
-0.2295 
(-4.21)*** 
Sp -0.0074 
(-2.35)** 
-0.0079 
(-2.62)*** 
In -0.0029 
-0.96 
-0.0030 
-1.04 
In(Banks) -0.0059 
-0.60 
-0.0038 
(-0.39) 
_cons 
0.0326 
(1.01) 
0.0234 
(0.71 
Within- R2 0.1641 0.1655 
Cross- R2 0.1503 0.1664 
Overall- R2 0.1220 0.1369 
Wald Chi-squared 30.37 31.91 
Prob. 0.0001 0.0000 
This table explains effects of asset securitization on risks for originators from the regression using panel data 
containing 176 observations: 
APR;, = co + c, Se + c2Rating, + c3Size,, + c4Cc,, + c5Sp,, + c6In,, + c7ind l; + c I =1,2....... 176 
Equation 5.6 
where A PR = change of bad debt provision ratio; 
Set = In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing); Set = (size)/(total assets); 
Dummy Rating= 6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; =2if BB; =1 if B; =0 for all the other 
lower ratings; 
Size = firm size = Ln(total assets); 
Cc = cost of capital using WACC method; 
Sp = spread between 10-year and 1-year government bond; 
In = volatility of 1-year interest rate; 
Dummy Ind 1, =I if the issuer belongs to banks, =0 if the issuers belongs to financial institutions. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t-test. 
Table 5.9 presents the regressions considering changes of bad debt provision ratios. 
The sample is reduced to 176 due to data availability. 21 The changes of bad debt 
21 Datastrea in only contains bad debt provision for banks and financial institutions. 
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provision are proved to be negatively influenced by the cost of capital of originator 
(c4=-0.2295, t-statistic=-4.21) and the spread between long term and short term 
government bonds (c7 =-0.0079, t-statistic=-2.62). 
Summing up, the panel data analysis does not explain the effects of asset 
securitization on risks better than cross sectional regression does. The values of R 
squared are reduced significantly. This may indicate in long run there are unobserved 
factors affecting risks suffered by originators, such as the accounting treatment of the 
assets (sale or finance), or whether internal or external enhancement is adopted. 22 T he 
other findings are: firstly, higher securitization ratio, more changes of leverage ratio; 
secondly, changes of risk suffered by originators are related to cost of capital and 
industry of the originator; finally, in long term, macro-economic factors are proved to 
be significantly affect risks. 
5.5. Conclusions 
In this section, the effects of asset securitization on risks of originators are 
investigated through empirical study. Previous literature suggests asset securitization 
realizes risk reduction not only directly through the issue, but also by affecting 
lending decision of the originator (e. g. Murray, 2001, and Jobst, 2003). Asset 
securitization improves liquidity of assets (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994). It 
reduces credit risk by providing reliable and constant funding source (Zweig, 1989), 
segregating risks in assets securitized from insolvency through "true sale" (Ong, 
2000), and better estimating and controlling of risk (Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988, 
and Benston, 1992). Finally, it lowers interest rate risk through diversification 
22 This might also be as the result of significant reduction on number of observations (from 542 to 276). 
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(Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988, and Benston, 1992). On the other hand, asset 
securitization may also create new problem for originators. Firstly, there are risks 
inherent in asset securitization, include credit risk, structure risk, and legal and tax 
risk (e. g. Bradt, 1991, Kravit, 1997, and Jobst, 2005). Secondly, securitization may 
encourage irrational lending through pipeline structure (Kaufman, 1999). Thirdly, it 
has also been suggested that securitization may lead to a reduction in the average 
quality of assets (Twinn, 1994). Finally, if originators suffer from weak financial 
status, securitization may lead to a decrease in quality and stability of earnings 
(Bernstein and Siegel, 1979). 
Consequently, the effects of asset securitization on risks remain unsolved. This 
research investigates the relationship between asset securitization and risks, also 
clarifies which firm-specific characteristics influences consequences of adoption of 
asset securitization as risk management tool. Six hypotheses are tested in empirical 
study, which are summarized in Table 5.10. 
Table 5.10: Hypotheses Summary 
Hypotheses under Investigation Expected Approved 
Sign 
Hypothesis One: Asset securitization affects risks of Yes 
originator. 
Hypothesis Two: Originators with higher credit ratings LR/Rating: + Yes 
have higher leverage levels, but lower bad debt provision 
ratios. PR/Rating: - Yes 
Hypothesis Three: Risks of originators are influenced by Yes 
the size of company. 
Hypothesis Four: Originators with higher cost of capital + Yes 
bear higher risks. 
Hypothesis Five: Movements of macro-economy affect In: + Yes 
i k ff db r s s su ere y originators. S p: + Yes 
Hypothesis Six: Effects of asset securitization on risks are Yes 
indust -s ecific. 
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It is found that asset securitization reduces leverage level significantly, which is 
consistent with research of Zweig's (1989), but contrasts with Dionne and 
Marchaoui's (2003). Other major findings are: 
Firstly, there are firm-specific characteristics affecting the result of using asset 
securitization as risk hedging tool, including credit ratings, company size, cost of 
capital, and industry it belongs to. Generally speaking, asset securitization encourages 
lending for the originator with good credit rating, large size and high cost of capital. 
Although this type of company is less likely to be affected by securitization activity 
due to the fact that direct loans are easily achievable in a short run, the potential 
benefit of risk management offered by securitization is highly valued by the originator 
in the long term. While in contrast, smaller companies more frequently use asset 
securitization to fund big projects, therefore, the financial ratios of the event year are 
strongly influenced by the activity. Overall, asset securitization offers originators the 
opportunities to reallocate risks, and only take risks they can handle. 
Secondly, in long-term, macro-economic factors are proved to significantly affect 
risks. Under more unstable economic circumstances, the originator will reduce the 
proportion of direct loan, and take other types of finance on the purpose of risk hedge. 
Moreover, asset securitization is highly valued by the originator to handle prepayment 
and interest rate risks under volatility of macro-economy, since the bad debt provision 
ratio is reduced after securitization. 
Finally, asset securitization is viewed as effective risk management tool by originators. 
It is proved that originators tend to reduce bad debt provisions after securitizing assets, 
which indicate they consider use of asset securitization effectively hedges future risk. 
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The equations concluded by this study could not well explain the effects of asset 
securitization on risks in long run. The values of R squared are reduced significantly 
when running the regression using panel data, which indicates in long run there are 
unobserved factors affecting risks suffered by originators. Further research is 
expected to fulfill the gap. 
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Chapter 6 
Effects of asset securitization on share price 
6.1. Introduction 
This proposed research is going to examine the effects of asset securitization on UK 
issuers' share prices. 542 asset-backed securities issued between 1993 and 2005 by 
133 companies are investigated through event study by examining the changes of 
daily returns for each security within event window. The author argues that asset 
securitization brings positive wealth effects to originators, which is due to the 
potential benefits offered by asset securitization. Moreover, the study also tries to 
identify factors related to wealth effects of asset securitization. 
The findings are: (1) Securitization brings positive wealth effects for originators; (2) 
investors are in favor of large volume issues; (3) wealth effects of asset securitization 
are affected by asset collateral; (4) firms that suffer with limited free cash flow use 
asset securitization to solve the problem of under-investment; (5) firms lack of growth 
opportunities enjoy gains due to adverse selection under information asymmetry; (6) 
effects are industry-specific; (7) stronger firms with higher financial slack 
experience more gains from securitization. 
The remainder of this paper consists of four sections. Existing literature is reviewed in 
part two. Data and methodology are described in part three, followed by results in 
section 4 and conclusion in section 5. 
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6.2. Literature review 
6.2.1 Introduction 
Asset securitization is the process to transfer illiquid assets into tradable securities. 
There are two factors distinguishing it from other derivatives, the first, structure of 
SPV (Special Purpose Vehicle), which is a bankruptcy-remote entity from the 
originator; the second, only the type of assets which could bring fixed income in the 
future could be securitized. The assets, mostly future receivables, normally are still be 
served by the owner, and generate income to pay off dividends to investors before 
maturation of the security. During the process, originators repackage the assets into 
homogeneous pools, underwriting, and selling to investors in form of securities. 
The argument of whether asset securitization gives positive impact on share price for 
originators has been continuing. Some researchers (e. g. Lockwood, Rutherford and 
Herrera, 1996) suggest the potential benefits offered by asset securitization lead to 
positive wealth effects for shareholders of issuing companies, including lowering cost 
financing (Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988), reducing risks (Hess and Smith, 1988; and 
Zweig, 1989); and reducing reserve and capital requirement (Donahoo and Shaffer, 
1991). Although the potential benefits of asset securitization indicate that there are 
positive wealth effects for shareholders of issuing firms, the new risks associated with 
securitization make the effects mixed. In academic field, whether asset securitization 
will affect share price and bond price positively is still problematic (Thomas, 2001). 
There are also debates on whether those benefits actually work for originators in real 
life (e. g., Bryan, 1988a; Morrissey, 1992; Benston, 1992; Hill, 1997); or, even further, 
some researchers argue only originators with certain characteristics could benefit from 
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asset securitization (e. g. Pavel, 1986; Bryan, 1988b; Benston, 1992; O'connell, 
Ratnatunga, and Smyrnios, 2000), although no one could define exactly which 
characteristics should be included in. Therefore, based on previous literature, these 
questions remain unsolved: 
(1) Does asset securitization bring positive wealth effects for originators? 
(2) Which factors influence the result? 
It is important to find the response of investors to securitization announcements, not 
only because it affects market value of existing originators directly, but also, it could 
guide potential originators to avoid unnecessary losses under certain circumstances. 
As a result, the aim of this study is to give a preliminary look at these questions 
through event study using UK market data. To examine whether there are abnormal 
returns around event window, two types of factors are tested in this research. The first 
type is firm-specific factors, including company's financial status, the industry 
company belongs to, credit rating of the company, and frequency of ABS issuing as an 
originator; the other type is related to each ABS issue, including the type of assets 
being securitized, and volume of the issue. Previous similar studies include Lockwood 
et al (1996), Thomas (1999), and Gasbarro et al (2005), all using US data. 
Nevertheless, in Lockwood's study, distressed banks occupied large part of sample, 
while Gasbarro only concentrate on multi-bank holding companies, and Thomas 
barely considers any firm-specific characteristics, which leave huge room to make 
improvement. Besides, the UK market remain untouched in empirical study field, 
which could be explained by the data protection rule, although it is quite meaningful 
to do so considering a interesting factor that while the UK is the second largest asset 
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securitization market in the world, people in the UK still think it is much costly and 
too complex, and the only reason to use it is to diversify (PWC, 2002). In this case, a 
sample of data containing 542 asset securitization issues, covering from 1994 to 2005 
in the UK, are collected through a number of sources available to the public, which 
are also cross several industries and containing firm-specific characteristics. 
6.2.2 Benefits of asset securitization 
Previous literature suggests asset securitization offers a series benefits, such as 
reduction of cost of capital (Morrissey, 1992), risk management (Hess and Smith, 
1988) and liquidity enhancement (Finnerty, 1988, and Bartlett, 1989). Greenbaum and 
Thakor (1987), Pavel and Phillis (1987), and Hess and Smith (1988) suggest that 
securitization provides a means to reduce risk, to diversify portfolio, and to fund new 
assets and operations. Donahoo and Shaffer (1991), and Hugh Thomas (2001) suggest 
that depository institutions securitize to reduce reserve and capital requirements, thus 
to alleviate regulatory burden. Rosenthal and Ocampo (Securitization of Credit, 1988) 
suggest that since securitization allows separating the credit risk of securitized assets 
from the risk of the firm, regardless of the firm's credit rating, it could reduce the cost 
of financing for the firm. 
When companies issue equity, they send a strong signal to the stock market that they 
think their shares are overvalued, and the stock price tends to fall (Froot et al, 1994). 
If companies borrow loans, high leverage level increases default risk of the company, 
and also makes it difficult to raise external funds in the future. From funding point of 
view, asset securitization is an innovation different with traditional financial methods, 
and has its own comparative advantages. Securitization offers the firm expanded 
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borrowing capacity, freeing the firm to pursue additional positive net present value 
(NPV) projects. Typically, the benefit from securitized transactions is accounted for 
as a gain on sale (FAS 125, Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 RL., 1996) 
valued at the present value of future net cash flows. Obviously, this method, involving 
the gains in advance, benefits on the income statement in comparison with a 
spread-driven portfolio lender. There are two alternatives to recast financial 
statements to make statements of portfolio lenders and securitizers more comparable: 
Apply gain on sale methodology to all loans or adjust securitizations so that the 
excess spread is treated similarly to net interest income calculations to portfolio 
lenders. Moreover, ABS also provides off-balance-sheet financing. Companies are 
required to report as liabilities only that part of the ABS that they guarantee (e. g., 
through credit enhancement). Thus, firms are able to convert assets to cash quickly 
and to remove liabilities arising from assets acquired through business expansion 
(Bernstein, 1993). The issuing firms also receive fee income for serving the ABS 
(Kopff and Lent, 1990). The cash inflow from the ABS issue can be used to retire 
existing debt, which, in turn, reduces interest expense, increases reported earnings, 
and increases stockholder equity. The financial benefits offered by securitization, 
therefore, suggest that there are positive wealth effects for shareholders. 
6.2.3 Asset securitization and optimal capital structure 
Maximizing shareholders' wealth is one of the goals for firms. Contemporary research 
suggests adoption of securitization could avoid Myers (1977) under-investment 
problem (e. g. Thomas, 2001, Gasbarro, Stevenson, Schwebach and Zumwalt, 2005), 
hence, allows forms to move towards an optional capital structure. The key to creating 
corporate value is making good investments. The key to making good investments is 
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generating enough cash internally to fund those investments; when companies do not 
generate enough cash, they tend to cut investments more dramatically than their 
competitors do. Cash flow - so crucial to the investment process - can often be 
disrupted by movements in external factors such as exchange rates, commodity prices 
and interest rates, potentially compromising a company's ability to invest. A sset 
securitization, in that case, transfers future income into cash, offering flexible funding 
source to solve the problem. 
Benveniste and Berger (1987) show that securitization can improve risk sharing and 
increase project funding using optimal risk allocation models. They argue 
securitization allows banks to issue debt claims senior to those of depositors, hence, 
the risks borne by depositors can be reduced. This is an optimal risk allocation result 
(the securitization buyers are risk averse) under fluctuating rate, fairly priced deposits. 
Secondly, securitization could free more funds, increase financial slack, as a result, 
new positive net present projects that, which would not be funded in the absence of 
securitization, can be undertaken. Gasbarro, Stevenson, Schwebach and Zumwalt 
(2005) also point out that asset securitization reduces information asymmetry, which 
may cause a firm to under-invest or reject projects with positive net present value if 
the investment causes a wealth transfer form the old shareholders when new equity 
has to be issued to raise funds. Both studies indicate use of asset securitization could 
solve the problem of under-investment, when firms are short of cash to fund new 
investments. Therefore, firms lack of free cash flow but with growth opportunities 
tend to securitize to solve the problem of underinvestment. 
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6.2.4 Firm-specific characteristics 
There are certain firm-specific characteristics influencing wealth effects of asset 
securitization for originators, including the industry the company belongs to, the 
financial performance and reputation of company. 
First of all, researchers argue banking industry, including FIs (financial institutions), 
has comparative advantages in issuing asset-backed securities, therefore, we expect 
the effects of asset securitization on share price are industry-specific. Banks and FIs 
provide collections of services to issuers, investors, and those in need of financial 
information. The literature seldom addresses why a given FI provides a particular 
blend of services. Casual analysis leads to the conjecture that if an FI has a 
comparative advantage in supplying a service, it will indeed supply the service. Some 
models provide insights as to how those comparative advantages may arise. Millon 
and Thakor's (1985) model of FIs as coalitions of information gathering agents whose 
certification is needed by issuers is directly applicable to the role of rating agencies in 
securitizations (although not the securitization process itself ). They model an explicit 
comparative advantage of the information gathering agents as an ability to share 
information within the coalition. In a related model, Ramakrishnan and Thakor's 
(1984) information producers' comparative advantage comes from their ability to 
costlessly monitor each other in coalitions. Either way, FIs as so modeled have 
comparative advantages in information production, independent of other functions. 
Since non-FIs do not excel at funding, they would be more likely to sell off their fixed 
income claims in securitization if they could obtain an attractive implied cost of 
funding. If funding is a major motive for securitization then, given the comparative 
funding disadvantage of non-banking firms, one would expect that the market reaction 
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to successful securitizations would be larger for non-banks than for banks. This 
positive effect would be reinforced to the extent that the rating agencies perform a 
monitoring role for the corporation, certifying the value of assets*. 
Secondly, stronger firms with higher financial slack tend to have more positive 
reaction from share price. The management of a healthy firm can generally decide the 
conditions under which it will sell its assets. If managers maximized shareholder 
wealth, then a firm would only sell those assets when the price is advantageous. Given 
this ability to choose when to securitize, one would expect the news of most 
securitizations originated by most healthy firms would be greeted by a positive share 
price effect. Conversely, it might be expected that the forced sale of assets by a firm in 
distress might be interpreted by the market as a confirmation of the firm's poor 
condition, with a commensurate fall in firm value. This would explain the effect 
observed by Lockwood et al. (1996) that poorly capitalized banks demonstrate a 
reduction in shareholder wealth with securitization. Nevertheless, asset securitization 
still offers a chance to retrieve the loss for the weaker company. A company at risk of 
becoming bankrupt may have some fixed income assets that are, in themselves, highly 
credit-worthy. It may be able to legally securitize these assets and so obtain necessary 
funding. The new funds, if invested in positive NPV projects, will increase the equity 
holders' value. Benveniste and Berger (1987) find support for their hypothesis that 
riskier banks tend to securitize. Berger and Udell (1992) confirm Benveniste and 
Berger (1987) results but find no connection between commercial and industrial loan 
sales and banks riskness. Stanton (1998) also comes to the conclusion that riskier 
banks - including banks with capital adequacy constraints, low liquidity, and high bad 
loan ratios - tend to do more off-balance-sheet activities. Using this line of reasoning, 
the wealth effects of asset securitization is positively related to financial performance 
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of originators. 
Finally, reputation building is important for originators. Fitchratings suggests that 
market discipline reduces moral hazard and ensures that only reputable lenders 
continue to securitize. Thus, a history of successful securitizations signals an 
originator's strong financial position. Suggested by previous research (Gasbarro, 
Stevenson, Schwebach and Zumwalt, 2005), more experienced originators are 
expected with better handle of risks and costs, also, better response from the market. 
Besides, bond ratings are used by Stanton (1998) as a measure of information 
asymmetry, by Thomas (1999) as a proxy for creditworthiness, and by Fitchratings as 
a measure of reputation. 
6.2.5 Issue-specific characteristics 
Tierney et al. (1994), Benston (1992), and Pavel (1986) argue that asset portfolios 
need to possess certain desirable characteristics, such as homogenous cashflows, 
before firms might efficiently securitize them. Despite this contention, researchers 
have yet to resolve what those desirable characteristics are. 
Pavel (1986) suggested that risks associated with asset-backed securities are the main 
price determinants and argued that very large assets, or those with complex credit 
characteristics, are not suitable for securitization. Bryan (1988a and b) argued that the 
liquidity advantage offered by securitization is maximized with assets like residential 
mortgages. Bryan (1988a and b) and Pavel (1986) observed that mortgages are prime 
candidates for securitization, owing to their historically low default rates and ease of 
credit analysis. Tierney et al. (1994) identified various characteristics of asset pools, 
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such as geographic and demographic diversity, that might be important to credit rating 
agencies, and presumably to securitization transaction arrangers in their assessments. 
Benston (1992) placed less emphasis on characteristics of underlying assets than 
either Pavel (1986) or Tierney et al. (1994) did, highlighting availability of credit 
enhancements to asset-backed securities which reduce risks associated with 
underlying collateral. Nevertheless, Benston (1992) recognized that attributes of 
assets are significant in facilitating securitization transactions in specific 
circumstances. For example, he noted that commercial loans would be costly to 
securitize, because of adverse selection and moral hazard problems faced by 
guarantors in assessing probabilities of default on asset types. He stipulated that 
severity of adverse selection and moral hazard problems is likely to be high for 
commercial loans based on lack of uniformity and volatility of asset class. It follows 
that asset attributes might be important in determining whether or not securitization 
transactions will proceed, even though research has not provided evidence of what 
those desirable characteristics are. 
Pavel (1986), Bryan (1988b), and Zweig (1989) identified suitability of information 
systems as important to securitization transactions. Zweig (1989) emphasized the 
significance of technology to development of securitization, noting that these 
transactions would be impossible without information systems that successfully 
monitor cashflows and loan arrears or defaults, thereby ensuring that participants 
receive correct returns. Zweig (1989) also observed that loans and related interests 
had to be "tagged" as they flow from borrowers to originators, to special purpose 
vehicles, and, finally, to end investors. 
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Researchers (e. g., Bryan, 1988a and b; Bartlett, 1989; and Sinkey, 1992) argued that 
an important precondition to securitizing is possession of sufficient volumes of 
suitable assets. Bryan (1988a) and Bartlett (1989) stressed the necessity to amortize 
large established costs over high volumes of assets to economically render 
securitization transactions. Sinkey (1992) quantified a minimum economic volume as 
being 50 million US dollars and suggested that transaction arrangers' fees were major 
cost hurdles. 
There is also an association between asset volume and liquidity. For example, Bryan 
(1988a) nominated a higher figure than Sinkey (1992), 100 million US dollars, 
arguing that issues below this size are illiquid with issuance costs higher than 
associated cost savings. Conversion of illiquid assets to tradable asset-backed 
securities appears to be a catalyst for securitization. Notwithstanding these views, 
these studies lack evidence to support their assertions. 
In summary, there are conflicting results under the topic of wealth effects of asset 
securitization. Literature review has posited a number of critical factors to 
securitization. However, research has not provided evidence to identify the 
characteristics, and there is a lack of test within transactions. 
6.3. Methodology 
Two steps are included in this study. The first is an event study to find whether share 
prices of issuing companies do response to the news of securitization; the second is to 
run a regression to clarify which factors affect the abnormal returns. Same data and 
sample are tested as what described in Chapter 3.4. 
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6.3.1 Event Study Processing 
The change of share price around announcement day indicates the investors' attitude 
to the news, which significantly affects the issuing company's market value and 
wealth of its shareholders. In this section, in order to find the response of stock market 
to the news of securitization, an event study is adopted. 23 
Wealth effects of asset securitization have been examined by researchers using event 
study over past years. Lookwood, Rutherford and Herrera (1996) give the fist 
example, followed by Hugh Thomas (1999,2001), also Gasbarro, Stevenson, 
Schwebach and Zumwalt (2005). Lookwood, Rutherford and Herrera examine 294 
securitization issues by companies of different industry (banks, finance companies, 
automobile and other industries) during 1985 to 1992. Hugh Thomas tests a sample of 
236 transactions during 1991 to 1996 in his first study in 1999, and later, a much lager 
sample, 1,416 issues from 1983 to 1997 are used. The most update study by Gasbarro, 
Stevenson, Schwebach and Zumwalt (2005) contains a sample of 233 securitization 
issues by 24 U. S. multi-bank holding companies from 1992 through 2000. All studies 
focus on U. S market, and CSRP (Centre fro Research in Security Prices) has been 
used as main data source. Gasbarro, Stevenson, Schwebach and Zumwalt use a 
single-industry sample of MBHCs (Multi Bank Holding Companies), other studies are 
cross-industry. The results are conflicting. Three out of four tests show positive 
wealth effects of asset securitization for entire sample over the event window, and 
only the latest study by Gasbarro et. al. finds bank returns are significantly different 
from zero. More specific, Lockwood et. al. find that securitization increase 
shareholder wealth in well-capitalized banks and finance companies but reduces 
23 Literature review of event study is provided in Chapter 3.3.3. 
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shareholders wealth in weak banks, moreover, findings are industry specific with 
wealth increase for finance companies, with no wealth change for industrial 
companies and automobile companies, and with wealth loss for banks. Thomas (1999) 
concludes the opposite: significant positive returns are available to shareholders and 
the returns decrease with the creditworthiness of shareholders. The fact that these 
studies used different data sets begs the questions as to whether the effects are 
dependent on the years under study. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3.3.3, the event study includes three tasks, (1) define the 
event of interest and event window, (2) measure abnormal return, and (3) test the null 
hypothesis designed. The process concerning this test is then described as follow. 
The first, define event day. For securitization, previous studies use a combination of 
issuing day, pricing day announcement day as the event day due to availability. The 
event window is difficult to be decided when there is uncertainty on event day, 
suggested by Thomas (1999), and in that case, wide event window is adopted by both 
of his studies, 50 days and 100 days exactly. Lookwood, Rutherford and Herrera 
(1996), and Gasbarro, Stevenson, Schwebach and Zumwalt (2005), use small event 
window in their study ((-1,0) and (-2, +2)). Gasbarro et al. explain the reason why a 
small event window is allowed in their study. It is because after comparing the 
financial press announcement date and the IFR (International Financial Review 
Platinum) announcement date, the announcement dates are more precisely identified. 
In our study, we face the same problem as Thomas (1999). Due to data protection rule 
in the UK, there is no existing data base that provides announcement dates for each 
securitization issue in the UK, therefore, we use a mixed data sources, including Fitch 
ratings, Absreports, and announcements made through web side of London stock 
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exchange, as a result, pricing date, issuing date, and listing date are provided by 
different sources for some issues. When the dates differ, we use the earliest date as the 
event date. Further more, we also follow Thomas to use an event window of 101 
trading days ((-70, +30)24 The reasons are firstly, our dates of event are not as 
precise as others; the second, we believe in the UK, the market could be aware of a 
securitization for the period from two to six months in advance of the listing25. UK 
FSA (Financial Services Authority) requires firms to submit information of issuing 
securities one year before officially listed, and during the process of securitization, 
there are several participants involved, for example, rating agency need to approval 
and place paper, as a result, the news could be relieved very earlier to investors. But 
the reaction of investors not only related to the quality and quantity of the information, 
but also their views on securitization under certain circumstances. Conclusively, 
whether the impact of asset securitization will be before or after the official listing 
dates of securities is still in doubt. 
Secondly, calculate abnormal returns. Previous studies on wealth effects of assets 
securitization commonly use market model (e. g. Lookwood, Rutherford and Herrera, 
1996; Hugh Thomas, 1999 and 2001; Gasbarro, Stevenson, Schwebach and Zumwalt, 
2005). Following Thomas's (1999,2001) studies, daily abnormal return is calculated 
as total daily return for each event day minus weighted market return, in our case, 
daily FTSE 100 return, 26 which is as follow: 
24 There is always a problem unsolved with how to define event window. Because the issuer structuring the 
transaction has to spend certain amount of time to find other participants, determining appropriate size, structure 
and price for the issue. However, the timing varies depending on the frequency of issuing. For new issuer, the 
process of securitization could last for months, while for a frequent issuer, it could be as little as two weeks. 
25 The analyst of FSA is contacted for consulting purpose. The suggestions are the process of listing ABS in the 
UK takes as long as a year, and based on their experience, the market is aware of the news two to six months 
before the listing day. 
26 This index comprises the 100 most highly capitalized blue chip companies, representing approximately 80% of 
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AR;! = R;, - R,, ,t= -70,... +30. 
R;, = daily return of share i on day t, 
R., = daily return on FTSE 100 on day t. 27 
Finally, define the null hypothesis and determine the techniques for aggregating the 
abnormal returns of each individual firm in the sample. For this study, the null 
hypothesis is: there is no abnormal return during event window. Results of t-tests on 
AAR (average abnormal return) and CAAR (cumulative average abnormal return) are 
reported in section 6.4.28 
6.3.3 Hypotheses and Variables 
Seven hypotheses are to tested by this study, which are as follow. 
Hypothesis One: Asset securitization positively affects share price of the originator. 
Average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) 
during event window for each issue are calculated using market model. 29 T -test is 
employed to find whether there are significant abnormal returns for originators. 
the UK market. It is used extensively as a basis for investment products, such as derivatives and exchange-traded 
funds. 
27 Appendix 6.1 presents the results using constant mean model. 
21 8 AARS= ARS, ,n= the number of sample securities whose excess return are available on day t, n 
t=-70,..., +30. CAAR, (tI, t2) _± AARt , where time 
interval are represented by (t I, t2) 
t=r, 
29 In later chapter, Caar(+l, +10) proved to be the abnormal return with most significant sign. We adopted it as 
dependent variable of the regression in order to explain the abnormal return. 
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The independent variable used in regression for this hypothesis is securitization ratio 
(Se). Previous studies by Lookwood, Rutherford and Herrera (1996), Hugh Thomas 
(1999), and Gasbarro, Stevenson, Schwebach and Zumwalt (2005), suggest positive 
sign between CAAR and size of issuing (Se). As in the previous chapter, Se is 
measure by two methods, natural logarithm of the issuing size, and the ratio of issuing 
size to total assets. 
Hypothesis Two: Wealth effects of asset securitization are specific in type of assets 
securitized. 
Different type of assets contains desirable characteristics, which determine efficiency 
of securitization (e. g. Tierney et al). As mentioned in Chapter 3.4, the four types of 
assets collateral included in this study are: RMBS (residential mortgage-backed 
securities), CMBS (commercial mortgage-backed securities), CDO (collateralized 
debt obligations), and the rest are defined as ABS (including WB-ABS 
(Whole-business asset-backed securities), CC-ABS (credit-card ABS), project finance, 
SL-ABS (student loan ABS), et al). We expect the effects to be different depending on 
types of assets securitized. The dummy variable Asset is measured as follow: 
Dummy asl, =1 for CDO, =0 otherwise; 
Dummy as2, =1 for CMBS, =0 otherwise; 
Dummy as3; =1 for RMBS, =0 otherwise. 
Hypothesis Three: Asset securitization creates wealth for originators due to its 
comparative advantages. 
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A series of direct and indirect benefits have been suggested by researches (Rosenthal 
and Ocampo, 1988, Hill, 1997, and Thomas, 2001). Overall, asset securitization is 
widely accepted as financing and risk management tool, and each aspect is examined 
in detail in chapter 4 and 5. In this chapter, we use two variables, interest expenses 
ratio (IE) and bad debt ratio (BD), for this purpose. When the originator chooses asset 
securitization over loans, interest expenses decrease, if asset securitization is cost 
efficient, negative sign is expected. It is rather difficult to decide the sign of 
coefficient of bad debt provision, because it could either reflect a conservative 
approach, or a bad financial status. Due to data availability, a reduced sample 
containing 386 issues is tested with the variable of BD. 30 
Hypothesis Four: Firms that suffer with limited free cash flow but have growth 
opportunities tend to securitize could solve the problem of underinvestment through 
asset securitization. 
Literature suggests securitization could solve the problem of under-investment. Jensen 
(1986) describes that the reaction to an issue depends on the expected purpose of the 
capital and the type of security that is issued. As managers have incentives to increase 
the size of the firms, even with negative NPV projects, the abnormal returns are 
determined by growth opportunities and free cash flow. If firms issue debt, they 
choose to discipline overinvestment behavior. Instead, securitization is valued for a 
firm with growth opportunities, but at the same time lack of free cash flow. Therefore, 
we expect a positive relationship between the abnormal return associated with the 
issuance of asset-backed securities to growth opportunities, and negative sign to free 
cash flow. 
30 The reduced sample includes 304 issues by banks, and 82 issues by financial institutions. The descriptive 
statistics are presented in Appendix 6.2. 
153 
Suggested by De Jong and Veld (2001), the variable of growth opportunities (Mtb) is 
measured by market-to-book ratio. The larger the ratio is, the higher growth 
opportunities are. Free-cash-flow (Fcf) is measured as operating income minus taxes, 
interest expenditures and dividends paid, divided by the market value of equity. 
Hypothesis Five: The effects of asset securitization on originator's share prices are 
industry specific. 
Banks have always represented the largest group of originators of asset securitization. 
With the development of market and the trend of globalization, more and more big 
companies appear to merge in other industries, which are financially strong enough to 
be the originators of asset securitization, and benefit from this financial innovation. 
The research by Lockwood et al. (1996) indicates the wealth effects of asset 
securitization on originators are industry specific. The dummy variable industry (Ind) 
is defined as follow: 
Dummy indl, =1 if the issuer belongs to Auto industry, =0 otherwise; 
Dummy ind2; =1 if the issuer belongs to Banks, =0 otherwise; 
Dummy ind3, =1 if the issuer belongs to financial institutions, =0 otherwise; 
Dummy ind4, =1 if the issuer belongs to real estates, =0 otherwise; 
Dummy ind5, =1 if the issuer belongs to retailers, =0 otherwise. 
Hypothesis Six: Stronger originators generate higher abnormal returns. 
This hypothesis tests the proposition that wealth effects of asset securitization differ 
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on the basis of financial slack status of originators. Stronger firms normally own more 
financial slack. As indicated by Lockwood et al. (1996) and Schwarcz (1993), the 
market may view low financial slack as indicative of an eroded capital base, thus, the 
sale of assets by low slack firms could be considered as confirmation of worse 
financial status. Alternatively, securitization may require the originator to spend 
additional resources, which makes it difficult for low slack firm to complete the 
transaction. Therefore, financial slack of originator is viewed by investors as an 
indicator of financial ability. Stronger companies with superior financial slack attract 
investors more than firms with litter financial slack do, since investors are more likely 
to view their announcement of securitization as good news. 
Financial slack (Fs) is measured following research by De Jong and Veld (2001), 
which stands for having cash (or near cash) and/or spare debt capacity available to 
take up opportunities as they appear. Considering the company own financial ability, 
the first component is the sum of cash and liquidity divided by the book value of the 
firm; the second component is unused debt capacity, the difference between average 
industry debt ratio and firm's debt ratio. 31 A positive sign is expected. 
Hypothesis Seven: Originators with good reputation have better response from the 
market. 
Two variables are included, frequency of issue, and credit rating of originators. 
Firms are expected to be more capable to deal with asset securitization when they 
already have experiences in this specific field since most people consider it as 
complicated and tough to handle. Big banks or firms build their good reputation in 
31 Results of financial slack measure as the first component and sum of the two components are both reported. 
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years, which could be more favorable by investors, which suggested by Gasbarro et al 
(2005). Here in our sample, the average frequency during last 12 years is calculated as 
4.56, therefore, the sample is divided into two groups. The dummy variable Fe is 
measured as: 
Fe =1 if the firm issued more than 5 times over sample year, =0 otherwise. 
Considering information symmetry, credit rating on originators' bond rating is a key 
factor for potential investors to take into account. We expect positive relationship 
between credit rating and cumulative abnormal return, which is consistent with Fitch 
observation, also confirmed by Gasbarro et al. (2005). The variable (Rating) is 
measure as: 
Rating= 6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 
Rating= 5 if Moody's rating is AA; 
Rating= 4 if Moody's rating is A; 
Rating= 3 if Moody's rating is BBB; 
Rating= 2 if Moody's rating is BB; 
Rating= 1 if Moody's rating is B; 
Rating= 0 for all the other lower ratings. 
The seven hypotheses are summarized as follows. 
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Hypothesis One: Asset securitization positively affects share price of the originator. 
Hypothesis Two: Wealth effects of asset securitization are asset collateral specific. 
Hypothesis Three: Asset securitization creates wealth for originators due to its 
comparative advantages. 
Hypothesis Four: Firms that suffer with limited free cash flow but have growth 
opportunities tend to securitize could solve the problem of underinvestment through 
asset securitization. 
Hypothesis Five: The effects of asset securitization on originator's share prices are 
industry specific. 
Hypothesis Six: Stronger originators generate higher abnormal returns. 
Hypothesis Seven: Originators with good reputation have better response from the 
market. 
6.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 6.1 and 6.2 provide descriptions and statistics for each variable used in this 
study, along with Datastream codes representing the figures. 
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Table 6.1: Data description 
Variable Description Datastream Codes 
CAAR Cumulative average abnormal 
return 
Financial slack (1) (Cash + liquid assets)/(Book (1) 375/305; 
(fs) value of the company) (2) debt ratio = 1301/392 
(2) (Cash + liquid assets)/(Book 
value of the company) 
+(Average debt ratio in the 
industry - company's debt 
ratio) 
Interest expanse ratio Interest payment on loan/loan WC012S1/1301 
ier 
Bad debt ratio Bad debt provision/loan 818/1301 
(bdr) 
Securitization ratio (1) natural logarithm (issue size (1) LN(se) 
(se) (million USA of securitization) (2) Sec/392 
dollar) (2) (Issue size of 
securitization /total assets 
Growth opportunities Market-to-book ratio MTBV 
(mtb) 
Free cash flow (Operating income - taxes - (WC01250-WC01451-WC01075-WC04551)/(MV* 1000) 
(fcf) interests - dividends paid)/market 
value of equity 
Table 6.2: Statistics of variables 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
fs1 542 0.6334 1.4430 -11.4 5.6169 
fs2 542 0.6334 1.4520 -11.7563 5.6169 
ier 542 0.0515 . 0593 . 0009 0.5626 Se l 542 6.3168 1.2372 0.23 10.14 
Se2 542 0.0945 0.3490 5.73e-07 4.5473 
Fe 542 0.7325 0.4431 0 1 
rating 542 4.2657 1.1110 0 6 
542 2.1131 1.3211 . 23 17.2 fcf 542 -0.4619 0.7068 -4.9254 0.8967 
One of the variables, bad debt provision is only available for banks and financial 
institutions from Datastream. The sample is reduced to 386 observations due to the 
reason. And the statistics of reduced sample is described in Table 6.3. The mean value 
of one independent variable, financial slack, is significantly lower than it is under full 
sample (0.3974 v. s. 0.6334). 
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Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics of reduced sample 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
fs1 386 0.3974 1.4520 -11.4 5.1503 
fs2 386 0.3786 1.4561 -11.7563 5.3157 
ier 386 0.0447 0.0656 0.0015 0.5626 
Se l 386 6.3434 1.3523 0.23 10.14 
Se2 386 0.0825 0.3059 5.73c-07 2.8065 
Fe 386 0.8056 0.3961 0 1 
Rating 386 4.5466 0.3961 1 6 
g 386 2.0853 1.0348 0.36 7.03 
fcf 386 -0.6018 0.7376 -4.9254 0.0160 
Bd 386 0.0169 0.0325 -0.0002 0.3689 
Table 6.4: Correlation matrix 
Variables fsl 1"s2 ier 
1: s 111.0000 
fs2 
icr 
Sel 
Se2 
fe 
rating 
9 
fI 
Scl Se2 fc rating g fcf 
0.9905* 1.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.1202* 0.0960 1.0000 
(0.0051) (0.0254) 
-0.0602 -0.0562 0.0085 1.0000 
(0.1613) (0.1914) (0.8427) 
0.0196 -0.0046 0.6093* 0.0429* 1.0000 
(0.6485) (0.9150) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
0.0572 0.0270 0.0669 0.0597 -0.0646 1.0000 
(0.1837) (0.5304) (0.1199) (0.1653) (0.1329) 
-0.2850* -0.3058* -0.0725 0.0427 -0.0547 0.0696 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0918) (0.3207) (0.2038) (0.1057) 
0.0543 0.0837 -0.0277 -0.0774 0.0235 -0.0178 0.0999 1.0000 
(0.2065) (0.0515) (0.5198) (0.0717) (0.5854) (0.6792) (0.0201) 
0.2393* 0.3113* -0.1114* 0.0984 0.0282 -0.1574* -0.3962* 0.2702* 1.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0094) (0.0220) (0.5128) 
_ 
(0.0002) (0.0000) (10.0000) 
*Correlation is significant at 1% level. 
The correlation matrix of variables is provided in Table 6.4. The result indicates there 
is no multicollinearity. The high correlation between tsl and 1s2 (two diflcrent 
measurements of financial slack) could be explained as fs2 equals to Isl plus unused 
debt capacity of the company. 32 
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6.4. Results and Findings 
6.4.1 Response of share price to asset securitization 
Table 6.5 and 6.6 calculates the cumulative abnormal return over event window and 
give the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns are zero. Testing 
on AAR and CAAR for entire sample, the null hypothesis of no excess returns are 
both rejected, more specific, AAR is 0.02% (t-statistics = 2.03), and CAAR is 
0.16% (t-statistics = 1.93), both statistically significant. 33 Positive wealth effects by 
asset securitization are strongly suggested based on this result. 
33 Results using constant mean model are reported in Appendix 6.3. 
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Table 6.5 presents event study results for all 542 issues based on different industries, 
indicating only specific industries during certain period realize wealth effects from 
asset securitization. Financial institutions show strongest sign of benefits, CAAR 
during (-30, -21), (-10, -1) and day -1 all give positive abnormal returns (the 
cumulative abnormal returns equal to 1.11%, 1.48%, and 0.44% accordingly) 
significantly at 1 percent level (t-statistics equal to 2.35,3.44 and 2.77). Banks and 
retailers all show positive abnormal return on day (+1, +10) with statistically 
significant results. Real estates and automobile industries give mixed reaction during 
event window, and the rest of sample seems to not benefit from asset securitization. 
For further investigation, we pick the period day (+1, +10), which shows the most 
abnormal return for the whole sample. 4 Table 6.4 indicates that during period day +1 
to day +10 retailers show the highest positive abnormal return. However, the industry 
of retailers only contains 22 issues. Banks, containing 181 out of 126 observations 
with positive abnormal returns, contribute most of the all. 
Results of abnormal return based on different type of assets securitized are present in 
Table 6.6. Overall, companies which issued CMBS are more likely to have market 
value increased, except for periods (-60, -51) and (-50, -41), all other 10 day periods 
give positive wealth effects. During day +1 to +10, originators who issued CDO-ABS 
provide most significant abnormal return of 1.32% (t-statistics = 2.60), while 
companies issued RMBS experienced losses (0.19%) at the same time. Therefore, 
results suggest wealth effects of asset securitization are also asset specific. 
74 Later in the regression, CAAR(+1, +10) is adopted as independent variable to find reasons cause the abnormal 
returns. 
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Table 6.7: T -test of CAAR(+' 1, +10) by industry 
CAAR(+1, +10) 
(%) 
t-value Positive: Negative Observations 
Auto -2.40 -1.73* 9: 17 26 
Banks 1.27 3.37*** 181: 126 307 
Financial institutions 0.41 0.74 91: 73 164 
Real estate -2.23 -2.06** 5: 11 15 
Retailer 4.24 3.15*** 18: 4 22 
Others -0.83 -0.30 4: 4 8 
Total 0.83 2.83*** 307: 235 542 
'Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test; 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test; 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t-test. 
Table 6.8: T -test of CAAR(+1, +10) by asset collateral 
CAAR(+1, +10) 
(%) 
t-value Positive: Negative Observations 
ABS 1.38 1.67* 66: 44 110 
CDO 1.32 2.60*** 92: 63 155 
CMBS 1.27 1.99** 59: 41 100 
RMBS -0.19 -0.42 90: 87 177 
Total 0.83 2.83*** 307: 235 542 
"Ntatistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test; 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test; 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t-test. 
The cumulative excess return over event day +1 through day +10 is proved to be the 
most significant, which is described in Table 6.7 and Table 6.8. Accordingly, based on 
industry the originator belongs to, banks (1.27%) and retailers (4.24%) contribute the 
most of positive return, while auto (-2.40%) and real estate (-2.23%) industries suffer 
significant loss during the period. Differing in asset collateral, ABS brings the highest 
cumulative excess return of 1.38%, and is statistically significant (t-statistic=1.67); 
the issues by CDO and CMBS also give positive wealth effects, more specific, 
1.32% for CDO (t-statistic=2.60) and 1.27% for CMBS (t-statistic=1.99). 
Thus, the results of event study indicate positive wealth effects for whole sample, 
which is consistent with previous studies by Lookwood, Rutherford and Herrera 
(1996), Hugh Thomas (1999), also Gasbarro, Stevenson, Schwebach and Zumwalt 
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(2005). Considering all different event window adopted, the closest comparison can 
be made for all studies on day +1. Again, we confirm the finding by Lockwood et. al. 
and Thomas, a positive return for the day +1 is reported but is not significantly 
different from zero, more specific, an abnormal return of 0.08 percent with t-statistics 
equal to 0.94. And, similar with those studies, both AAR and CAAR are changing 
through event window without trend. Further investigation suggest wealth effects of 
asset securitization are industry and asset specific, individual groups perform 
extremely well, while some other groups experience losses instead. 
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6.4.2 Factors affecting wealth effects of asset securitization 
Based on results above, CAAR(+1, +10) shows the most significant sign. It is taken as 
dependent variable in following regression. 
CAAR, (+1, +10) 
yo + y1FS, +Y2IE, +Y3Se, + y4Fe, + y5Rating, + y6Mtb, + y7Fcf, + y8ind1, +Y9ind2, 
+ y1oind3, + y, lind4, +Y12ind5, +Y13as1, +Y14as2, + y, Sas3, +e, 
i =1,2,.... n. 
The financial slack and securitization ratio are both measured into two different 
methods, in total, giving 4 regressions for each test. 
Further, the issue of lagging has to be discussed. Since annual accounting data is used, 
the data of the event year may not fit the model the best. Therefore, independent 
variables in three terms are tested to find the best results, which are: (1) the year 
before event year (x, -, 
); (2) the event year (x, ); and (3) mixed term (xr_t or x, ). The 
measurement of mixed term is based on the time distance between issuing date and 
accounting date of the year. If the issue is within 6 months before or after accounting 
date of the year, the event year's accounting data are adopted (x1 ); if issuing date is 
earlier than 6 months before the accounting date, the share price is more likely to be 
affected by last year's financial status, and accounting data of previous year are used 
xr-1 )"35 
35 The accounting data of the event year are proved to be the best fit in the regressions. However, results of the 
other terms are also reported in Appendix 6.4. 
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Table 6.9: Regressions using full sample 
Variables Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. 
(t) (t) (t) (t) 
Fsl 0.0072 0.0073 
(3.36) (3.43) 
Fs2 0.0071 0.0073 
(3.30) (3.40) 
ier -0.0123 -0.0116 -0.0909 -0.0933 
(-0.22) (-0.21) (-1.33) (-1.37) 
Sel 0.0024 0.0024 
(0.96) (0.96) 
Set 0.0215 0.0223 
(2.01) (2.08) 
#+ ## 
Fre -0.0026 -0.0019 -0.0025 -0.0017 
(-0.34) (-0.25) (-0.33) (-0.23) 
Rating -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 
(-0.09) (-0.05) (0.08) (0.12) 
Mtb(market-to-book value) -0.0054 -0.0055 -0.0058 -0.0059 
(-2.19) (-2.22) (-2.34) (-2.37) 
Fcf(free-cash-flow) -0.0231 -0.0241 -0.0234 -0.0245 
(-4.58) (-4.72) (-4.67) (-4.83) 
##+ ##+ #** *«« 
InI(Auto) -0.0355 -0.0358 -0.0313 -0.0317 
(-1.13) (-1.14) (-1.01) (-1.02) 
1n2(Banks) -0.0072 -0.0087 -0.0055 -0.0071 
(-0.27) (-0.33) (-0.21) (-0.27) 
1n3(Fin. Ins. ) -0.0147 -0.0160 -0.0124 -0.0138 
(-0.57) (-0.62) (-0.48) (-0.54) 
1n4(R. Estate) -0.0413 -0.0416 -0.0427 -0.0430 
(-1.35) (-1.36) (-1.40) (-1.41) 
1n5(Retailer) 0.0304 0.0306 0.0232 0.0231 
(1.07) (1.07) (0.81) (0.80) 
Asl(CDO-ABS) -0.0161 -0.0156 -0.0188 -0.0184 
(-1.62) (-1.58) (-1.97) (-1.92) 
# i# *+ 
As2(CMBS) -0.0151 -0.0147 -0.0163 -0.0160 
(-1.56) (-1.52) (-1.69) (-1.66) 
* * 
As3(RMBS) -0.0229 -0.0222 -0.0236 -0.0229 
(-2.56) (-2.48) (-2.64) (-2.57) 
+## +*# *+* *#* 
_cons 
0.0180 0.0176 0.0331 0.0327 
(0.53) (0.52) (1.05) (1.04) 
F 4.21 4.18 4.44 4.43 
«i+ *#* *#* *** 
R2 0.1072 0.1065 0.1125 0.1122 
Adjusted R2 0.0818 0.0810 0.0872 0.0869 
This table explains wealth effects of asset securitization originators from the regression containing full sample of 
542 issues: 
CAAR, (+1, +10)= yo+y, FS, +y=IE, +y3Se, +y4Fe, +y$Rating, +y6Mtb, +y7Fcf, +y, indl, +y9ind2, i=1,2....... , 
+ y, oind3, + y,, ind4, + y12ind5, + yasle + y, 4as2, +y, sas3, +s, 
where 
FSi = Financial slack of security i's issuer = (cash + liquid assets) / Book value of the firm +( average debt ratio in 
the industry - firm's debt ratio) = (C+CA)B V+ (Da - Df) 
FS 1= (C+CA)/BV; FS2= (C+CA)BV + (Da - Df); 
NIET = interest-expanse ratio = interest payment on loan/ loan; 
Se 1= In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing); Se2 = (size)/(total assets); 
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Dummy Fei =1 if the originator has issued more than 5 times during 1994-2005; =0 otherwise; 
Dummy Rating= 6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; =2if BB; =1 if B; =0 for all the other 
lower ratings; 
mtb I= MTBV; mtb2 = (unadjusted share price)/(book value per share); 
fcf = (Operating income - taxes - interests - dividends paid)/(market value of equity); 
Dummy ind l1 =I if the issuer belongs to Auto industry, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind2, =1 if the issuer 
belongs to Banks, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind 31 =I if the issuer belongs to financial institutions, =0 otherwise; 
Dummy ind 4; =1 if the issuer belongs to real estates, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind 5, =1 if the issuer belongs 
to retailers, =0 otherwise; 
Dummy QSl, =1 for CDO, =0 otherwise; Dummy RS2, =1 for CMBS, =0 otherwise; Dummy QS3, =1 
for RMBS, otherwise. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t -test. 
Table 6.9 expresses factors that make wealth effects of asset securitization different. A 
sample of 542 issues is tested considering the hypotheses mentioned before. The 
regressions are expected to provide some evidences on whether asset securitization 
reduces interest payment or avoids under-investment. Moreover, the results may also 
indicate whether the wealth effects are firm-specific or depending on collateral type. A 
reduced sample containing 386 issues are tested to find out another hypothesis, 
whether asset securitization reduces bad debt provisions to increase wealth for 
originators. The reduced sample only includes banks and financial institutions, and the 
results are presents in Table 6.10. 
In Table 6.9, all four regressions give similar results, and the third combination of 
measurements of variables give best explanation of abnormal returns. 36 Findings 
reported indicate, first of all, financial slack is positively related to excess return 
(y, =0.0073, t-statistic=3.43), which means stronger firms benefit more from asset 
securitization. Further, securitization ratio is also proved to positively affect share 
price of originator (y3=0.0215, t-statistic=2.01). The third, market-to-book value and 
36 The combination is: fsl = the sum of cash and liquidity divided by the book value of the firm; se2 = (issuing 
size of securitization)/(total assets of originator); mbt1= (net tangible assets)/(market value). 
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free cash flow of the firm move inversely (y6=-0.0058, t-statistic=-2.34; r7 =-0.0234, 
t-statistic=-4.67). Thus, firms short of free cash flow tend to raise funds through asset 
securitization to solve the problem of under-investment. Finally, the wealth effects of 
asset securitization vary across asset collateral, and the results are statistically 
significant, showing that ABS should be favorable for investors. 
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Table 6.10: Regressions using reduced sample 
Variables Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. 
t t t t 
FsI 0.0085 0.0086 
(3.36) (3.43) 
Fs2 0.0087 0.0088 
(3.34) (3.43) 
**r r«« 
ier -0.0238 -0.0231 -0.1704 -0.1723 
(-0.37) (-0.36) -1.56 (-1.57) 
Sel ., 0.0017 0.0017 (0.59) (0.60) 
Se2 0.0383 0.0390 
(1.67) (1.70) 
r r 
fre 0.0002 0.0006 0.0011 0.0015 
(0.02) (0.06) (0.12) (0.16) 
rating 0.0009 0.0012 0.0022 0.0025 
0.21 (0.27) (0.51) (0.58) 
Mtb -0.0128 -0.0131 -0.0123 -0.0127 
(-3.17) (-3.25) (-3.08) (-3.16) 
««« rrr r*« r«r 
fcf -0.0179 -0.0188 -0.0197 -0.0207 
(-2.96) (-3.09) (-3.21) (. 3.35) 
rr* **« «r* r*« 
bd -0.0849 -0.0992 -0.0503 -0.0641 
-0.66 (-0.77) (-0.38) -0.49 
In l (Banks) -0.0017 -0.0033 0.0019 0.0002 
(-0.15) -0.29 (0.17) (0.02) 
Asl(CDO-ABS) -0.0216 -0.0208 -0.0246 -0.0239 
(-1.69) (-1.63) (-2.01) 
r r «« *« 
As2(CMBS) -0.0129 -0.0120 -0.0144 -0.0136 
-0.87 (-0.82) (-0.98) 493 
As3(RMBS) -0.0296 -0.0288 -0.0312 -0.0305 
(-2.45) (-2.39) (-2.59) (-2.53) 
*r« **« rr« «rr 
_cons 
0.0321 0.0317 0.0362 0.0359 
(1.04) (1.03) (1.39) (1.38) 
F 3.86 3.85 4.09 4.09 
*** *r* rr« «rr 
R2 0.1106 0.1103 0.1163 0.1163 
Adjusted R2 0.0819 0.0817 0.0879 0.0879 
This table explains wealth effects of asset securitization originators from the regression containing reduced sample 
of 386 issues: 
CAAR, (+1, +10) = yo + y, 
FS, + y=1E, + ySe, + y4Fe, + y5Rating, + y6Mtb, + y, Fcf, +y Bd, + y9ind 1,1.1,2,..... x " 
+ y1oasl, + y,, as2, + y12as3, + e, 
where 
FSi = Financial slack of security i's issuer = (cash + liquid assets) / Book value of the firm +( average debt ratio in 
the industry - fine's debt ratio) = (C+CA)/BV + (Da - Df) 
FS I= (C+CA)/BV; FS2= (C+CA)BV + (Da - Df); 
NIET = interest-expanse ratio = interest payment on loan/ loan; 
SeI = In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing); Set = (size)/(total assets); 
Dummy Fei =1 if the originator has issued more than 5 times during 1994-2005; =0 otherwise; 
Dummy Rating= 6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; =2if BB; =1 if B; =0 for all the other 
lower ratings; 
(mtb I= MTBV; mtb2 = (unadjusted share price)/(book value per share); 
fcf = (Operating income - taxes - interests - dividends paid)/(market value of equity); 
BDi = Bad debt ratio = (bad debt provision) / loan; 
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Dummy ind l; =I if the issuer belongs to Banks, =0 otherwise; 
Dummy QSI, =I for CDO, =0 otherwise; Dummy as2, =1 for CMBS, =0 otherwise; Dummy aS3, 
for RMBS, =0 otherwise. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t-test. 
As mentioned before, due to data availability, the sample is reduced to 386 issues 
when the variable of bad debt provision ratio is included in the equation. Respectively, 
only two different industries, banks and financial institutions, are tested in the 
regression. Table 6.10 describes the results. The new variable, provision ratio, does 
not affect share price according to the result ( y8 =-0.0503, t-statistic=-0.38). 
Comparing to financial institutions, banks do not have advantage in increasing market 
value through securitization (y9=0.0019, t-statistic=0.17). There are no significant 
differences for the results of the rest of variables. Overall, stronger banks or financial 
institutions realize positive wealth effects through asset securitization. 
However, there are several variables that give unexpected signs. Start with growth 
opportunities measured by market-to-book ratio. Literature suggests securitization 
could solve the problem of under-investment, and the growth opportunity should be 
positively related to the excess return of the company. However, the results from the 
regression turn to opposite for the relationship between growth opportunity and excess 
return (y6 =-0.0058, t-statistic=-2.34). In that case, companies with less growth 
opportunities will have more wealth increased through securitization. Nowadays with 
the development of securitization market, originators start to securitize their less 
quality assets, and investors are willing to accept securities backed by the assets, 
expecting higher return as compensation. The quality of assets is signaled by the 
coupon rate to investors. But during the process of pricing, there could be information 
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asymmetries between the borrower and originator, or the management and operator. 
As a result, misleading information could be sent to investors on the market by wrong 
price. On the other hand, according to the test, securitization activity is highly valued 
by investors on the market, and brings positive wealth effects. Under information 
asymmetries, the investor may make irrational choice among issues. Our results 
strongly suggest a firm that lacks of growth opportunities enjoy positive wealth 
effects around the announcement of securitization. Using the line of reasoning, the 
reason is due to adverse selection under the circumstances of information asymmetries. 
Secondly, experienced originators do not realize wealth increase based on our results 
(Y4=-0.0025, t-statistic=-0.33). And the credit ratings of the originator does not affect 
share price (ys =0.0003, t-statistic=0.08). This suggests in the UK, reputation building 
on securitization market is not important for originators. Investors pay more attention 
on the characteristics on each issue, for instance, the size and asset collateral. 
Moreover, the financial status of the firm is also highly valued by investors. 
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6.5 Conclusions 
This study examines the effects of asset securitization on share price for originators 
using event study. Seven hypotheses are investigated, which are summarized in Table 
6.11. 
Table 6.11: Hypotheses Summary 
Hypotheses under Investigation Expected Approved 
Sign 
Hypothesis One: Asset securitization affects share price of + Yes 
the originator. 
Hypothesis Two: Wealth effects of asset securitization are Yes 
asset collateral specific. 
Hypothesis Three: Asset securitization creates wealth for IE: - No 
originators due to its comparative advantages. 
BD: No 
Hypothesis Four: Firms that suffer with limited free cash Mtb: + No 
flow but have growth opportunities tend to securitize could 
solve the problem of underinvestment through asset Fcf: - Yes 
securitization. 
Hypothesis Five: The effects of asset securitization on Yes 
originator's share prices are industry specific. 
Hypothesis Six: Stronger originators with superior financial + Yes 
slack generate higher abnormal returns. 
Hypothesis Seven: Originators with good reputation have Fe: + No 
better response from the market. 
Rating: + No 
The findings are: 
First and foremost, securitization brings positive wealth effects for originators. Over 
the period from day +1 to day +10, our sample shows strongest cumulative abnormal 
return of 0.83%. Further, the size of securitization is proved positively related to 
abnormal return, therefore, larger volume issue is proved to be favorable for investors. 
173 
The wealth effects of asset securitization also depend on type of assets securitized, 
and issues by ABS bring the highest increase in share price. 
Secondly, positive wealth effects of asset securitization are not due to its main benefits. 
Asset securitization is widely accepted as funding and risk management tool, which 
results in reduced interest expenses and bad debt provision. Previous literature 
suggests the potential benefits of asset securitization motivate positive wealth effects. 
However, the empirical results indicate interest expenses and bad debt provision ratio 
are not related to excess returns, thus, the potential benefits of asset securitization for 
originators are not highly valued by investors. 
Thirdly, firms that have limited free cash flow use asset securitization to solve the 
problem of under-investment. Unexpectedly, firms that lack growth opportunities 
enjoy gains from asset securitization. The reason could be due to adverse selection 
under information asymmetry. Misleading information could be sent to investors 
through wrongly priced issues, which leads investors to make irrational decisions. 
Fourthly, evidence suggests effects are industry-specific. Banks and retailers perform 
well, while automobile industry experiences losses. 
Fifthly, stronger firms with higher financial slack experience more gains from 
securitization. Financial slack is found to be positively related to wealth effects of 
asset securitization, which is consistent with the hypothesis that investors treat the 
news of securitization differently based on financial status of originator. Higher 
financial slack indicates optimistic financial status of the company, and is 
significantly highly valued by investors. 
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Finally, investors do not consider the reputation of originators on securitization 
market as important. Frequency and credit ratings of originators are not highly valued 
, 
by investors. 
175 
Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
In this thesis the effects of asset securitization on originators in the UK are examined 
theoretically and empirically. The effects are investigated systematically from three 
aspects: effects on cost of capital, effects on risks and effects on share price. A sample 
of 542 public offerings of securitized assets issued by 133 firms over the period 
January 1993 through December 2005 is obtained and tested. T -test, regression using 
cross sectional and panel data, and event studies are employed as methodology. In this 
concluding chapter, the preceding chapters are summarized, along with the results of 
all three empirical studies. In addition, the contribution and limitation of the thesis are 
described in the end. 
7.2 Summary of Chapters 
Asset securitization has been widely accepted as funding and risk management tool all 
over the world. The technique is characterized by the bankruptcy remote structure of 
SPV (special purpose vehicle), offering a number of potential benefits (Jobst, 2003 
and 2005). The nature of asset securitization and previous researches on the topic are 
reviewed at the beginning. 
The first empirical study gives a primary look at the effects of asset securitization on 
cost of capital. Previous literature suggests asset securitization reduces cost of capital 
due to: (1) it offers competitive rate of funding by separating the assets securitized 
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from the risk of the firm, (Morrissey, 1992); (2) it reduces "information costs" under 
information asymmetry (Frankel, 1991); (3) it mitigates the regulatory capital charge 
and achieves greater specialization in areas of comparative advantage (Hill, 1997). 
However, at the same time, securitization also introduces new costs (Henderson and 
Barings, 1997). Benston (1992) contended that securitization could not lower capital 
cost, as lower funding costs resulting from securitizing quality assets are offset by 
higher funding costs on the remaining portfolio. As a result, the question of whether 
asset securitization reduces overall cost of capital remains unsolved. 
This research examines, firstly, changes of cost of capital after originators securitizing 
assets. Secondly, clarify which firm specific characteristics influence the 
consequences, including credit rating, growth opportunities, firm size and leverage 
level. T-test, regressions using cross-sectional and panel data are adopted. Six 
Hypotheses are tested, including (1) Hypothesis One: Asset securitization affects the 
cost of capital of originator; (2) Hypothesis Two: Asset securitization provides low 
cost funding source, therefore reduces overall cost of capital; (3) Hypothesis Three: 
Securitization offers competitive rate of funding by separating the assets securitized 
from the risk of firm, regardless of the firm's credit rating; (4) Hypothesis Four: Asset 
securitization reduces information costs under information asymmetry for originators; 
(5) Hypothesis Five: Experienced originators enjoy more savings on cost of capital 
through asset securitization; (6) Hypothesis Six: Originators' cost of capital will differ 
in asset collaterals. 
It is found that the cost of capital is reduced after adoption of asset securitization. 
Other major findings are: 
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Firstly, reduction of cost of capital is not direct benefit from asset securitization. 
Securitization itself is a costly funding tool. 
Secondly, companies suffering high leverage level benefit from asset securitization as 
result of lower information costs. 
Thirdly, the effects of asset securitization are asset collateral specific. CDO is proved 
to be cost efficient on the UK securitization market. 
Finally, companies with disadvantages in information costs saving, which have less 
growth opportunities and smaller size, are affected more significantly by asset 
securitization. 
The second empirical study aims to find the relationship between asset securitization 
and risk of originators. Asset securitization affects risks not only directly through 
launching the issue, but also by changing lending decision (e. g. Murray, 2001, and 
Jobst, 2003). Suggested by a number of researchers, asset securitization could reduce 
risks by improving liquidity of assets (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994), providing 
reliable and constant funding source (Zweig, 1989), segregating risks in assets 
securitized from insolvency (Ong, 2000), better estimating and controlling of risk 
(Benston, 1992), and diversification (Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988, and Benston, 
1992). On the other hand, asset securitization may also create new problem, such as 
encouraging irrational lending (Kaufman, 1999), lowering average quality of assets 
(Twinn, 1994), and decreasing quality and stability of earnings (Bernstein and Siegel, 
1979). 
Six hypotheses are tested in the study. They are: (1) Hypothesis One: Asset 
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securitization affects risks of originator; (2) Hypothesis Two: Originators with higher 
credit ratings have higher leverage levels, but lower bad debt provision ratios; (3) 
Hypothesis Three: Risks of originators are influenced by the size of company; (4) 
Hypothesis Four: Originators with higher cost of capital bear higher risks; (5) 
Hypothesis Five: Movements of macro-economy affect risks suffered by originators; 
(6) Hypothesis Six: Effects of asset securitization on risks are industry-specific. 
Asset securitization is proved to be negatively related to leverage level. Other major 
findings are: 
Firstly, there are firm-specific characteristics affecting the result of using asset 
securitization as risk hedging tool, including credit ratings, company size, cost of 
capital, and industry belonging. 
Secondly, in long-term, macro-economic factors are proved to significantly affect 
risks suffered by originators. 
Thirdly, the benefit of asset securitization as risk management tool is highly valued by 
originators. It is proved that originators tend to reduce bad debt provisions after 
securitizing assets, which indicate they consider use of asset securitization effectively 
hedges future risk. 
Finally, wealth effects of asset securitization are examined. As an effective funding 
and risk management tool, asset securitization offers a number of benefits: reduction 
of cost of funds (e. g. Morrissey, 1992, Bryan, 1988a and Benston, 1992), achievement 
of reliable and constant funding source (e. g. Kendall and Fishman, 1996 and Twinn, 
1994), reduction of credit exposure (Twinn, 1994), achievement of liquidity 
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enhancement (e. g. Finnerty, 1988, and Bartlett, 1989), diversification (e. g. Hess and 
Smith, 1988, and Zweig, 1989)and favorable regulatory/accounting treatment (e. g., 
Pavel and Phillips, 1987, Hull, 1989, and Twinn, 1994). These benefits suggest asset 
securitization offering positive wealth effects. 
The seven hypotheses tested are: (1) Hypothesis One: Asset securitization affects 
share price of the originator; (2) Hypothesis Two: Wealth effects of asset 
secüritization are asset collateral specific; (3) Hypothesis Three: Asset securitization 
creates wealth for originators due to its comparative advantages; (4) Hypothesis Four: 
Firms that suffer with limited free cash flow but have growth opportunities tend to 
securitize could solve the problem of underinvestment through asset securitization; (5) 
Hypothesis Five: The effects of asset securitization on originator's share prices are 
industry specific; (6) Hypothesis Six: Stronger originators with superior financial 
slack generate higher abnormal returns; (7) Hypothesis Seven: Originators with good 
reputation have better response from the market. 
The findings are: 
Firstly, securitization brings positive wealth effects for originators. Over the period 
from day +1 to day +10, our sample shows strongest cumulative abnormal return of 
0.83%. 
Secondly, larger volume issue is proved to be favorable for investors. 
Thirdly, wealth effects of asset securitization are asset collateral specific, and issues 
by ABS bring the highest increase in share price. 
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Fourthly, firms that suffer limited free cash flow use asset securitization to solve the 
problem of under-investment. 
Fifthly, wealth effects are industry-specific. Banks and retailers perform well, while 
automobile industry experiences losses. 
Finally,: stronger firms with higher financial slack experience more gains from 
securitization. 
In sum, as a funding tool, asset securitization is costly, but it lowers overall cost of 
capital through diversification and mitigating level of information asymmetry between 
investors and originators. Companies suffering high leverage level could use asset 
securitization to reduce information costs. But smaller companies or companies with 
less growth opportunities have to be cautious when make decisions to securitize. 
Because for these companies, asset securitization may provide immediate cash flow 
they require, but it is so costly that they have to pay extra in the future. As a risk 
management tool, asset securitization hedges prepayment and interest rate risks 
effectively, also reduces leverage level and bad debt provision significantly. It offers 
originators the opportunities to reallocate risks, and only take risks they can handle. 
Finally, asset securitization brings positive wealth effects for originators. However, 
the potential benefits of asset securitization for originators are not the reason. And the 
reputation of originator on securitization market is not considered as important by 
investors. While larger issuing size is preferred by investors. As a result, investors pay 
more attention on issue-specific characteristics than firm-specific characteristics. 
Further, wealth effects of asset securitization are industry specific. Banks and retailers 
perform well, while automobile industry experiences losses. Moreover, stronger firms 
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with superior financial slack experience more gains from securitization. Unexpectedly, 
firms ` that lack growth opportunities enjoy gains from asset securitization due to 
adverse selection under information asymmetry. 
7.3 Contributions and Implications of the Study 
After summarizing the results of this thesis, the knowledge of asset securitization 
could be better constructed and grasped. The findings of the three empirical studies 
confirm asset securitization effectively reduces cost of capital and leverage level for 
originators, also brings positive wealth effects. By doing so, the thesis provide 
empirical evidences to answer the question, "Why securitize? ". 
There are several contributions offered by this study. Firstly, it is a systematic 
empirical study on effects of asset securitization on originators in long timeframe (13 
years). Secondly, it tests the direct relationships between asset securitization and cost 
of capital, also, between asset securitization and overall risks. Thirdly, unlike previous 
studies, this test goes inside firm who securitize and try to identify characteristics 
influence the results. Finally, whereas most studies investigate US market this study is 
to provide evidence from UK securitization market. 
The main findings of this study not only confirm potential benefits of asset 
securitization suggested by literature, but also clarify several firm specific and issue 
specific characteristics related to effects of asset securitization. Firm specific 
characteristics include credit rating, growth opportunity, firm size, leverage level, cost 
of capital, financial slack, and industry it belongs to. Issue specific characteristics 
include the type of assets being securitized, and volume of the issue. One important 
implication of this study is that suitable characteristics will maximize benefits through 
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asset securitization. It is found that companies with high leverage level could use asset 
securitization to reduce information costs. But smaller companies or companies with 
less growth opportunities are affected more significantly by asset securitization, thus, 
have to be cautious when securitize their assets. In stock market, companies belonging 
to banking and retailer industry gain abnormal return when they announce to 
securitize assets, while automobile industry experiences losses. Moreover, stronger 
firms with superior financial slack experience more gains from securitization, and 
firms that lack growth opportunities also enjoy gains from asset securitization due to 
adverse selection under information asymmetry. Therefore, when companies decide to 
securitize or not, they have to consider the suitability of their own characteristics. 
Another important implication is that investors pay more attention on issue-specific 
characteristics than firm-specific characteristics. Thus, asset securitization offers 
chance to raise funds without considering companies' performances. 
7.4 Limitations of the Study 
In this study, companies' accounting data are tested and analyzed to find effects of 
asset securitization on originators. The accounting data are used due to, firstly, the 
accounting data provide constant basis which could be compared; secondly, the 
business should be considered as a whole when investigate effects of asset 
securitization. However, there are limitations caused by using of accounting data. 
One important limitation of this study lies in the data compilation process. The 
information concerning UK securitization market is rather difficult to achieve under 
protection laws. And the sample is further reduced significantly due to unavailability 
of company data. Secondly, problem may arise due to annual basis of accounting data, 
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which makes it difficult to recognize changes in short run. Thirdly, the measurements 
of financial ratios vary among companies, which may cause the problem of 
inconsistency. Finally, the companies which access the UK securitization market are 
world wide, thus different regulatory and accounting rules are obeyed. The changes of 
cost of capital, or risks may not appear in the same way. The future studies could 
contribute by minimizing the possible bias. 
There is a lack of more detailed information of securitization transaction, leaving 
certain factors uninvestigated. In Chapter 4, the model used to explaining reduction of 
cost of capital generates rather minimal R squared values when testing the sub-sample 
with negative changes of cost (A y<O). While the other group (0 yz 0) is much better 
explained by the regression with satisfying R squared value. Therefore, there are 
unobserved factors related to reduction of cost of capital for originators, for instance, 
be the maturity, the novelty or complexity of securitization transaction. This leaves 
gap for further research. 
The final study applied an event study methodology which, however, only rests on the 
assumption that stock market is efficient in evaluating the impact of the event to 
determine abnormal returns. 
7.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
Future research in the field of asset securitization is recommended to consider the 
following potential study areas: 
It could be meaningful to find the relationship between asset securitization and 
optimal capital structure, providing further information in answering the question 
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"Why securitize? ". 
It could also be of interest to enhance the study through additional investigation of 
corporate characteristics. The low R squared value indicates there are unobserved 
factors leading to reduction of cost of capital. 
Better measurements of risks could also be taken in future research. 
A further interesting point includes the investigation whether there is relationship 
between movements of share price and bond price of the issuing company. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 4.1: Shapiro-Wilk test 
Variable Observation w V Z Prob>Z 
cc 542 0.7976 73.231 10.359 0.0000 
542 0.6830 114.693 11.441 0.0000 
size 542 0.8979 36.966 8.709 0.0000 
Ir 542 0.4843 186.567 12.615 0.0000 
Sel 542 0.9560 15.937 6.679 0.0000 
Se2 542 0.2780 261.236 13.427 0.0000 
Fe 542 0.9957 1.574 1.095 0.1368 
rating 542 0.9191 29.258 8.145 0.0000 
W is the ratio of best estimator of the variance to the usual corrected sum of squares estimator of the variance. 
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Appendix 4.2: Hausman test 
---- Coefficients ---- 
(b) (B) (b-B) sgrt(diag(V b-V B)) 
fixed random Difference S. E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
mtbll -. 0138377 -. 0085165 -. 0053212 . 0025883 
size l -. 014195 -. 0058538 -. 0083412 . 0060162 
Ir . 0199028 . 
0444573 -. 0245546 . 0610492 
se2 I -. 0097114 -. 0117931 . 0020817 . 0098482 
b= consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B= inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(4) _ (b-B)'[(V b-V B)^(-1)](b-B) 
= 5.18 
Prob>chi2 = 0.2691 
The result does not reject the null hypothesis in favor of random effects model. 
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Appendix 4.3: Fixed effects model (dependent variable Ay, ) 
Whole sample 
Variables FE 
Reg. 
FE 
Reg. 
No. of Observations 272 272 
G -0.0140 
(-3.79)*** 
-0.0138 
(-3.75)*** 
Size -0.0146 
(-1.96)** 
-0.0144 
-2.08 ** 
Lr 0.0189 
(0.26) 
0.0201 
(0.28) 
Se l 0.0005 
(0.16) 
Set -0.0097 
-0.73 
Fe Dropped Dropped 
Rating - Dropped Dropped 
Asl(CDO-ABS) 0.0016 
(0.12) 
0.0018 
(0.13) 
As2(CMBS) 0.0011 
(0.09) 
0.0012 
(0.09) 
As3(RMBS) 0.0002 
(0.02) 
0.0003 
(0.02) 
cons 0.2651 
(1.87)* 
0.2644 
1.92* 
F value 2.22 2.30 
Within- R2 0.0877 0.0905 
Between - R2 0.0083 
0.0111 
Overall- R2 0.0041 0.0069 
Wald Chi-squared 
Prob. 0.0349 0.0291 
Group One: Dy<0 
Variables Hypothesized Sign FE FE 
Reg. Reg. 
(t) (t) 
No. of Observations 162 162 162 
G - -0.0045 -0.0030 (-1.16) (-0.83) 
Size - -0.0008 0.0042 (-0.11) (0.64) 
Lr + 0.0296 0.0300 
0.62 (0.68) 
Se l - -0.0011 (-0.39) 
Se2 - -0.1059 
(-3.32)*** 
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Fe + Dropped Dropped 
Rating - Dropped Dropped 
As l (CDO-ABS) 0.0032 
(0.29) 
-0.0020 
-0.19 As2(CMBS) -0.0068 
(-0.64) 
-0.0110 
(-1.09) 
As3(RMBS) 0.0059 
(0.52) 
-0.0001 
(-0.01) 
_cons -0.0258 (-0.19) 
-0.0987 
-0.81 
F value 0.45 2.07 
Within-R, 0.0417 0.1673 
Between-R2 0.0050 0.0006 
Overall-R2 0.0030 0.0074 
Prob. 0.8687 0.0581 
Group Two: Dy_0 
Variables FE 
Reg. 
(t) 
FE 
Reg. 
0 
No. of Observations 110 110 
G -0.0013 
(-0.27) 
-0.0012 
(-0.23) 
Size -0.0108 
-1.61 
-0.0121 
-1.77 
Lr -0.5039 
(-2.14 ** 
-0.5279 
-2.04 ** 
Se l -0.0011 
-0.50 
Se2 -0.0002 
(-0.02) 
Fe Dropped Dropped 
Rating Dropped Dropped 
As 1(CDO-ABS) -0.0037 
-0.31 
-0.0036 
-0.29 
As2(CMBS) 0.0025 
(0.24) 
0.0031 
(0.29) 
As3(RMBS) -0.0139 
(-0.97) 
-0.0137 
(-0.95) 
_cons 
0.6793 
(2.86)*** 
0.7155 
(3.08)*** 
F value 2.56 2.51 
Within- R2 0.2945 0.2904 
Between- R2 0.0718 0.0719 
Overall- R2 0.0174 0.0171 
Prob. 0.0267 0.0293 
This table explains the relationship between asset securitization and change of cost of capital (0 y). 
Ay,, =a,, +a, G +a2Size + a3Lr,, +a, Se +a. Fe, + a6Rating, +a7As1 +a8As2,, +a9As3 +v,, 
i=2 72 for full sample; 162 for Group One; 110 for Group Two. 
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Where yl = cost of capital of firm i using WACC method, 
Gj = Growth opportunities of firm i= market-to-book value, 
Ske1= firm size of i= Ln(total assets), 
Set = In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing), 
Se2 = (size)/(total assets), 
F'e1 (Dummy) = frequency of issuing ABS =1 if the originator has issued more than 5 times during 
1993-2005; =0 otherwise, 
Rating, (Dummy) =6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; -2if BB; -1 if B; -0 for 
all the other lower ratings; 
Dummy asl,. =I for CDO, =0 otherwise; Dummy aS2, =I for CMBS, -0 otherwise; Dummy 
as31 =1 for RMBS, =0 otherwise. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed West. 
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Appendix 5.1: Measurement of first difference estimators 
There is a timing factor has to be mentioned that since companies could issue at 
different time the same year, what's more, their accounting year may end at different 
time during one year, the gap and order between the issuing date and accounting date 
become a key to decide how to calculate Ay,. The reason for considering that is 
because, for instance, if the issuing time is too close to the end of accounting year, the 
accounting data could be made much earlier than the influence happen, therefore, in 
order to observe the change results in securitization, it should be better by comparing 
issuing year's with next year's accounting data rather than issuing year's with the year 
before. The measurement adopted is as follow: 
Originator Order Gap D. Yr 
tIi tli<tAi <3months =. yr+t . 
Yr 
tli<tAi >_3months = yr - yt-t 
tAi 
tIi>tAi <3months = . 
yr - . 
Yr-t 
tli>tAi >3months = yr+t 
. 
Yt 
Where, t= event year; 
tIi = originator i issuing date; 
tAi = originator i accounting year ending date. 
And tIi <tAi means company i's issuing date is earlier than the same year ending date for accounting. 
Where n=y, t= event year (the year firm securitized assets), t -1 = the year before event year; t+ I= the year after 
event year. 
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Appendix 5.2: Shapiro-Wilk test 
- Variable Observation w 
V Z Prob>Z 
Ir 542 0.4843 186.567 12.615 0.0000 
dr 
- 
542 0.9551 16.261 6.728 0.0000 
sei 542 0.9560 15.928 6.678 0.0000 
se2 542 0.2779 261.258 13.427 0.0000 
rating 542 0.9185 29.471 8.163 0.0000 
size - 542 0.8978 36.966 8.709 0.0000 
cc 542 0.7976 73.231 10.359 0.0000 
sp 542 0.9648 12.722 6.136 0.0000 
it 542 0.9673 11.819 5.958 0.0000 
W is the ratio of best estimator of the variance to the usual corrected sum of squares estimator of the variance. 
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Appendix 5.3: Cross sectional regressions with different lags 
Leverage ratio Leverage ratio 
(t t+l 
Variables Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. 
W t t t 
No. of observations 542 542 542 542 
Se l -0.0403 -0.0314 
(-6.41)*** -5.72 *** 
Se2 -0.0080 -0.0066 
(-0.27) (-0.26) 
Rating 0.0359 0.0326 0.0254 0.0227 
(4.05)*** (3.54)*** (3.28)*** 2.86 *** 
Size 0.0314 0.0323 0.0233 0.0251 
(7.03)*** (6.07)*** 5.96 *** (5.44)** 
Cc 0.3184 0.2738 0.1946 0.1420 
(2.30)** (1.83)* (1.61)* (1.10) 
Sp 0.0255 0.0402 0.0237 0.0359 
(1.84)* (2.82)*** (1.97)** (2.91)*** 
In 0.0271 0.0424 0.0222 0.0351 
(2.17)** (3.29)*** (2.04)** (3.15)*** 
In 1(Auto) 0.2412 0.1952 0.1745 0.1381 
(3.06)*** (2.40)** (2.54)*** (1.96)** 
In2(Banks) 0.1013 0.0729 0.0762 0.0541 
(1.58) (1.10) (1.36) (0.94) 
1n3(Fin. Ins. ) 0.1707 0.1470 0.1195 0.1011 
(2.63)*** (2.19)** (2.11)** (1.74)* 
1n4(R. Estate) -0.0504 -0.0701 -0.0844 -0.0987 
(-0.65) (-0.87) (-1.24) -1.41 
1n5(Retailer) 0.0232 0.0049 -0.0193 -0.0352 
(0.31) (0.06) (-0.30) (-0.53) 
_cons 
0.2906 0.0726 0.4668 0.2764 
(2.65)*** (0.62) (4,89)*** (2.72)*** 
F 17.64 12.92 14.95 11.29 
R2 0.2680 0.2114 0.2368 0.1899 
Adjusted R2 0.2528 0.1951 0.2210 0.1730 
This table explains effects of asset securitization on risks for originators from the regression containing lull sample 
of 542 issues: 
LA., = as + a, Se,,, + a2Rating, + a, Si: e,,, + a4Cc, d + a3Sp, + a61n, +a ind 1, + aalnd 2,1=1,2....... 542. 
+ a9ind 3, + a, 0ind4, + a, 0ind5, + s, 
Equation 5.1 
where 
LR = leverage ratio = (total liabilities)/(total assets); 
SeI = In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing); Se2 = (size)/(total assets); 
Dummy Rating= 6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; =2if BB; =1 if B; =0 for all the other 
lower ratings; 
Size = firm size = Ln(total assets); 
Cc = cost of capital using WACC method; 
Sp = spread between 10-year and 1-year government bond; 
In = volatility of 1-year interest rate; 
Dummy lndl, =1 if the issuer belongs to Auto industry, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind2, =I if the issuer 
belongs to Banks, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind3, =I if the issuer belongs to financial institutions, =0 otherwise; 
Dummy ind4, =1 if the issuer belongs to real estates, =0 otherwise; Dummy ; nd5, =1 if the issuer belongs to 
retailers, =0 otherwise. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed West. 
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Debt ratio Debt ratio 
t (t+1) 
Variables Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. 
(t) (t) (t) (t) 
No. of observations 542 542 542 542 
Se l -0.0128 -0.0073 
(-1.80)* "1.07 
Se2 0.0020 0.0149 
(0.06) (0.49) 
Rating 0.0656 0.0645 0.0620 0.0613 
(6.54)**** (6.43)*** (6.42)*** 6.35 *"* 
Size -0.0331 -0.0324 -0.0394 -0.0378 
(-6.56)*** (. 5.59)*** (-8.10)*** (. 6.77 )*$* 
Cc 0.7356 0.7151 0.6913 0.6603 
(4.70)*** (4.39)*** (4.58)*** (4.22)*** 
Sp -0.0122 -0.0073 -0.0157 -0.0121 
(-0.78) (-0.47) -1.04 -0.81 
In -0.0463 -0.0411 -0.0521 -0.0481 
(-3.28)*** (-2.92)*** (-3.83)*** (. 3.56 )**$ 
In I (Auto) 0.4384 0.4237 0.4119 0.4028 
(4.93)*** (4.77)*** (4.81)*** (4.72 )**0 
In2(Banks) 0.0730 0.0640 0.0449 0.0398 
1.01 (0.88) (0.64) (0.57) 
1n3(Fin. Ins. ) 0.1490 0.1415 0.1155 0.1111 
(2.04)** (1.93)** (1.64)* (1.58) 
In4(R. Estate) -0.0507 -0.0566 -0.0707 -0.0730 
-0.58 -0.64 -0.83 (-0.86) 
1n5(Retaiter) -0.0174 -0.0238 -0.0516 -0.0570 
-0.21 (-0.28) (-0.64) -0.71 
cons 0.6974 0.6211 0.8259 0.7599 
(5.64)*** (4.85)*** (6.93)*** (6.18 )**$ 
F 15.58 15.20 17.99 17.88 
R2 0.2444 0.2398 0.2719 0.2707 
Adjusted R2 0.2287 0.2240 0.2568 0.2555 
This table explains effects of asset securitization on risks for originators from the regression containing full sample 
of 542 issues: 
b,, +b, Se,,, +b3Rating, +b3S,: e,,, +b4Cc,., +b, Sp, +b6In, +b7indt, +b1ind2, t-4Z 342" 
+b, ind3, +bjornd4, +b, alnd5, + ', 
Equation 5.2 
where 
DR = Debt ratio = (total loans)/(total assets - customer liabilities on acceptance); 
SeI = In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing); Set = (size)/(total assets); 
Dummy Rating= 6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; -2if BB; -I if B; -0 for all the other 
lower ratings; 
Size = firm size = Ln(total assets); 
Cc = cost of capital using WACC method; 
Sp = spread between 10-year and 1-year government bond; 
In = volatility of 1-year interest rate; 
Dummy mndl, =1 if the issuer belongs to Auto industry, =0 otherwise; Dummy 1nd2, -I If the issuer 
belongs to Banks, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind3, =I if the issuer belongs to financial institutions, -0 otherwise; 
Dummy ind4, =I if the issuer belongs to real estates, =0 otherwise; Dummy ! nd 5, -I if the issuer belongs 
to retailers, =0 otherwise. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
'Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
"Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
'Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t-test. 
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Bad debt provision ratio Bad debt provision ratio 
t (t+1) 
Variables Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. 
t (t) (t) t 
No. of observations 386 386 386 386 
Se l -0.0005 -0.0009 
-0.47 -1.05 
Se2 -0.0167 -0.0077 
(-2.44)*** "1.53 Rating -0.0051 -0.0055 -0.0041 -0.0042 
(-2.89)*** 
_(-3.16)*** 
(-3.17)*** (-3.29)0$$ 
Size 0.0031 0.0021 0.0017 0.0012 
3.15*** (1.94)** 2.36** (1.49) 
Cc -0.0011 0.0567 -0.1353 -0.1068 
(-0.03) (1.28) (-4.86)*** (. 3.29)*** 
Sp 0.0040 0.0029 -0.0020 -0.0027 
(1.52) (1.11) -1.03 "1.44 
In -0.0004 -0.0020 -0.0031 -0.0041 
(-0.15) (-0.85) -1.80 * (-2.35 )*$ 
Inl(Banks) -0.0390 -0.0383 -0.0431 -0.0425 
(-8.16)*** (-8.11)*** (. 12.36)* ** (. 12.26)0$$ 
cons 0.0102 0.0333 0.0335 0.0484 
(0.55) (1.82)* (2.50)*** (3.62)$$$ 
F 14.15 15.18 27.83 28.10 
R2 0.2077 0.2194 0.3401 0.3422 
Adjusted R2 0.1930 0.2050 0.3279 0.3300 
This table explains effects of asset securitization on risks for originators from the regression containing 386 Issues: 
--. - PR,.,,, = co + c, Se,, + c2Rating, + c3Size,., + c, Cc,,, + c5Sp, + c61n, + c, ind i, + Q, 1.1.2,...... 386. 
Equation 5.3 
where PR = bad debt provision ratio = (bad debt provision)/(total loans); 
SeI =In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing); Se2 = (size)/(total assets); 
Dummy Rating= 6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; =2if BB; -I if B; =0 for all the other 
lower ratings; 
Size = firm size = Ln(total assets); 
Cc = cost of capital using WACC method; 
Sp = spread between 10-year and 1-year government bond; 
In = volatility of 1-year interest rate; 
Dummy ind l1 =1 if the issuer belongs to banks, =0 if the issuers belongs to financial institutions. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
** *Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t-test. 
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Appendix 5.4: Hausman tests (fixed effects model vs. random effects model) 
(1) Leverage ratio 
---- Coefficients ---- 
(b) (B) (b-B) sgrt(diag(N b-V B)) 
f ixed random Difference S. E. 
self . 0022789 . 002382 -. 0001031 . 0019836 size ý -. 0239987 -. 0035711 -. 0204277 . 0135862 ccj -. 0854647 -. 0763043 -. 0091603 . 0620283 spy . 0118237 . 0193054 -. 0074817 . 0048187 it j 
. 0054954 . 0159783 -. 010483 . 0064472 
b= consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B= inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(5) _ (b-B)'[(N b-N B)^(-1)](b-B) 
= 3.08 
Prob>chi2 = 0.6876 
. (2) Debt ratio 
---- Coefficients ---- 
(b) (B) (b-B) sgrt(diag(V b-V B)) 
fixed random Difference S. E. 
sell . 0033919 . 0031551 . 0002368 . 0017729 size I -. 0098742 -. 0069103 -. 0029639 . 0104701 
ccl . 0815731 . 0532031 . 
02837 . 0520595 
SP I . 0089482 . 0097293 -. 0007811 . 0039165 ir1 
. 0008594 . 0051588 -. 0042994 . 
0051409 
b= consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(5) = (b-B)'[(V b-V B)^(-1)](b-B) 
= 5.78 
Prob>chi2 = 0.3286 
(3) Bad debt provision 
---- Coefficients ---- 
(b) (B) (b-B) sgrt(diag(V b-V B)) 
fixed random Difference S. E. 
sell . 0016868 . 0015499 . 000137 . 0011964 sizeI -. 0076968 -. 0026483 -. 0050484 . 0069654 
ccl -. 2363036 -. 2103227 -. 0259808 . 0322502 
spl -. 0067809 -. 0073582 . 0005773 . 0021917 irl -. 0028396 -. 0029146 . 000075 . 0031823 
b= consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B= inconsistent under Ha, efficien t under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(5) _ (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-I)](b-B) 
5.02 
Prob>chi2 = 0.4135 
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Appendix 5.5: Panel data analysis using of fixed effects model 
Leverage ratio 
Fixed 
Variables Coe. 
(t) 
Coe. 
(t) 
No. of observations 272 272 
Se l 0.0023 
(0.56) 
Se2 0.0271 
(1.34) 
Rating Drooped Dropped 
Size -0.0240 
(-1.70)* 
-0.0240 
-1.73 
Cc -0.0855 
(-0.90) 
-0.0842 
-0.92 
Sp 0.0118 
(1.50) 
0.0085 
(1.06) 
In 0.0055 
(0.62) 
0.0028 
(0.31) 
Inl(Auto) Drooped Drooped 
In2(Banks) Drooped Drooped 
In3(Fin. Ins. ) Drooped Drooped 
In4(R. Estate) Drooped Drooped 
In5(Retailer) Drooped Drooped 
_cons 
0.4225 
(1.71)* 
0.4313 
(1.75)* 
F 2.44 2.76 
Within- R2 0.0691 0.0775 
Cross- RZ 0.0548 0.0540 
Overall- R2 0.0425 0.0442 
Prob. 0.0368 0.0203 
ALp = ao + a, 
Se,, + a; Rating, + a3Size + a4Cc,, + a5SP + a61n + a, ind 1, + a5lnd 2, t =1,2,..... 272 
+a; ind3, +a, oind4, +a1oind5, + 
where (1) A LR = change of leverage ratio; 
(2) Se 1= In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing); Se2 - (size)/(total assets); 
(3)Dummy Rating= 6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; -2if BB; -1 if B; -0 for all the other lower 
ratings; 
(4)Size = firm size = Ln(total assets); (5)Cc = cost of capital using WACC method; 
(6)Sp = spread between 10-year and 1-year government bond; 
(7)In = volatility of l-year interest rate; 
(8)Dummy ;,, dl, -I if the issuer belongs to Auto industry, 0 otherwise; Dummy /nd2, -I if the issuer belongs to Banks, -O 
otherwise; Dummy ind3, =I if the issuer belongs to financial institutions, 0 otherwise; Dummy W4, -I If the issuer 
belongs to real estates, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind5, =1 if the issuer belongs to retailers, -0 otherwise, 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically signif icant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
"Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
"'Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t-test. 
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Debt ratio 
Fixed 
Variables Coe. 
(t) 
Coe. 
(t) 
No. of observations 272 272 
Se l 0.0034 
(1.09) 
Se2 0.0104 
(0.68) 
Rating Drooped Dropped 
Size -0.0099 
(-0.92) 
-0.0084 
(-0.79) 
Cc 0.0816 
(1.16) 
0.0868 
(1.24) 
Sp 0.0089 
(1.49) 
0.0069 
(1.13) 
In 0.0009 
(0.13) 
-0.0010 
(-0.15) 
In I (Auto) Drooped Drooped 
In2(Banks) Drooped Drooped 
In3(Fin. Ins. ) Drooped Drooped 
In4(R. Estate) Drooped Drooped 
W(Retailer) Drooped Drooped 
cons 0.1630 
(0.87) 
0.1564 
(0.83) 
F 2.02 1.86 
Within- R2 
0.0579 0.0537 
Cross- RZ 
0.1016 0.1047 
Overall- R2 
0.1035 0.0988 
Prob. 0.0790 0.1037 
ADR - 
bo+b1Se+b2Rating, +b3Size,, +b4Cc,, +b5Sp+bbin+blind1, +b, lnd2, f=1,2,.,,,, 272 
+b9ind3, +b, oind4, +b, jnd5, + 
where (I) 0 DR = change of Debt ratio; 
(2) Se 1- In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing); Set - (size)/(total assets); 
(3)Dummy Rating= 6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; -3 if BBB; =2if BB; -1 if B; =0 for all the other lower 
ratings; 
(4)Size = firm size = Ln(total assets); 
(5)Cc = cost of capital using WACC method; 
(6)Sp - spread between 10-year and 1-year government bond; 
(7)In - volatility of I-year interest rate; 
(8)Dummy indl, =I if the issuer belongs to Auto industry, -0 otherwise; Dummy Ind 2, -I if the issuer belongs to 
Banks, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind3, =I if the issuer belongs to financial institutions, -0 otherwise; Dummy ind4, +1 
if the issuer belongs to real estates, "0 otherwise; Dummy ind 5ý =I if the issuer belongs to retailers, "0 otherwise. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
'Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
"Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
" "Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t-test. 
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Bad debt provision .. 
Fixed 
Variables Coe. 
(t) 
Coe. 
(t) 
No. of observations 176 176 
Se l 0.0017 
(0.82) 
Se2 0.0077 
(0.81) 
Rating Drooped Dropped 
Size -0.0077 
(-1.07) 
-0.0074 
(-1.04) 
Cc -0.2363 
(-3.85)"' 
-0.2317 
(-3.79)*** 
Sp -0.0068 
(-1.77)' 
-0.0080 
(-2.05)'" 
In -0.0028 
(-0.65) 
-0.0039 
(-0.88) 
In(Banks) Drooped Drooped 
_cons 
0.1306 
(1.03) 
0.1343 
(1.05) 
F 4.85 4.85 
Within- R2 
0.1717 0.1716 
Cross- R2 
0.1012 0.0968 
Overall- R2 
0.0680 0.0635 
Prob. 0.0005 0.0005 
EBDP, - co +c, 
Se,, +c2Rating, +c3Size,, +c4Cc +c5Sp +c6In,, +c, indl, +gind2, I =1,2....... 176. 
+c ind3, +c1oind4, +c1oind5, +Q,, 
where (1) A BDP = change of bad debt provision ratio; 
(2) SeI = In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing); Se2 - (size)/(total assets); 
(3)Dummy Rating= 6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; =3 if BBB; =2if BB; -1 if B; -0 for all the other lower 
ratings; 
(4)Size = firm size = Ln(total assets); (5)Cc = cost of capital using WACC method; 
(6)Sp = spread between 10-year and 1-year government bond; 
(7)In = volatility of 1-year interest rate; 
(8)Dummy ßnd 1, =I if the issuer belongs to Auto industry, -0 otherwise; Dummy lnd 21 -1 if the issuer belongs to 
Banks, otherwise; Dummy MO, =1 if the issuer belongs to financial institutions, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind 4, -I 
if the issuer belongs to real estates, 0 otherwise; Dummy ind51 =1 if the issuer belongs to retailers, r0 otherwise. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
"Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
"'Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t-test. 
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Appendix 6.1: AR calculated using constant mean model 
The estimation window is taken as 200 day period from t= 250 to t= - 51. The 
following 52 days (-50 through +1) are designated as the event window The event 
day is on the pricing date (t = 0) plus the date prior to the pricing date (t = -1). 
AR= R; t- R; ,t= "50,..., +1. 
Where AR; t=abnormal return of stock i on day t, 
R; t observed return of stock i on day t, 
_ -51 R, 
.= mean return on security 
i=1ZR,, 
200 ra-25o 
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Appendix 6.2: Shapiro-Wilk test 
Variable Observation w V Z Prob>Z 
fsi 542 0.5297 170.152 12.392 0.0000 
fs2 542 0.5417 165.798 12.330 0.0000 
ier, 542 0.6074 142.051 11.957 0.0000 
Sel 542 0.9560 15.937 6.679 0.0000 
Se2 542 0.2780 261.236 13.427 0.0000 
fe 542 0.9957 1.574 1.095 0.1368 
rating 542 0.9191 29.258 8.145 0.0000 
g 542 0.6830 114.693 11.441 0.0000 
fcf 542 0.7254 99.355 11.095 0.0000 
W is the ratio of best estimator of the variance to the usual corrected sum of squares estimator of the variance. 
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Appendix 6.3: T -test results for AAR in different methods of whole sample. 
Mean model: 
AR; tR1 - R,, t=-50,..., +1; 
R, = mean return on security i= 200 
R;, 
r= 250 
Market model: 
AR,, R - R., 9t= -70,... +30. 
Mean Model Market Model 
AAR -0.01% 0.02% 
(-0.51) (2.03) ** 
CAAR -0.04% 0.16% 
(-0.59) (1.93) * 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
**Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t-test. 
219 
Appendix 6.4: Results of regressions in different terms (full sample) , 
W Mixed term 
Variables Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. 
W t (t t t t t t 
Fs 1 0.0034 0.0034 0.0049 0.0048 
(1.35) (1.34) (1.77) (1.77) 
Fs2 0.0030 0.0030 0.0046 0.0047 
(1.18) (1.19) (1.67) (1.71) 
ier 0.0408 0.0414 0.0163 0.0165 0.0133 0.0135 -0.0493 -0.0503 
(0.89) 0.90 (0.33) (0.33) (0.23) (0.24) -0,74 -0.75 
Se l 0.0033 0.0033 0.0020 0.0020 
(1.27) (1.27) (0.80) (0.78) 
Set 0.0129 0.0130 0.0183 0.0186 
(1.36) (1.37) (1,77) (1.81) 
Fe -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0007 
-0.12 -0.06 419 -0.14 -0.13 406 (-0.16) (. 009) 
Rating -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0012 -0.0011 
-0.33 -0.29 (-0.10) -0.07 -0.47 445 436 -0,37 
Mtb(market-to-book -0.0062 -0.0062 -0.0063 -0.0063 -0.0059 -0.0059 -0.0061 -0.0062 
value) (-2.68) (-2.70) (-2.75) (-2.77) (. 2.48) (-2.49) (-2.59) (-2.61) 
r. " r"r "rr """ "r" """ """ """ 
Fcf(free-cash-flow) -0.0137 -0.0138 -0.0130 -0.0131 -0.0193 -0.0200 -0.0195 -0.0203 
(-3.98) (-3.96) (-3.88) (-3.87) (-3.93) (4,11) (-3.99) (-4.18) 
"rr rrr rrr rr" rrr """ """ """ 
InI(Auto) -0.0345 -0.0343 -0.0277 -0.0274 -0.0433 -0.0431 -0.0393 -0.0394 
(-1.12) -1.11 -0.90 -0.89 (. 1.35) -1.34 -1.24 -1.24 
1n2(Banks) -0.0054 -0.0064 0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0112 -0.0124 -0.0095 -0.0107 
-0.21 -0.25 0.01 -0.03 -0.42 -0.46 -0.36 . 1.40 1n3(Fin. lns. ) -0.0180 -0.0186 -0.0139 -0.0145 -0.0222 -0.0231 -0.0203 -0.0212 
-0.70 -0.72 -0.55 (-0.57) -0.84 (. 0.87) -0.77 (. 080) 
1n4(R. Estate) -0.0468 -0.0472 -0.0466 -0.0470 -0.0494 -0.0496 -0.0509 -0,0512 
(-1.54) (-1.55) (-1.54) (-1.55) (-1.59) (. 1.59) (-1.64) ("1.65) 
1n5(Retailer) 0.0242 0.0241 0.0214 0.0213 0.0225 0.0226 0.0159 0.0159 
0.85 (0.85) (0.75) (0.74) (0.78) (0.78) (0.54) 0,54 
Asl(CDO-ABS) -0.0118 -0.0111 -0.0155 -0.0149 -0.0157 -0.0152 -0.0183 -0.0178 
(-1.19) (-1.13) (-1.60) (-1.55) (-1.50) (-1.54) (-1.89) (-1.83) 
As2(CMBS) -0.0133 -0.0128 -0.0140 -0.0135 -0.0142 -0.0138 -0.0152 -0.0148 
(. 1.37) -1.31 -1.44 (-1.39) -1.47 -1.43 (. 1.57) (. 1.54) 
As3(RMBS) -0.0245 -0.0241 -0.0249 -0.0244 -0.0224 -0.0218 -0.0232 -0.0226 
(-2.74) (-2.69) (-2.76) (-2.72) (-2.49) (-2.43) (-2.58) (-2.53) 
rr" rr" rrr ""r "" "r """ """ 
cons 0.0185 0.0183 0.0339 0.0336 0.0328 0.0327 0.0456 0.0434 
(0.56) (0.55) (1.10) (1.09) (0.95) (0.95) 1.42 1.41 
F 3.85 3.82 3.86 3.84 3.94 3.92 4.13 4.11 
R2 0.0989 0.0981 0.0993 0.0986 0.1011 0.1005 0.1053 0.1050 
Adjusted R2 0.0732 0.0724 0.0736 
0.0729 0.0755 0.0748 0.0798 0.0793 
This table explains wealth effects of asset securitization originators from the regression containing full sample of 542 issues: 
CAAR, (+1, +10)= yo+y1FS, +y2IE, +y3Se, +y4Fe, +ysRaring, +y6Mtb, +y7Fcf, +y5indl, +y, ind2, I-1,2,..... it. 
+ y, oind3, + yllind4, +y12ind5, + y, 3as1, + y,, as2, + y1jas3, +e, 
where 
(1) FSi - Financial slack of security i's issuer = (cash + liquid assets) / Book value of the firm +( average debt ratio In the 
industry - firm's debt ratio) _ (C+CA)BV + (Da - Df) FS I- (C+CA)B V; FS2= (C+CA)B V+ (Da - DO; (2) NIET = interest-expanse ratio = interest payment on loan! loan; 
(3) Se I= In (size) = In (original issuing funds of each ABS issuing); Set - (size)/(total assets); 
(4) Dummy Fei =1 if the originator has issued more than 5 times during 1994-2005; -0 otherwise; 
(5) Dummy Rating= 6 if Moody's rating is AAA; 5 if AA; =4 if A; -3 if BBB; -2if BB; -1 if B; -0 for all the other lower 
ratings; 
(6) mtbl = MTBV; mtb2 - (unadjusted share price)/(book value per share); 
(7) fcf = (Operating income - taxes - interests - dividends paid)/(market value of equity); 
220 
(8) Dummy ind 1, =1 if the issuer belongs to Auto industry, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind2, -1 if the issuer belongs to 
Banks, =0 otherwise; Dummy ind3, a1 if the issuer belongs to financial institutions, =0 otherwise; Dummy Jnd 4, "I 
if the issuer belongs to real estates, 0 otherwise; Dummy ind51 a1 if the issuer belongs to retailers, -0 otherwise; 
(9) Dummy aSI, =I for CDO, 0 otherwise; Dummy as2, -1 for CMBS, =0 otherwise; Dummy as3, -1 for 
RMBS, =0 otherwise. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two tailed t-test. 
'Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two tailed t-test. 
" "Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed t-test 
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